scholarly journals Social Support Substitution and the Earnings Rebound: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity in Disability Insurance Reform

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lex Borghans ◽  
Anne Gielen ◽  
Erzo F.P. Luttmer
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lex Borghans ◽  
Anne C. Gielen ◽  
Erzo F. P. Luttmer

We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effects of decreased DI (disability insurance) generosity on behavior of existing recipients. We find evidence of social support substitution: individuals on average offset €1.00 of lost DI benefits by collecting €0.30 more from other social assistance programs, but this benefit-substitution effect declines over time. Individuals also exhibit a rebound in earnings: earnings increase by € 0.62 on average per euro of lost DI benefits and this effect remains roughly constant over time. This is strong evidence of substantial remaining earnings capacity among long-term claimants of DI. (JEL I38, J14, J22, J28, J31)


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 606-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pilar García-Gómez ◽  
Anne C. Gielen

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 329-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Maestas ◽  
Kathleen J. Mullen ◽  
Alexander Strand

As health insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from disability onset —will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.


2019 ◽  
pp. 82-98
Author(s):  
Tatjana Piljan ◽  
Marija Lukić ◽  
Ivan Piljan

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-150
Author(s):  
Gordon B. Dahl ◽  
Anne C. Gielen

Using a 1993 Dutch policy reform and a regression discontinuity design, we find children of parents whose disability insurance (DI) eligibility was reduced are 11 percent less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government programs, and earn 2 percent more as adults. The reduced transfers and increased taxes of children account for 40 percent of the fiscal savings relative to parents in present discounted value terms. Moreover, children of treated parents complete more schooling, have a lower probability of serious criminal arrests and incarceration, and take fewer mental health drugs as adults. (JEL H53, I12, I38, J14)


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