scholarly journals Quantum Games with Unawareness with Duopoly Problems in View

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 1097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Frąckiewicz ◽  
Jakub Bilski
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Quantum Domain ◽  
Duopoly Model

Playing the Cournot duopoly in the quantum domain can lead to the optimal strategy profile in the case of maximally correlated actions of the players. However, that result can be obtained if the fact that the players play the quantum game is common knowledge among the players. Our purpose is to determine reasonable game outcomes when players’ perceptions about what game is actually played are limited. To this end, we consider a collection consisting of the classical and quantum games that specifies how each player views the game and how each player views the other players’ perceptions of the game. We show that a slight change in how the players perceive the game may considerably affect the result of the game and, in the case of maximally correlated strategies, may vary from the inefficient Nash equilibrium outcome in the classical Cournot duopoly to the Pareto optimal outcome. We complete our work by investigating in the same way the Bertrand duopoly model.

scholarly journals Duopoly price competition with limited capacity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Limited Capacity ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Full Capacity ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Given

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.

scholarly journals On Correlated Equilibria in Marinatto–Weber Type Quantum Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (24) ◽  
pp. 9003
Author(s):  
Piotr Frąckiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
The Other ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Weber Type ◽  
Correlated Equilibria

Players’ choices in quantum game schemes are often correlated by a quantum state. This enables players to obtain payoffs that may not be achievable when classical pure or mixed strategies are used. On the other hand, players’ choices can be correlated due to a classical probability distribution, and if no player benefits by a unilateral deviation from the vector of recommended strategies, the probability distribution is a correlated equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to investigate relation between correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria in the MW-type schemes for quantum games.

A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jidong Chen ◽  
Mark Fey ◽  
W. Ramsay Kristopher
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Agreement Theorems

AbstractVarious well known agreement theorems show that if players have common knowledge of actions and a “veto" action is available to every player, then they cannot agree to forgo a Pareto optimal outcome simply because of private information in settings with unique equilibrium. We establish a nonspeculation theorem which is more general than previous results and is applicable to political and economic situations that generate multiple equilibria. We demonstrate an application of our result to the problem of designing an independent committee free of private persuasion.

scholarly journals Quantum Mean-Field Games with the Observations of Counting Type

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Open Problem ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Existence Of Solutions ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Mean Field Games ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Interesting Open Problem

Quantum games and mean-field games (MFG) represent two important new branches of game theory. In a recent paper the author developed quantum MFGs merging these two branches. These quantum MFGs were based on the theory of continuous quantum observations and filtering of diffusive type. In the present paper we develop the analogous quantum MFG theory based on continuous quantum observations and filtering of counting type. However, proving existence and uniqueness of the solutions for resulting limiting forward-backward system based on jump-type processes on manifolds seems to be more complicated than for diffusions. In this paper we only prove that if a solution exists, then it gives an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N-player quantum game. The existence of solutions is suggested as an interesting open problem.

The Mode of Action of Disulfide Accelerators of Vulcanization

1937 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-163
Author(s):  
W. Langenbeck ◽  
H. C. Rhiem
Keyword(s):  
Organic Compounds ◽  
Mode Of Action ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Inorganic Compounds ◽  
Technical Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rubber Industry ◽  
Organic Catalysis ◽  
Catalytic Power ◽  
Organic Catalysts

Abstract The catalytic power of organic compounds in general has up to the present time been studied much less extensively than that of inorganic compounds. For about the last ten years, however, the first author has, in collaboration with a number of his students, attempted to fill this gap, though so far efforts have been confined to explaining the mode of action of natural enzymes by means of comparative experiments with organic catalysts. As a result of this work, a theory based on experimental facts has been developed to explain in a satisfactory way the action of enzymes. The other phase of organic catalysis is, strictly speaking, a technical problem. Why for instance should it not be practicable to utilize organic catalysts more extensively than heretofore in industry? If this problem is to be attacked, it seems reasonable to start with the particular industry which already uses organic catalysts to the greatest extent. This is, of course, the rubber industry. The important accomplishments of the chemical industry with respect to the development of vulcanization accelerators is already common knowledge, and the important task at present is not simply to increase the great number of accelerators already known. A problem of more practical value would seem to be to study the mechanism of the acceleration of vulcanization, about which relatively little has been known heretofore.

scholarly journals Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Strategic Trade Policy ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Product Competition ◽  
Cross Ownership

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

scholarly journals The Chaos Dynamic of Multiproduct Cournot Duopoly Game with Managerial Delegation

