scholarly journals Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Kolstad
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

BELIEFS ABOUT OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES IN A SEQUENTIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 614-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENNIFER C. COATS ◽  
WILLIAM S. NEILSON
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

The Source and Significance of Confusion in Public Goods Experiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J Ferraro ◽  
Christian A Vossler
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Game Form ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Experiments ◽  
Experimental Parameters ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Design Experiments

Abstract Economists use public goods experiments to develop and test theories of individual preferences and institutional design. Previous work demonstrates many participants in public goods experiments contribute to the public good out of confusion. We design experiments to provide insights on the consequences and causes of confusion. We establish that confusion amounts to more than statistical noise and does not dissipate with repetition (i.e. learning). Confused subjects use experimental parameters and the behavior of other players as cues, which confounds treatment effects and traditional strategies to identify other-regarding preferences through exogenous parameter changes and the modeling of reactions to other subjects’ decisions. We argue that confusion stems from an inaccurate understanding of game incentives (“failure of game form recognition”), which is a consequence of the framing and inadequate payoff information in standard instructions. Modified instructions can substantially reduce confusion, and, in turn, change the distribution of contributions to the public good.

Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5861-5885
Author(s):  
Emma von Essen ◽  
Marieke Huysentruyt ◽  
Topi Miettinen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Stage Model ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Effect Theory ◽  
Groups And Teams ◽  
Information Externality ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Positive Effect

This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration where both information and payoff externalities exist and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that, even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first player exploration on the optimality of the second player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared with a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also and especially so, for public goods. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

In evolutionary games, enlightened self-interests are still ultimately self-interests

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Getty
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Evolutionary theory provides a firm foundation for the unification of the behavioral sciences, and the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model is a useful analytical tool for understanding human behavior. However, evolutionary theory suggests that if other-regarding preferences expressed by humans have evolved under selection, they are ultimately, if not purely, in the constrained, relative self-interests of individuals who express them.

Going Far by Going Together: James M. Buchanan’s Economics of Shared Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Art Carden ◽  
Gregory W. Caskey ◽  
Zachary B. Kessler
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Capital ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Ethical Communication ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.

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