scholarly journals The Different Meanings of Land in the Age of Neoliberalism: Theoretical Reflections on Commons and Resilience Grabbing from a Social Anthropological Perspective

Land ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haller
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Political Ecology ◽  
Land Tenure ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
The State ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Land Acquisitions ◽  
The Commons

Recent debates in social anthropology on land acquisitions highlight the need to go further back in history in order to analyse their impacts on local livelihoods. The debate over the commons in economic and ecological anthropology helps us understand some of today’s dynamics by looking at precolonial common property institutions and the way they were transformed by Western colonization to state property and then, later in the age of neoliberalism, to privatization and open access. This paper focuses on Africa and refers to the work of critical scholars who show that traditional land tenure was misinterpreted as customary tenure without full property rights, while a broader literature on the commons shows that common-pool resources (pasture, fisheries, wildlife, forestry etc.) have been effectively managed by locally-developed common property institutions. This misinterpretation continues to function as a legacy in both juridical and popular senses. Moreover, the transformation of political systems and the notion of customary land tenure produced effects of central importance for today’s investment context. During colonial times a policy of indirect rule based on new elites was created to manage customary lands of so-called native groups who could use the land as long as it was of no value to the state. However, this land formally remained in the hands of the state, which also claimed to manage common-pool resources through state institutions. The neoliberal policies that are now demanded by donor agencies have had two consequences for land and land-related common-pool resources. On the one hand, states often lack the financial means to enforce their own natural resource legislation and this has led to de facto open access. On the other hand, land legally fragmented from its common-pool resources has been transformed from state to private property. This has enabled new elites and foreign investors to claim private property on formerly commonly-held land, which also leads to the loss of access to land related common-pool resources for more marginal local actors. Thus, the paper argues that this process does not just lead to land grabbing but to commons grabbing as well. This has furthermore undermined the resilience and adaptive capacity of local populations because access to common-pool resources is vital for the livelihoods of more marginal groups, especially in times of crisis. Comparative studies undertaken on floodplains in Botswana, Cameroon, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia based on a New Institutional Political Ecology (NIPE) approach illustrate this process and its impacts and show how institutional transformations are key to understanding the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) and investments in Africa.

scholarly journals The Position and the Development Trends Private Property and Common Property

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Quang Duc
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
The Commons

The issue of the relationship between private property and common property has engaged both legal and economic scholars in a long series of controversies over the meaning, the sequence of development, and the superiority of private vs. common property. The issues debated relate to the efficiency, equity and sustainability of private property as contrasted to common property. Many scholars think of contemporary examples of common property as remnants of the past, likely to disappear during the twenty-first century. Recent research, however, has challenged the presumption that private property is necessarily superior to common property. Keywords: Private property, common property, open access regimes. References: [1] Grossi, Paolo (1981), An Alternative to Private Property; Collective Property in the Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.[2] Maine, Henry Sumner (1963), Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas; With Introduction and Notes by Frederick Pollack, Boston: Beacon Press (reprint of 1861 ed.), p. 252.[3] North, Douglass C. and Robert Paul Thomas (1976), The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, London: Cambridge University Press.[4] North, C. Douglass, L. Terry Anderson, and J. Peter Hill (1983), Growth and Welfare in the American Past: A New Economic History, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.[5] W.P. Welch, “The political feasibility of full ownership property rights: The cases of pollution and fisheries”, Policy Sciences, (1983), 16, 165-80.[6] Ostrom, Vincent, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, 3rd ed., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press (2008).[7] North, C. Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press (1990).[8] Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 29/11/2007, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=sul (truy cập lần cuối: 31/03/2019).[9] Ciriacy-Wantrup, V. Siegfried and C. Richard. Bishop (1975), “Common property” as a concept in natural resource policy, Natural Resources Journal, 15, 713-727.[10] Báo Pháp luật (điện tử): https://plo.vn/thoi-su/dai-bieu-lo-dan-het-duoc-tu-do-tam-bien-o-phu-quoc-774398.html (truy cập lần cuối: 05/04/2019).[11] Báo Tuổi Trẻ (điện tử): https://tuoitre.vn/khong-the-chap-nhan-tinh-trang-lay-bien-lam-cua-rieng-2018110711421466.htm (truy cập lần cuối: 05/04/2019.[12] Dales, H. John (1968), Pollution, Property, and Prices: An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.[13] Higgs, Robert (1996), “Legally induced technical regress in the Washington salmon fishery”, in L. J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, and Douglass North (eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, New York: Cambridge University Press.[14] Johnson, N. Ronald and D. Gary Libecap (1982), “Contracting problems and regulation: The case of the fishery”, American Economic Review, 72, 1005-1022.[15] Wiersma, L. Lindsey (2005), “Indigenous lands as cultural property: A new approach to indigenous land claims”, Duke Law Journal, 54, 1061-1088.[16] Ostrom, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (1977), “A theory for institutional analysis of common pool problems”, in Garrett Hardin and John Baden (eds), Managing the Commons, San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, pp. 157-172.[17] Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker (1994), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.[18] Feeny, David, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay, and James M. Acheson (1990), “The tragedy of the commons: Twenty-two years later”, Human Ecology, 18, 1-19.[19] Bromley, Daniel W. (1992), “The commons, common property, and environmental policy”, 2 Environmental and Resource Economics, 1-17.[20] Singh, Katar (1994), Managing Common Pool Resources: Principles and Case Studies, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. [21] Singh, Katar and Vishwa Ballabh (1996), Cooperative Management of Natural Resources, New Delhi: Sage.[22] Blomquist, William and Elinor Ostrom (1985), “Institutional capacity and the resolution of a commons dilemma”, Policy Studies Review, 5, 383-393.[23] Lueck, Dean (1995), “The rule of first possession and the design of the law”, Journal of Law and Economics, 38, 393-436.[24] Ghoshal, Sumantra and Peter Moran (1996), “Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory”, Academy of Management Review, 21, 13-47.[25] Putterman, Louis (1995), Markets, hierarchies, and information: On a paradox in the economics of organization”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26, 373-390.[26] Seabright, Paul (1993), “Managing local commons: Theoretical issues in incentive design”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 113-134.  