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Output Fluctuations ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
High Volatility ◽  
Route To Chaos ◽  
Barrier To Entry ◽  
Intermittent Chaos ◽  
Consumer Tastes

Although oligopoly theory is generally concerned with the single-product firm, what is true in the real word is that most of the firms offer multiproducts rather than single products in order to obtain cost-saving advantages, cater for the diversity of consumer tastes, and provide a barrier to entry. We develop a dynamical multiproduct Cournot duopoly model in discrete time, where each firm has an owner who delegates the output decision to a manager. The principle of decision-making is bounded rational. And each firm has a nonlinear total cost function due to the multiproduct framework. The Cournot Nash equilibrium and the local stability are investigated. The tangential bifurcation and intermittent chaos are reported by numerical simulations. The results show that high output adjustment speed can lead to output fluctuations which are characterized by phases of low volatility with small output changes and phases of high volatility with large output changes. The intermittent route to chaos of Flip bifurcation and another intermittent route of Flip bifurcation which contains Hopf bifurcation can exist in the system. The study can improve our understanding of intermittent chaos frequently observed in oligopoly economy.

scholarly journals Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions: Possibilities and Impossibilities

Quantum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 475
Author(s):  
Myrto Arapinis ◽  
Mahshid Delavar ◽  
Mina Doosti ◽  
Elham Kashefi
Keyword(s):  
Large Family ◽  
Quantum States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Physical Unclonable Function ◽  
Physical Unclonable Functions ◽  
Quantum Analogue ◽  
Universal Quantum ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Comprehensive Study

A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a device with unique behaviour that is hard to clone hence providing a secure fingerprint. A variety of PUF structures and PUF-based applications have been explored theoretically as well as being implemented in practical settings. Recently, the inherent unclonability of quantum states has been exploited to derive the quantum analogue of PUF as well as new proposals for the implementation of PUF. We present the first comprehensive study of quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs) with quantum cryptographic tools. We formally define qPUFs, encapsulating all requirements of classical PUFs as well as introducing a new testability feature inherent to the quantum setting only. We use a quantum game-based framework to define different levels of security for qPUFs: quantum exponential unforgeability, quantum existential unforgeability and quantum selective unforgeability. We introduce a new quantum attack technique based on the universal quantum emulator algorithm of Marvin and Lloyd to prove no qPUF can provide quantum existential unforgeability. On the other hand, we prove that a large family of qPUFs (called unitary PUFs) can provide quantum selective unforgeability which is the desired level of security for most PUF-based applications.

The Effect of Anticipatory Repudiation: Principle and Policy

1962 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M. Nienaber
Keyword(s):  
Proper Time ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Entire Period ◽  
Sales Manager ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Pertinent Question ◽  
Do So

IThe facts of the recent House of Lords decision, White and Carter (Councils), Ltd. v. McGregor, were so simple and have been canvassed so thoroughly as to be now practically a matter of common knowledge. The appellants' business consisted in the placing of advertisements, for a fee, on litter bins which were then distributed to various local authorities. They agreed to run the respondents' advertisement for a period of three years. The respondents repudiated on the ground that their sales manager who had concluded the contract had no authority to do so. The appellants refused to accept the repudiation and duly displayed the advertisements for the entire period, bringing at the proper time a suit for the full amount owing under the contract. The pertinent question was: were the appellants entitled to dismiss the repudiation and give effect to the contract on their side in order to secure performance on the other side; or rather were they obliged to adopt the repudiation as the end of the contract and the beginning of a suit for damages subject to mitigation? The latter view prevailed in all but the House of Lords where a majority of three to two preferred the former.In coming to this conclusion the House of Lords in effect overruled an earlier decision, viz., Langford and Co., Ltd. v. Dutch, the facts of which were virtually on all fours with those of the present case. In Langford's case the appellant was unsuccessful in recovering the contract price for exhibiting an advertisement film which he persisted in showing despite the respondent's repudiation of the contract.

The United States and Iran

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Takeyh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Effects ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Third Order ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Taking Action

Implementing deterrent and compellent strategies are among the most critical tasks of the national security decision maker. However, as the case of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979 demonstrates, deterring another state from taking action—especially if it considers those steps to be in its national interests—or compelling it to adopt policies in line with one’s own preferences but which represent a setback to the goals of the other state can be a difficult proposition. In addition, the Iran relationship demonstrates howthe use of deterrent and compellent instruments must be weighed against costs and other second- and third-order effects which may cause the policymaker to accept a less than optimal outcome in order to avoid greater complications in other areas.

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