BELIEFS ABOUT OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES IN A SEQUENTIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 614-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENNIFER C. COATS ◽  
WILLIAM S. NEILSON
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5861-5885
Author(s):  
Emma von Essen ◽  
Marieke Huysentruyt ◽  
Topi Miettinen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Stage Model ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Effect Theory ◽  
Groups And Teams ◽  
Information Externality ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Positive Effect

This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration where both information and payoff externalities exist and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that, even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first player exploration on the optimality of the second player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared with a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also and especially so, for public goods. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

The Source and Significance of Confusion in Public Goods Experiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J Ferraro ◽  
Christian A Vossler
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Game Form ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Experiments ◽  
Experimental Parameters ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Design Experiments

Abstract Economists use public goods experiments to develop and test theories of individual preferences and institutional design. Previous work demonstrates many participants in public goods experiments contribute to the public good out of confusion. We design experiments to provide insights on the consequences and causes of confusion. We establish that confusion amounts to more than statistical noise and does not dissipate with repetition (i.e. learning). Confused subjects use experimental parameters and the behavior of other players as cues, which confounds treatment effects and traditional strategies to identify other-regarding preferences through exogenous parameter changes and the modeling of reactions to other subjects’ decisions. We argue that confusion stems from an inaccurate understanding of game incentives (“failure of game form recognition”), which is a consequence of the framing and inadequate payoff information in standard instructions. Modified instructions can substantially reduce confusion, and, in turn, change the distribution of contributions to the public good.

scholarly journals Bilateral costly expulsions resolve the public goods dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 477 (2254) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Wang ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Field Analysis ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
The Public ◽  
Personal Cost ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Cost

Expulsion has been found to promote cooperation in social dilemmas, but only if it does not incur costs or is applied unilaterally. Here, we show that removing both conditions leads to a spontaneous resolution of the costly expulsion problem. Namely, by studying the public goods game where cooperators and defectors can expel others at a personal cost, we find that public cooperation thrives as expulsion costs increase. This is counterintuitive, as the cost of other-regarding behaviour typically places an additional burden on cooperation, which is in itself costly. Such scenarios are referred to as second-order free-rider problems, and they typically require an additional mechanism, such as network reciprocity, to be resolved. We perform a mean field analysis of the public goods game with bilateral costly expulsion, showing analytically that the expected payoff difference between cooperators and defectors increases with expulsion costs as long as players with the same strategy have, on average, a higher frequency to interact with each other. As the latter condition is often satisfied in social networks, our results thus reveal a fascinating new path to public cooperation, and they show that the costs of well-intended actions need not be low for them to be effective.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document