scholarly journals Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandra Casella ◽  
Antonin Macé
Keyword(s):  
Vote Trading

Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Koehler
Keyword(s):  
Voting Paradox ◽  
Vote Trading

Vote trading and Pareto efficiency

Public Choice ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Vote Trading

scholarly journals Effect of holding office on the behavior of politicians

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (48) ◽  
pp. 13690-13695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Enemark ◽  
Clark C. Gibson ◽  
Mathew D. McCubbins ◽  
Brigitte Seim
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Experimental Designs ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Recruitment And Selection ◽  
Behavioral Games ◽  
Norm Of Reciprocity

Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges—whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth—require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians’ behavior.

Intense Preferences, Strong Beliefs and Democratic Decision-Making

1988 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jones
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Group Activity ◽  
Pressure Group ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
The Way

Some decisions require individuals to make judgements rather than to express preferences. Some conflicts of preference arise from different beliefs about the efficacy or propriety of a policy rather than from different wants. Should the ‘intensity’ with which a judgement is made, or a belief is held, figure in decisionmaking in the way that it should ideally influence decisions concerning wants? This article questions the relevance of intensity to matters of judgement and examines how far decision processes that are sensitive to different intensities of preference, such as pressure group activity, vote trading and point voting, are open to criticism for failing to discriminate between intense wants and strong beliefs.

Vote trading and subset sums

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Bervoets ◽  
Vincent Merlin ◽  
Gerhard J. Woeginger
Keyword(s):  
Subset Sums ◽  
Vote Trading

scholarly journals Vote Trading and Information Aggregation

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 2897-2929 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUSAN E.K. CHRISTOFFERSEN ◽  
CHRISTOPHER C. GECZY ◽  
DAVID K. MUSTO ◽  
ADAM V. REED
Keyword(s):  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Vote Trading

How are the powers of the president decided? Vote trading in the making of Taiwan’s semi-presidential constitution

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 659-672
Author(s):  
Jih-wen Lin
Keyword(s):  
Unusual Case ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Provincial Government ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Constitutional Choice ◽  
Reasonable Explanation ◽  
The Status ◽  
Vote Trading

To establish an unambiguous source of accountability, a semi-presidential constitution can either allow the president to dominate government formation and dissolve the parliament without a prior vote of no confidence being passed or it can reverse the arrangement of these powers. Accordingly, Taiwan is an unusual case of semi-presidentialism because the president can unilaterally appoint the premier but cannot actively dissolve the parliament, so the electorate is seldom called upon to evaluate the responsibility of the constitutional agents in a snap election. Vote-trading theory offers a reasonable explanation for this puzzling situation by showing how seemingly unconnected issues can be voted on as a package. In Taiwan, the choice of presidential powers was complicated by the sovereignty issue, leading the reformers of the constitution to deny the legislature the power to confirm the president’s appointment of the premier in exchange for downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government. This is exactly what vote-trading theory foresees: votes on different issues may be traded if no “pivot” finds the status quo to be his/her favorite option. By demonstrating how the linking of unconnected issues can obstruct institutional design, vote-trading theory expands our understanding of constitutional choice.

Vote trading in a legislative context: An analysis of cooperative and noncooperative strategic voting

Public Choice ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Enelow ◽  
David H. Koehler
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Vote Trading
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