scholarly journals Estimating Trade Elasticities: Demand Composition and the Trade Collapse of 2008-09

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Bussière ◽  
Giovanni Callegari ◽  
Fabio Ghironi ◽  
Giulia Sestieri ◽  
Norihiko Yamano
2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Bussière ◽  
Giovanni Callegari ◽  
Fabio Ghironi ◽  
Giulia Sestieri ◽  
Norihiko Yamano

This paper introduces a new empirical model of international trade flows based on an import intensity-adjusted measure of aggregate demand. We compute the import intensity of demand components by using the OECD Input-Output tables. We argue that the composition of demand plays a key role in trade dynamics because of the relatively larger movements in the most import-intensive categories of expenditure (especially investment, but also exports). We provide evidence in favor of these mechanisms for a panel of 18 OECD countries, paying particular attention to the 2008–2009 Great Trade Collapse. (JEL E23, F14, F17, F44, G01)


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anindya S. Chakrabati ◽  
Kanika Mahajan ◽  
Shekhar Tomar

Author(s):  
Peter Hooper ◽  
Karen H. Johnson ◽  
Jaime Marquez
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan de Bromhead ◽  
Alan Fernihough ◽  
Markus Lampe ◽  
Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (10) ◽  
pp. 3029-3063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Sequeira

This paper exploits quasi-experimental variation in tariffs in southern Africa to estimate trade elasticities. Traded quantities respond only weakly to a 30 percent reduction in the average nominal tariff rate. Trade flow data combined with primary data on firm behavior and bribe payments suggest that corruption is a potential explanation for the observed low elasticities. In contexts of pervasive corruption, even small bribes can significantly reduce tariffs, making tariff liberalization schemes less likely to affect the extensive and the intensive margins of firms' import behavior. The tariff liberalization scheme is, however, still associated with improved incentives to accurately report quantities of imported goods, and with a significant reduction in bribe transfers from importers to public officials. (JEL D22, D73, F13, H83, O17, O19, O24)


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Alessandria ◽  
Joseph Kaboski ◽  
Virgiliu Midrigan

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