scholarly journals Signalling, Information and Consumer Fraud

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Silvia Martinez-Gorricho
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Market Price ◽  
High Price ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Quality Product ◽  
Parameter Values

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers’ imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in the market can be of two exogenously given qualities and it is common knowledge that the consumer is not willing to pay a high price for a low quality product. A low quality seller chooses to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price). We show that equilibria involving fraud exist for all parameter values. Furthermore, for some parameter values, we find that -in equilibrium- a higher precision of consumers’ private information leads to higher levels of fraud and incidence of fraud, reducing consumers’ welfare. We provide conditions for the public revelation of consumers’ private information to be a Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals FLUKTUASI HARGA IKAN CAKALANG (Katsuwonus pelamis L) SEGAR DI PASAR “BERSEHATI” KOTA MANADO PROPINSI SULAWESI UTARA

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olvie V. Kotambunan
Keyword(s):  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Market Price ◽  
High Price ◽  
Social Unit ◽  
Katsuwonus Pelamis ◽  
Price Fluctuations ◽  
Intensive Investigation

Abstract This study aims to determine the cause of fluctuations in the market price of tuna "Bersehati". The importance of the role of marketing as a key achievement of the goals and targets of fisheries, it is necessary to conduct research related to the field of marketing, as well as by looking at the fluctuations in the price of marketing, this research is more focused on price fluctuations in market held fish "Bersehati" City Manado. Research methods used in this field practice is a case study, namely an intensive investigation of a person or an individual, is also a social unit. Data were analyzed descriptively. Descriptive analysis was to provide an overview and analysis of the information by using the author's own words, in a systematic and easily understood in accordance with the data that has been obtained. Further discussion or interpreted to provide a review of the data. Based on the results of the study and discussion of a number of conclusions as follows : 1) fluctuations in the market price of fish "Bersehati" caused by variations in the number and type of fish on offer ; 2) In terms of supply, price fluctuations occurring in the tuna market "Bersehati" Manado is caused by the influence of fishing season, and the influence of technology ; 3) in terms of demand, price fluctuations caused by the influence of tuna consumer income, prices of other goods influence and shape the market, 4) the high price of fish occur on Tuesdays and Saturdays, and 5) Form of “Bersehati” market is an oligopoly, where retailers play an important role in the determination of the market price of fish. Keywords: tuna, descriptive, prices, fluctuations   Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan mengetahui penyebab terjadinya fluktuasi harga ikan cakalang dipasar bersehati. Pentingnya peranan pemasaran sebagai kunci keberhasilan pencapaian tujuan dan sasaran pembangunan perikanan, maka dirasakan perlu untuk mengadakan penelitian sehubungan dengan bidang pemasaran, serta dengan melihat adanya fluktuasi harga dalam pemasaran, maka penelititan ini lebih difokuskan pada fluktuasi harga ikan yang dilaksanakan di pasar Bersehati Kota Manado. Metode Penelitian yang digunakan dalam praktek kerja lapang ini adalah metode studi kasus, yaitu suatu penyelidikan intensif tentang seseorang atau individu, juga suatu unit sosial. Data yang diperoleh dianalisis secara deskriptif. Analisis deskriptif yaitu analisis dengan memberikan gambaran serta keterangan dengan menggunakan kalimat penulis sendiri, secara sistematis dan mudah dimengerti sesuai dengan data yang telah diperoleh. Selanjutnya diinterpretasi untuk memberikan bahasan atau kajian terhadap data.Berdasarkan hasil penelitian dan pembahasan dapat ditarik beberapa kesimpulan sebagai berikut : 1) Fluktuasi harga ikan di Pasar Bersehati disebabkan oleh adanya variasi jumlah dan jenis ikan yang ditawarkan ; 2) Dari segi penawaran, fluktuasi harga ikan cakalang yang terjadi di Pasar Bersehati Manado disebabkan oleh pengaruh musim penangkapan, dan pengaruh teknologi ; 3) Dari segi permintaan, fluktuasi harga ikan cakalang disebabkan oleh pengaruh pendapatan konsumen, pengaruh harga barang lain, dan bentuk pasar ; 4) Harga ikan tinggi terjadi pada hari selasa dan sabtu ; danan 5) Bentuk pasar bersehati adalah oligopoli, dimana pedagang eceran memegang peranan penting dalam penetuan harga ikan yang dipasarkan. Kata Kunci : ikan cakalang, deskriptif, harga, fluktuatif

