scholarly journals Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

10.3386/w8633 ◽  
2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucian Bebchuk ◽  
Oliver Hart
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Proxy Fights ◽  
Takeover Bids

The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Amel-Zadeh ◽  
Yuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Main Driver ◽  
Takeover Bids ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

The Political Dynamics of Marketizing “Corporate Control”

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Callaghan
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Background Information ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Case Selection ◽  
Political Struggles ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Takeover Bids

Chapter 2 provides background information pertaining to the regulation of takeover bids, to clarify how political struggles surrounding shareholder rights elucidate the political dynamics of marketization. Four considerations motivated the case selection. First, the so-called market for corporate control cannot arise spontaneously and is prone to market failure, because corporate control is a fictitious good in need of commodification by means of market-enabling rules. Second, the rules governing this market are politically contentious because they have significant distributional implications. Third, struggles surrounding these rules pit different kinds of equally well-endowed profit-oriented opportunists against one another. Fourth, the process started a long time ago and played out differently in different countries, partly due to variation in the political salience of hostile bids.

Raiders Activity on the Market for Corporate Control as a Product of Coercive Entrepreneurship Evolution

2007 ◽  
pp. 80-92
Author(s):  
A. Kireev
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Basic Characteristics

The paper studies the problem of raiders activity on the market for corporate control. This activity is considered as a product of coercive entrepreneurship evolution. Their similarities and sharp distinctions are shown. The article presents the classification of raiders activity, discribes its basic characteristics and tendencies, defines the role of government in the process of its transformation.

Russia’s Market of Mergers and Acquisitions: Stages, Features and Prospects

2009 ◽  
pp. 23-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Radygin
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Data Bases ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Access Data

The article deals with key tendencies in the development of Russia’s market of mergers and acquisitions in the first decade of the 21st century. Quantitative parameters are analyzed by using available in the open access data bases for the years 2003-2008 taking into consideration new tendencies relating to 2008 financial crisis. An active role of the state played in the market of corporate control represents an important factor. Special attention is given to issues of development of Russia’s system of legal norms regulating the market of mergers and acquisitions.

Mergers and Acquisitions Financing: The Russian Case

2007 ◽  
pp. 85-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Kasparova
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Business Market

The article considers the financial tools of corporate control transfers and mergers and acquisitions financing forms. In western countries tax and informative factors are more important, but in the Russian business market lack of development of the stock market and low cost of securities of Russian companies play the main role. The analysis has shown that in Russia the monetary form of M&A financing dominates over other financing forms (90% of reviewed cases), still there are individual cases of M&A financing by buying company’s shares (10% of reviewed cases).

THE EVALUATION OF EFFICIENCY OF INTERNAL CORPORATE CONTROL AT HOLDING ENTERPRISES

2017 ◽  
pp. 76-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. V. Kucherova ◽  
◽  
T. A. Ponkratova ◽  
T. A. Tyuleneva ◽  
N. A. Cherepanova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control

СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ КОНФЛИКТЫ В РАМКАХ «КАПИТАЛИЗМА ПЛАТФОРМ»

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
L. V. Tomin
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Communication Infrastructure ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Integrated Information

The article is devoted to the analysis of the structure, the peculiarities of functioning and the socio-economic and political effects of the «platform capitalism». The basis of this model is the network effects produced by the integrated information and communication infrastructure, which contribute to the monopolization and the constant expansion of platform companies into new areas. The principle of functioning of this infrastructure is the continuous collection and further monetization of data extracted from the interactions of individuals among themselves or with one of the elements of a digitalized economy or government structures. Such an infrastructure — forms a potential threat of strengthening state and corporate control over citizens. In addition, the activities of platform companies produce negative effects on the labor market, reinforcing the process of precarization of employment. The integrated information and communication infrastructure of platform companies form a system of a kind of «digital Taylorism», which deprives the employee of autonomy and privacy in the workplace. The influence of digitalization, subjected to the technocratic logic of the neoliberal model of governance in democratic countries, strengthens the de-politicization of relations between the citizen and the state and further changes the balance of power between labor and capital in favor of the latter. Large-scale protests of the last years against the companies of “capitalism of platforms” demonstrated the structural contradictions of this model and formed new forms of organization and actions of grassroots workers of the “digital economy”.

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