scholarly journals Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages

10.3386/w1011 ◽  
1982 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Feldstein ◽  
James Poterba
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Reservation Wages

Der Einfluss der Agenda 2010 auf die Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Search Model ◽  
Transition Rates ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Dynamic Search ◽  
Unemployment Insurance System ◽  
Agenda 2010

AbstractThis paper examines the impacts on reservation wages of unemployed persons and on transition in employment due to the reform of the unemployment insurance system in Germany in the course of the Agenda 2010. An dynamic search-model is developed, on which reservation wages are simulated for different groups of unemployed. Afterwards, increases in the transition rates in employment are forecasted due to the reductions in reservation wages. It is shown that the reform of the unemployment transfer payments mainly affect unemployed persons with a high income before unemployment. For these persons the transition rates in employment are increased by 5% to 9% if they are eligible for social welfare. For unemployed persons without eligibility for social welfare the transition rates in employment are increased by 9% to 22%.

scholarly journals The Effect of Unemployment Benefits and Nonemployment Durations on Wages

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-777 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes F. Schmieder ◽  
Till von Wachter ◽  
Stefan Bender
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Reservation Wage ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Wage Effects ◽  
Key Policy

We estimate that unemployment insurance (UI) extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in UI eligibility in Germany. We show this effect combines two key policy parameters: the effect of UI on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers. Our framework implies if UI extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration, then reservation wages do not bind. We derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects. The effect of UI on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects. (JEL J31, J64, J65)

scholarly journals Unemployment insurance and reservation wages: Evidence from administrative data

2019 ◽  
Vol 171 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Le Barbanchon ◽  
Roland Rathelot ◽  
Alexandra Roulet
Keyword(s):  
Administrative Data ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Reservation Wages

Job Search by Unemployed Women: Determinants of the Asking Wage

ILR Review ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven H. Sandell
Keyword(s):  
Least Squares ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Search Behavior ◽  
Longitudinal Survey ◽  
National Longitudinal Survey ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Mature Women ◽  
Job Search Behavior

This study uses actual observations of reservation wages from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women who were 35 to 49 years of age in 1972 to estimate, with a two-stage least squares procedure, a model of the job-search behavior of unemployed women. To a greater extent than shown by most previous studies, the results indicate that unemployed women substantially reduce their reservation wages as the period of their unemployment progresses. Also, recipients of unemployment insurance are shown to ask for wages that are substantially higher than those asked for by other unemployed women.

scholarly journals Unemployment insurance and reservation wages

1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 141-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Feldstein ◽  
James Poterba
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Reservation Wages

Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Behavior*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioana Marinescu ◽  
Daphné Skandalis
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Search Behavior ◽  
Individual Response ◽  
Search Models ◽  
Search Effort ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Job Search Behavior ◽  
The Individual

Abstract How does unemployment insurance (UI) affect unemployed workers’ search behavior? Search models predict that, until benefit exhaustion, UI depresses job search effort and increases reservation wages. Over an unemployment spell, search effort should increase up to benefit exhaustion, and stay high thereafter. Meanwhile, reservation wages should decrease up to benefit exhaustion and stay low thereafter. To test these predictions, we link administrative registers to data on job search behavior from a major online job search platform in France. We follow over 400,000 workers, as long as they remain unemployed. We analyze the changes in search behavior around benefits exhaustion, and take two steps to isolate the individual response to unemployment benefits. First, our longitudinal data allows us to correct for changes in sample composition over the spell. Second, we exploit data on workers eligible for 12–24 months of UI as well as workers ineligible for UI, to control for behavior changes over the unemployment spell that are independent of UI. Our results confirm the predictions of search models. We find that search effort (the number of job applications) increases by at least 50% during the year preceding benefits exhaustion and remains high thereafter. The target monthly wage decreases by at least 2.4% during the year preceding benefits exhaustion, and remains low thereafter. Additionally, we provide evidence for duration dependence: workers decrease the wage they target by 1.5% over each year of unemployment, irrespective of their UI status.

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