Common Knowledge and Cheap Talk in Democratic Discourse and Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-164
Author(s):  
Richard R. W. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Communication ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
The Public ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Key Aspects

This commentary illuminates key aspects of Shiffrin’s view by appeal to concrete examples and notions from game theory. It underscores the role of law as a means for the public communication of moral commitments by invoking the idea of common knowledge. Our commitments must be known to be shared, that knowledge itself must be known to be shared, and so on ad infinitum. This offers a perspective on the importance of common law from a democratic framework: common law can be seen as a mechanism for generating common knowledge about disputes and their resolution. The commentary invokes another game-theoretic notion, that of the contrast between cheap talk and costly signaling, to illuminate Shiffrin’s discussion of constitutional balancing. Where the interests of speaker and addressee are not aligned, cheap talk lacks credibility, and this is something to which courts need to be sensitive in balancing state and constitutional interests.

scholarly journals Consumer Response and Their Level of Satisfaction towards Nepalese Coffee

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-216
Author(s):  
Yogendra Kumar Karki ◽  
Punya Prasad Regmi
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Consumer Response ◽  
High Price ◽  
Satisfaction Level ◽  
Level Of Satisfaction ◽  
Increasing Trend

Coffee is important beverages of Nepalese farming society having export potentiality for its unique characteristics as majority of coffee are grown in different microclimates with organic in nature. Production of coffee and its plantation area is in increasing trend every year. In the same situation individuals taste is changing towards coffee than other beverages and are forced to buy from different countries to meet the demand of coffee neglecting quality of Nepalese coffee. There is important role of different actors in coffee value chain and consumers play important role as they decide on the value of coffee serving after various step of processing. This study was done in Kathmandu and Lalitpur districts of Nepal to know the preferences and satisfaction level of coffee consumers. Majority of the consumers were satisfied with foreign coffee and they prefer foreign coffee mostly due to high price of Nepalese coffee and also due to lack of awareness on Nepalese coffee. Foreign peoples were found to prefer foreign coffee in comparison to Nepalese coffee (χ²= 23.02***) and generally drink three cup per day (χ²= 13.67***) while Nepalese consumer drink two cup of coffee per day on an average. The survey showed that high market price for Nepalese coffee is major reason for less consumption of Nepalese coffee.Int J Appl Sci Biotechnol, Vol 4(2): 213-216

scholarly journals The dual role of equilibrium price in competitive economies with asymmetric information

2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (178-179) ◽  
pp. 7-43
Author(s):  
Dejan Trifunovic
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Dual Role ◽  
Walrasian Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Rational Expectations Equilibrium ◽  
Relative Scarcity

This paper analyses equilibrium in competitive markets with asymmetrically informed agents. In contrast to Walrasian equilibrium, where equilibrium price is only an indicator of relative scarcity, in the models studied in this paper equilibrium price has two additional roles. It conveys and aggregates the private information of agents in the economy. Each agent infers the private information of other agents by studying the equilibrium price. This implies that agents in this setting have higher cognitive capabilities than Walrasian agents. The equilibrium concept used to describe these additional roles of equilibrium price is called Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).

scholarly journals Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions

1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz
Keyword(s):  
Government Policy ◽  
Major Theme ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
The Public ◽  
Simple Question ◽  
Pareto Improvements ◽  
Made In

