scholarly journals A Free Lunch in the Commons

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kotchen ◽  
Stephen Salant
Keyword(s):  
2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Kotchen ◽  
Stephen W. Salant
Keyword(s):  

Finisterra ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (70) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarida Queirós

UTILITARIANISM OR EQUITY? DILEMMAS FOR ENVIRONMENT AND LAND USE. The aim of this note is to stimulate discussion as to the criteria behind land use planning and the distribution of natural resources to achieve a sense of social well-being. When determining strategies on how to use these resources and other environmental services, considerations involving efficiency versus equity reveal value choices and contradictory opinions that we seek to question. Numerousexamples demonstrate that certain economic policy choices which affect environment and land planning are responsible for the emergence of predicaments known as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ and the ‘tragedy of the commons’. ‘No free lunch’ belongs to a group of conservation laws that steers towards the painful awareness that traditional economic policy has still severe limitations.


2011 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Kotchen ◽  
Stephen W. Salant
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Fisher ◽  
Jennifer Wies ◽  
Stacie King
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 32-51
Author(s):  
R. Yu. Kochnev ◽  
L. I. Polishchuk ◽  
A. Yu. Rubin

We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.


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