scholarly journals Emergent sustainability in open property regimes

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (51) ◽  
pp. 12859-12867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Moritz ◽  
Roy Behnke ◽  
Christine M. Beitl ◽  
Rebecca Bliege Bird ◽  
Rafael Morais Chiaravalloti ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Resource Use ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Social Ecological Systems ◽  
Social Ecological ◽  
Sustainable Resource Use ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Property Regimes

Current theoretical models of the commons assert that common-pool resources can only be managed sustainably with clearly defined boundaries around both communities and the resources that they use. In these theoretical models, open access inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. However, in many open-access systems, use of common-pool resources seems to be sustainable over the long term (i.e., current resource use does not threaten use of common-pool resources for future generations). Here, we outline the conditions that support sustainable resource use in open property regimes. We use the conceptual framework of complex adaptive systems to explain how processes within and couplings between human and natural systems can lead to the emergence of efficient, equitable, and sustainable resource use. We illustrate these dynamics in eight case studies of different social–ecological systems, including mobile pastoralism, marine and freshwater fisheries, swidden agriculture, and desert foraging. Our theoretical framework identifies eight conditions that are critical for the emergence of sustainable use of common-pool resources in open property regimes. In addition, we explain how changes in boundary conditions may push open property regimes to either common property regimes or a tragedy of the commons. Our theoretical model of emergent sustainability helps us to understand the diversity and dynamics of property regimes across a wide range of social–ecological systems and explains the enigma of open access without a tragedy. We recommend that policy interventions in such self-organizing systems should focus on managing the conditions that are critical for the emergence and persistence of sustainability.

scholarly journals Innovative Management of Common-Pool Resources by Smart Contracts

2020 ◽  
pp. 265-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prause Gunnar ◽  
Hoffmann Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Sustainable Logistics ◽  
Legal Perspective

The access to common-pool resources, i.e. to resources in limited common property, are legally distributed in a far more diverse way than limited private property resources. In transportation, a critical case for common-pool resources appear in Green Transport Corridors (GTC), that has been coined by European Union as being «sustainable logistics solutions for cargo transportation’ with a shared pool of resources aiming for multimodal trans-shipment routes with a concentration of freight traffic between significant hubs». Although there are already existing implementations of GTC concepts, there are still a lot of open questions concerning GTC governance and ownership models hindering easy marketing of the GTC approach. This paper discusses how and to which extent smart contracts in combination with blockchain technology as innovative solutions are able to facilitate GTC governance and how smart contracts can be applied to provide legal certainty by managing and allocating distributed access to common-pool resources. Smart contracts can be considered as computerised transaction protocols for the execution of underlying legal contracts, and they do not only target reducing transaction costs by realising trackable and irreversible transactions through blockchain technology for distributed databases, but also show high potential to strengthen cooperative business structures and to facilitate the entrepreneurial collaboration of cross-organisational business processes. From a legal perspective, it is controversial whether the use of smart contracts to distribute access to resources in terms of both general common-pool resources. GTCs implies an added value automatically for legal certainty and fair balance among different forms and degrees of access granted to different members of the cooperative. In cases of incorrect performance, change of circumstances or unduly induced contracts smart contracts fall considerably short on the protection of weaker parties, which the paper illustrates at the example of GTCs to be a decisive detriment of the cooperative members. The paper analyses these potentials and risks of smart contracts for the case of GTCs and showcases from both business and legal perspective in terms of their potential as viable means of distributing access to common-pool resources comprising infrastructure. Keywords common-pool resources, cooperative governance, blockchain, smart contracts, Green Transport Corridors.

