scholarly journals Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits

10.3386/w7553 ◽  
2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber
2000 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber ◽  
Larry Levitt

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 1568-1579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Selden ◽  
Bradley M. Gray

10.3386/w5147 ◽  
1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber ◽  
James Poterba

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaele Morrow ◽  
Shane R. Stinson ◽  
Marcus M. Doxey

ABSTRACT The Affordable Care Act (ACA) employs personal income tax credits and surcharges to enforce its mandate for health insurance coverage. This initiative depends largely on the use of tax incentives to increase participation by young adults who are relatively healthy and have voiced concerns over the expected costs and benefits of obtaining mandated coverage. Consistent with these concerns, we find in an experimental setting that so-called “young invincibles” largely base their decisions to purchase insurance on the expected costs of coverage and the perceived likelihood of illness or injury, but are relatively unmotivated by tax incentives in the forms featured in current legislation. Tax incentive structures not featured in the ACA show some ability to motivate young invincibles, but the effect is not incremental to simple price reductions. In contrast, older and more experienced participants exhibit less sensitivity to premium costs and respond favorably to tax incentives, regardless of form. JEL Classifications: H20; H24; I13.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leemore Dafny ◽  
Kate Ho ◽  
Mauricio Varela

Most nonelderly Americans purchase health insurance through their employers, which sponsor a limited number of plans. Using a panel dataset representing over ten million insured lives, we estimate employees' preferences for different health plans and use the estimates to predict their choices if more plans were made available to them on the same terms, i.e., with equivalent subsidies and at large-group prices. Using conservative assumptions, we estimate a median welfare gain of 13 percent of premiums. A proper accounting of the costs and benefits of a transition from employer-sponsored to individually-purchased insurance should include this nontrivial gain. (JEL G22, I13, J32)


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