scholarly journals Health Effects of Containing Moral Hazard: Evidence from Disability Insurance Reform

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pilar Garcia Gomez ◽  
Anne C. Gielen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Health Effects ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Reform

scholarly journals Mortality effects of containing moral hazard: Evidence from disability insurance reform

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 606-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pilar García-Gómez ◽  
Anne C. Gielen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Reform

scholarly journals Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 110-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Autor ◽  
Mark Duggan ◽  
Jonathan Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Time Variation ◽  
Rate Increase ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Severe Disabilities ◽  
Replacement Rate ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Over Time

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities. (JEL D82, G22, J28, J32)

scholarly journals Disability Insurance and Health Insurance Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 329-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Maestas ◽  
Kathleen J. Mullen ◽  
Alexander Strand
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Health Insurance Coverage ◽  
Insurance Reform ◽  
Health Insurance Reform ◽  
Access To Health ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
The Cost

As health insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from disability onset —will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.

scholarly journals FDICIA After Five Years

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J Benston ◽  
George G Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Market Discipline ◽  
Agent Behavior ◽  
Depository Institutions ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Insurance Reform ◽  
Early Results ◽  
Incentive Incompatibility

At year-end 1991, Congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts--the FDIC Improvement Act. This reform followed the failure of more than 2,000 depository institutions in the 1980s. Many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government-provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators. Insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis, providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks. This article reviews these changes and evaluates early results.

scholarly journals The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H Autor ◽  
Mark G Duggan
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Fiscal Crisis ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Insurance Program ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense. This growth poses significant risks to the finances of the DI program and the broader Social Security system, and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants. This article first provides an overview of the Disability Insurance program, describing who qualifies for the program, how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined. Next, we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the DI rolls and discuss how the characteristics of DI recipients have changed as a result. We then explore the extent of moral hazard in the DI program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Finally, we identify the challenges that the DI program creates for Social Security finances and Social Security reform, and discuss potential reforms to the DI program.

scholarly journals Necessity of introduction of pension disability insurance reform

2019 ◽  
pp. 82-98
Author(s):  
Tatjana Piljan ◽  
Marija Lukić ◽  
Ivan Piljan
Keyword(s):  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Reform
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