scholarly journals A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (16) ◽  
pp. 1983
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez ◽  
Naila Hayek ◽  
Peter M. Kort
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Production Capacity ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Feedback Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Clean Environment ◽  
Time Differential ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

This paper studies a discrete-time dynamic duopoly game with homogenous goods. Both firms have to decide on investment where investment increases production capacity so that they are able to put a larger quantity on the market. The downside, however, is that a larger quantity raises pollution. The firms have multiple objectives in the sense that each one maximizes the discounted profit stream and appreciates a clean environment as well. We obtain some surprising results. First, where it is known from the continuous-time differential game literature that firms invest more under a feedback information structure compared to an open-loop one, we detect scenarios where the opposite holds. Second, in a feedback Nash equilibrium, capital stock is more sensitive to environmental appreciation than in the open-loop case.

State-Feedback Zero-Sum Dynamic Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
State Feedback ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Finite State ◽  
Solution Methods ◽  
Zero Sum

This chapter focuses on the computation of the saddle-point equilibrium of a zero-sum discrete time dynamic game in a state-feedback policy. It begins by considering solution methods for two-player zero sum dynamic games in discrete time, assuming a finite horizon stage-additive cost that Player 1 wants to minimize and Player 2 wants to maximize, and taking into account a state feedback information structure. The discussion then turns to discrete time dynamic programming, the use of MATLAB to solve zero-sum games with finite state spaces and finite action spaces, and discrete time linear quadratic dynamic games. The chapter concludes with a practice exercise that requires computing the cost-to-go for each state of the tic-tac-toe game, and the corresponding solution.

One-Player Differential Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical System ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
State Feedback ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Termination Time

This chapter focuses on one-player continuous time dynamic games, that is, the optimal control of a continuous time dynamical system. It begins by considering a one-player continuous time differential game in which the (only) player wants to minimize either using an open-loop policy or a state-feedback policy. It then discusses continuous time cost-to-go, with the following conclusion: regardless of the information structure considered (open loop, state feedback, or other), it is not possible to obtain a cost lower than cost-to-go. It also explores continuous time dynamic programming, linear quadratic dynamic games, and differential games with variable termination time before concluding with a practice exercise and the corresponding solution.

One-Player Dynamic Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Discrete Time Dynamical System ◽  
Solution Methods ◽  
The Cost

This chapter focuses on one-player discrete time dynamic games, that is, the optimal control of a discrete time dynamical system. It first considers solution methods for one-player dynamic games, which are simple optimizations, before discussing discrete time cost-to-go. It shows that, regardless of the information structure (open loop, state feedback or other), it is not possible to obtain a cost lower than the cost-to-go. A computationally efficient recursive technique that can be used to compute the cost-to-go is dynamic programming. After providing an overview of discrete time dynamic programming, the chapter explores the complexity of computing the cost-to-go at all stages, the use of MATLAB to solve finite one-player games, and linear quadratic dynamic games. It concludes with a practice exercise and the corresponding solution, along with an additional exercise.

scholarly journals Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Kańska ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Sticky Prices ◽  
Infinite Time ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Stackelberg Duopoly

AbstractIn this paper, we study a model of a market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg model with a myopic follower and infinite time horizon of Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform a comprehensive analysis of the equilibria instead of concentrating on the steady state only. We study both the equilibria for open loop and feedback information structure, which turn out to coincide, and we compare the results with the results for Cournot-Nash equilibria.

State-Feedback Zero-Sum Differential Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Saddle Point ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
State Feedback ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Saddle Point Equilibrium

This chapter focuses on the computation of the saddle-point equilibrium of a zero-sum continuous time dynamic game in a state-feedback policy. It begins by considering the solution for two-player zero sum dynamic games in continuous time, assuming a finite horizon integral cost that Player 1 wants to minimize and Player 2 wants to maximize, and taking into account a state feedback information structure. Continuous time dynamic programming can also be used to construct saddle-point equilibria in state-feedback policies. The discussion then turns to continuous time linear quadratic dynamic games and the use of dynamic programming to construct a saddle-point equilibrium in a state-feedback policy for a two-player zero sum differential game with variable termination time. The chapter also describes pursuit-evasion games before concluding with a practice exercise and the corresponding solution.

Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fouad El Ouardighi ◽  
Gary Erickson ◽  
Dieter Grass ◽  
Steffen Jørgensen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
The State ◽  
Current State ◽  
Marketing Activities ◽  
Purchase Rate ◽  
The Impact

The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key operational and marketing activities related to a single product in the supply chain. The manufacturer sets a production rate and the rate of advertising efforts while the retailer chooses a purchase rate and the consumer price. The state of the game is summarized in the firms’ backlogs and the manufacturer’s advertising goodwill. Depending on whether the supply chain members have and share state information, they may either make decisions contingent on the current state of the game (feedback Nash strategy), or precommit to a plan of action during the whole game (open-loop Nash strategy). Given a contract type, the impact of the availability of information regarding the state of the game on the firms’ decisions and payoffs is investigated. It is shown that double marginalization can be better mitigated if the supply chain members adopt a contingent strategy under a wholesale price contract and a commitment strategy under a revenue sharing contract.

Single Item Lot Sizing Models with Bounded Inventory and Remanufacturing

2010 ◽  
Vol 102-104 ◽  
pp. 791-795
Author(s):  
Neng Min Wang ◽  
Zheng Wen He ◽  
Qiu Shuang Zhang ◽  
Lin Yan Sun
Keyword(s):  
Lot Sizing ◽  
Dynamic Programming Algorithm ◽  
Production Capacity ◽  
Planning Horizon ◽  
Programming Algorithm ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Lot Sizing Problem ◽  
Dynamic Lot Sizing ◽  
Finite Planning Horizon

Dynamic lot sizing problem for systems with bounded inventory and remanufacturing was addressed. The demand and return amounts are deterministic over the finite planning horizon. Demands can be satisfied by manufactured new items, but also by remanufactured returned items. In production planning, there can be situations where the ability to meet customer demands is constrained by inventory capacity rather than production capacity. Two different limited inventory capacities are considered; there is either bounded serviceables inventory or bounded returns inventory. For the two inventory case, we present exact, polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm based on the idea of Teunter R, et al. (2006).

scholarly journals Kontribusi Private Investment Dan Belanja Modal Pemerintah Terhadap Nilai Tambah Ekonomi Dan Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja Kab/Kota Hight Economic Di Provinsi Jawa Timur (Kota Surabaya, Kota Kediri, Kab.Sidoarjo, Kab.Gresik)

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Didin Fatihudin
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Production Capacity ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Private Investment ◽  
Economic Value Added ◽  
Determinants Of Economic Growth ◽  
Capital Intensive

AbstractThe accumulation of capital in one of the determinants of economic growth factors in addition to the economic potential and population. Private investment and government capital expenditure is the implementation of capital accumulation then spent again to enlarge the production capacity and increase asset value. This study gives an overview of how the contribution of private investment and government capital expenditure of district/city economic hight on economic value added and employment in the province of East Java. District/city Surabaya, Kediri, Sidoarjo and Gresik selected from 38 districts/cities in East Java Province. The method of research used samples expost Pacto and purposive sampling techniques. Data obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Investment Coordinating Board and the Finance Bureau of East Java Governor's Office for five years from 2002 to 2006. Data processing is done manually assisted with Excel and SPSS software program. The results showed that the change in private investment and government capital spending districts / cities have contributed to the change in economic value added and the employment / town in East Java. Private investment and government capital expenditure is very important to increase economic activities in the region. Economic growth districts / cities that use capital-intensive approach (capital intensive) will not be able to absorb labor and expansion of new jobs as experienced Kediri, unless economic growth with labor-intensive approaches (labor intensive).

scholarly journals Comparative analysis of collaborative and simulation based learning in the management environment

Organizacija ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 236-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirjana Kljajić Borštnar
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Collaborative Problem Solving ◽  
Loop Model ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Collaborative Problem ◽  
Collaborative Environment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Business Politics ◽  
Simulation Based

Purpose of the study is to compare two different approaches to the collaborative problem solving one in a highly controlled laboratory experiment: Optimisation of business politics using business simulator at different experimental condition which reflect different feedback information structure and one in a collaborative environment of the social media, characterised by non-structured, rule-free and even chaotic feedback information. Comparative analyses of participant’s opinion who participate in experiments have been considered in order to find common characteristics relevant for group/collaborative problem solving. Based on these findings a general explanatory causal loop model of collaborative learning during problem solving was built.

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