Commoning or being commoned? Institutions, politics, and the role of the state in collective housing policy in Bangkok, Thailand

2021 ◽  
pp. 147309522110373
Author(s):  
Hayden Shelby
Keyword(s):  
Land Tenure ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
The State ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Slum Upgrading ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Collective Housing ◽  
Urban Commons ◽  
Active Promoter

This article theorizes the potential roles of the state in the urban commons through an analysis of a slum upgrading program in Thailand that employs collective forms of land tenure. In examining the transformation of the program from a grassroots movement to a “best practice” policy, the article demonstrates how the state has expanded from mere enabler of the commons to active promoter. In the process, the role of many residents has evolved from actively creating the institutions of collective governance— commoning—to adopting institutions prescribed by the state— being commoned. However, by comparing the work to two different groups of communities who work within the context of the policy, the article illustrates how active commoning can still take place in such contexts.

Impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on common-pool resources

2019 ◽  
pp. 257-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Giger ◽  
Kerstin Nolte ◽  
Ward Anseeuw ◽  
Thomas Breu ◽  
Wytske Chamberlain ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Land Acquisitions ◽  
Large Scale Land

The Neoliberal State

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harvey
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Free Markets ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Political Form

The role of the state in neoliberal theory is reasonably easy to define. The practice of neoliberalization has, however, evolved in such a way as to depart significantly from the template that theory provides. The somewhat chaotic evolution and uneven geographical development of state institutions, powers, and functions over the last thirty years suggests, furthermore, that the neoliberal state may be an unstable and contradictory political form. According to theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs. By extension, the freedom of businesses and corporations (legally regarded as individuals) to operate within this institutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good. Private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to innovation and wealth creation. Intellectual property rights are protected (for example through patents) so as to encourage technological changes. Continuous increases in productivity should then deliver higher living standards to everyone. Under the assumption that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, or of ‘trickle down’, neoliberal theory holds that the elimination of poverty (both domestically and worldwide) can best be secured through free markets and free trade. Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in seeking the privatization of assets. The absence of clear private property rights––as in many developing countries––is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and the improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered the best way to protect against the socalled ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly super-exploit common property resources such as land and water).

scholarly journals The Anti-Politics Machine of Green Energy Development: The Moroccan Solar Project in Ouarzazate and Its Impact on Gendered Local Communities

Land ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryser
Keyword(s):  
Solar Energy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Green Energy ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
The Government ◽  
Land Water

The Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) established one of the largest solar energy projects in the world through a public–private partnership. It is on communal land previously owned by a Moroccan Amazigh (Berber) clan in the Ghessate rural council area, 10 km away from Ouarzazate. The land for the energy project comprises a surface area of more than 3000 hectares. This large-scale land acquisition has led to the loss of access to common-pool resources (land, water, and plants), which were formerly managed by local common property institutions, due to its enclosure, and the areas themselves. This paper outlines how the framing of the low value of land by national elites, the state administration, MASEN, and the subsequent discourses of development, act as an anti-politics machine to hide the loss of land and land-related common-pool resources, and thus an attack on resilience—we call it in our scientific discipline a process of ‘resilience grabbing’, especially for women. As a form of compensation for the land losses, economic livelihood initiatives have been introduced for local people based on the funds from the sale of the land and revenue from the solar energy project Noor Ouarzazate. The loss of land representing the ‘old’ commons is—in the official discourse—legitimated by what the government and the parastatal company call the development-related ‘fruits of growth’, and should serve as ‘new forms of commons’ to the local communities. The investment therefore acts as a catalyst through which natural resources (land, water, and plants) are institutionally transformed into new monetary resources that local actors are said to be able to access, under specific conditions, to sustain their livelihood. There are, however, pertinent questions of access (i.e., inclusion and exclusion), regulation, and equality of opportunities for meeting the different livelihood conditions previously supported by the ‘old’ commons.

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