Aristote, l'âme et la cire. Sur la portée de la formule commune d'aisyhsiw (De Anima II 12)

2016 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jorge Mittelmann
Keyword(s):  
De Anima

Aristotle's Formal Identity of Intellect and Object: A Solution to the Problem of Modal Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-107
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Object A ◽  
Formal Identity ◽  
Identity Thesis ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Aristotelian Metaphysics

In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra-mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial features of Aristotelian metaphysics of the mind. I offer here a defense of the Formal Identity Thesis, based on specifically epistemological arguments about our knowledge of necessary or essential truths.

La Phantasia dans le De anima d'Aristote

Pallas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-51
Author(s):  
Noël Aujoulat
Keyword(s):  
De Anima

Dos momentos en De Ánima de Juan García Ponce: Ecfrasis y apropiacionismo

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-120
Author(s):  
Mildred Castillo Cadenas
Keyword(s):  
Carl Jung ◽  
Digital Archive ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Edouard Manet ◽  
Juan Garcia Ponce

Este artículo analiza dos momentos en la novela De Ánima (1984) de Juan García Ponce, en los cuales se utiliza el recurso de la ecfrasis y el apropiacionismo. Me aproximaré a estas estrategias con el objetivo de observar su funcionamiento en la estructura narrativa, además del efecto de sentido que producen en una lectura que los considere. También pretendo detallar algunas cuestiones de la relación pintura-escritura para observar el tratamiento intermedial establecido por el autor. El primer momento revisa la relación de una obra del pintor Lucas Cranach el Viejo y el procedimiento narrativo utilizado por García Ponce para articular a Paloma, protagonista femenina. El segundo momento contempla el análisis de dos ecfrasis, cuyo origen es Le Déjeuner sur l'Herbe de Édouard Manet, desde dos perspectivas de la misma representación visual. Asimismo, prestaré atención al tratamiento apropiacionista y su efecto de sentido derivado. El artículo se apoya en la noción de ecfrasis de Luz Aurora Pimentel, Irene Artigas y James Heffernan; la estructura abismada de Helena Beristáin; el apropiacionismo de Juan Martín Prada; y el concepto ánima-animus de Carl Jung. Para las imágenes se hace referencia al Cranach Digital Archive.

Οϒ MNHMONEϒOMEN ∆E... Aristot. De anima Γ 5. 430 a 23-5

Elenchos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-104
Author(s):  
Francesco Fronterotta
Keyword(s):  
De Anima

THEMISTIUS AGAINST PORPHYRY (?) ON ‘WHY WE DO NOT REMEMBER’

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Robert Roreitner
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Arabic Translation ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Agent Intellect ◽  
The One

Abstract This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original (and historically the most influential) section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’ (without specifying when and what). This Platonizing reading (probably inspired by Aristotle's early dialogue Eudemus) can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere (and, by Themistius’ lights, distorted) Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry.

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