scholarly journals Real Neurolaw in the Netherlands: The Role of the Developing Brain in the New Adolescent Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Schleim
Author(s):  
Linda MEIJER-WASSENAAR ◽  
Diny VAN EST

How can a supreme audit institution (SAI) use design thinking in auditing? SAIs audit the way taxpayers’ money is collected and spent. Adding design thinking to their activities is not to be taken lightly. SAIs independently check whether public organizations have done the right things in the right way, but the organizations might not be willing to act upon a SAI’s recommendations. Can you imagine the role of design in audits? In this paper we share our experiences of some design approaches in the work of one SAI: the Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA). Design thinking needs to be adapted (Dorst, 2015a) before it can be used by SAIs such as the NCA in order to reflect their independent, autonomous status. To dive deeper into design thinking, Buchanan’s design framework (2015) and different ways of reasoning (Dorst, 2015b) are used to explore how design thinking can be adapted for audits.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-253
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Stefanowicz

This article undertakes to show the way that has led to the statutory decriminalization of euthanasia-related murder and assisted suicide in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It presents the evolution of the views held by Dutch society on the euthanasia related practice, in the consequence of which death on demand has become legal after less than thirty years. Due attention is paid to the role of organs of public authority in these changes, with a particular emphasis put on the role of the Dutch Parliament – the States General. Because of scarcity of space and limited length of the article, the change in the attitudes toward euthanasia, which has taken place in the Netherlands, is presented in a synthetic way – from the first discussions on admissibility of a euthanasia-related murder carried out in the 1970s, through the practice of killing patients at their request, which was against the law at that time, but with years began more and more acceptable, up to the statutory decriminalization of euthanasia by the Dutch Parliament, made with the support of the majority of society.


Author(s):  
Chelsea Barabas

This chapter discusses contemporary debates regarding the use of artificial intelligence as a vehicle for criminal justice reform. It closely examines two general approaches to what has been widely branded as “algorithmic fairness” in criminal law: the development of formal fairness criteria and accuracy measures that illustrate the trade-offs of different algorithmic interventions; and the development of “best practices” and managerialist standards for maintaining a baseline of accuracy, transparency, and validity in these systems. Attempts to render AI-branded tools more accurate by addressing narrow notions of bias miss the deeper methodological and epistemological issues regarding the fairness of these tools. The key question is whether predictive tools reflect and reinforce punitive practices that drive disparate outcomes, and how data regimes interact with the penal ideology to naturalize these practices. The chapter then calls for a radically different understanding of the role and function of the carceral state, as a starting place for re-imagining the role of “AI” as a transformative force in the criminal legal system.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder

AbstractPhilip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of freedom—republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on another’s forbearance (what Pettit calls ‘formal’ freedom). Pettit believes that the principal justification for the traditional focus of the criminal law is that it constitutes a bulwark against domination. I will, in part, be considering the merits of this claim. Is the importance of the orthodox realm of the criminal law solely or mainly explained by the wish to protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not. Across the board, the criminal law rightly protects us equally from threats to what Pettit calls ‘effective,’ as opposed to formal, republican freedom. I will develop my critique of Pettit’s account of criminal law, in part to raise questions about the role of ‘domination’ in political theory, and about whether it poses a significant challenge to liberal accounts of criminal law.


2000 ◽  
Vol 181 (2) ◽  
pp. 631-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen M. Mascini ◽  
Margriet Jansze ◽  
Joop F. P. Schellekens ◽  
James M. Musser ◽  
Joop A. J. Faber ◽  
...  

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