scholarly journals Choice Function-Based Two-Sided Markets: Stability, Lattice Property, Path Independence and Algorithms

Algorithms ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamàs Fleiner ◽  
Zsuzsanna Jankó
Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Juan Lleras ◽  
Yusufcan Masatlioglu ◽  
Daisuke Nakajima ◽  
Erkut Ozbay

In the context of choice with limited consideration, where the decision-maker may not pay attention to all available options, the consideration function of a decision maker is path-independent if her choice cannot be manipulated by the presentation of the choice set. This paper characterizes a model of choice with limited consideration with path independence, which is equivalent to a consideration function that satisfies both the attention filter and consideration filter properties from Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al. (2017), respectively. Despite the equivalence of path-independent consideration with the consideration structures from these two papers, we show that, to have a choice with limited consideration that is path-independent, satisfying both axioms on the choice function that characterize choice limited consideration with attention and consideration filters unilaterally (from Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al. (2017)) is necessary but not sufficient.


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralf Dewenter

Seit einiger Zeit wird in der Medienliteratur der Begriff der „two-sided markets“ (auch zweiseitige Märkte genannt) verwendet und vor allem in jüngster Vergangenheit hat die Anzahl der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge und Konferenzen zu diesem Thema deutlich zugenommen. Was ist genau unter diesem Begriff zu verstehen? Welche Besonderheiten weisen zweiseitige Märkte auf? Und welche medienökonomischen Implikationen lassen sich für diese Märkte ableiten? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, werden im Folgenden das Prinzip der zweiseitigen Märkte am Beispiel von Medienmärkten erläutert und einige Besonderheiten dieser Märkte dargestellt.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takanori Adachi ◽  
Mark Tremblay
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Meltem Odaba¸ ◽  
Thomas J. Holt ◽  
Ronald L. Breiger

We analyze the governance structure of online stolen data markets. As cybercriminal underground economies, stolen data markets are beyond the reach of state intervention, and yet they need form and regulation in order to function. While the illicit nature of the business brings risks to its participants, the online characteristics of these markets enable the participants to communicate easily, which is a crucial means of generating trust. We first identify stolen data markets in terms of their economic organization as two-sided markets, economic platforms with two distinct user groups that provide each other with network synergies. This characterization enables us to understand the role of the forum administrator as that of an intermediary, market creator, and market regulator. Then we clarify the role of communication networks and social structure in creating trust among buyers and sellers.


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