scholarly journals Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bajari ◽  
Jungwon Yeo
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Spectrum Auctions

scholarly journals What Really Matters in Auction Design

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Klemperer
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Phone ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Third Generation ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Spectrum Auctions ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Ascending Auctions

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”

Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 446-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Ausubel ◽  
Oleg V. Baranov
Keyword(s):  
Market Design ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Spectrum Auctions ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
Evolutionary Changes ◽  
Recent Innovation ◽  
Weak Activity ◽  
Price Feedback

The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design which has been adopted for many spectrum auctions worldwide. Since its inception, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution. We begin by reviewing some important changes which have already occurred. Despite these enhancements, we observe that the performance of the CCA is still limited by weak activity rules, suboptimal price feedback, and a missing-bid problem. We then describe further evolutionary changes, including new activity rules, new approaches to pricing, and an integration of non-mutually-exclusive bids, which will help to address these issues.

Forestry: The Mechanisms of the Accordance of the Rights of User Analysis

2006 ◽  
pp. 57-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Manakov
Keyword(s):  
International Experience ◽  
Auction Design

The author considers the ways in which the rights of user of the forestry in Russia are granted. The article analyzes the international experience of forest auctions and describes the main problems of the auction design.

Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Alaei ◽  
Alexandre Belloni ◽  
Ali Makhdoumi ◽  
Azarakhsh Malekian
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction
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