[Joseph Stiglitz was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993–95, and chairman of the CEA from 1995 through February 1997.] Today, I want to share with you some of my thoughts about the possibilities and limitations of government. These thoughts are focused around a simple question: Why is it so difficult to implement even Pareto improvements? Working in Washington, I quickly saw that although a few potential changes were strictly Pareto improvements, there were many other changes that would hurt only a small, narrowly defined group (for example, increasing the efficiency of the legal system might hurt lawyers). But if everyone except a narrowly defined special interest group could be shown to benefit, surely the change should be made. In practice, however, “almost everyone” was rarely sufficient in government policy-making and often such near-Pareto improvements did not occur. My major theme will be to provide a set of explanations for why this might be so. I shall put forward four hypotheses in this lecture, each of which provides part of the explanation for the failure in at least one instance of a proposed Pareto improvement. These hypotheses, like much of the literature on government failures, focus on the role of incentives: how misaligned incentives can induce government officials to take actions that are not, in any sense, in the public interest.

Transaction Risk, Derivative Assets, and Equilibrium

2016 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 1650001 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Henry Cao ◽  
Dongyan Ye
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Asset Prices ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
State Variables ◽  
Underlying Asset ◽  
Market State

We describe a rational expectations model in which there is not only asymmetric information about payoffs but also asymmetric information about the preference, proportion and precision of private information of investors. We define this payoff-irrelevant risk as transaction risk, which is described by market state variables unrelated to payoffs. When derivative assets are introduced, the prices of the derivative assets can reveal information about transaction risk. Due to the informational role of derivative-asset prices, introducing derivative assets can increase social welfare and the price of the underlying asset even though no investors are trading in these derivative assets.

Pricing the EpiPen: This is Going to Sting

2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Steenburgh ◽  
Paul M. Hammaker
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Product Line ◽  
High Price ◽  
First Year ◽  
Pharmaceutical Drugs ◽  
Public Controversy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mba Students ◽  
Price Increases

This case examines the public controversy that erupted over the increasingly high price of EpiPens. Mylan Inc. (Mylan), a generic drug maker, bought the EpiPen product line from Merck in 2007. Since that time, the company both invested in marketing to raise awareness for the drug and dramatically increased the price, lifting it from $100 to $600 per two pack in the U.S. In 2016, simmering consumer anger about the high prices of pharmaceutical drugs finally reached a boiling point and a media firestorm ensued. The case challenges students to think about the role of fairness in pricing. How can Mylan justify the dramatic price increases? How can it justify the variation in prices across countries, as an EpiPen is priced at an equivalent of $85 in France? The case challenges students to think about how they would handle a public controversy. The EpiPen case is well suited for students in MBA, MBA for Executives, and executive education programs. For MBA students, it can be placed in first-year marketing, pricing, or marketing communications courses. For executives, it can serve as a vehicle to discuss both ethical issues of pricing and how to handle a public controversy.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information on Price Can Affect Bertrand Duopoly Players with the Gradient-Based Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
S. S. Askar
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Classical Model ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Basins Of Attraction ◽  
Time Step ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Gradient Based ◽  
Parameter Values

We study a Bertrand duopoly game in which firms adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their prices. In this competition, one of the firms knows somehow the price adopted by the other firm next time step. Such asymmetric information of the market price possessed by one firm gives interesting results about its stability in the market. Under such information, we use the bounded rationality mechanism to build the model describing the game at hand. We calculate the equilibrium points of the game and study their stabilities. Using different sets of parameter values, we show that the interior equilibrium point can be destabilized through flip and Neimark–Sacker bifurcations. We compare the region of stability of the proposed model with a classical Bertrand model without asymmetric information. The results show that the proposed game’s map is noninvertible with type Z 0 − Z 2 or Z 1 − Z 3 , while the classical model is of type Z 0 − Z 2 only. This explains the quite complicated basins of attraction given for the proposed map.

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