scholarly journals Central Bank independence and foreign exchange policies in Latin America

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Junguito ◽  
Hernando Vargas-Herrera
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Foreign Exchange ◽  
Central Bank Independence

scholarly journals A historical analysis of central bank independence in Latin America: the Colombian experience, 1923-2008

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adolfo Meisel ◽  
Juan D. Barón
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Latin America, using the experience of Colombia (1923-2008) as a case study. Since its creation, in 1923, Colombia’s central bank has undergone several reforms that have changed its objectives and degree of independence. Between 1923 and 1951, it was private and independent, with a legal commitment to price stability. In 1962, monetary responsibilities were divided between a government-dominated monetary board, in charge of monetary policies, and the central bank, which carried them out. In the early 1990s, the bank recovered its independence and its focus on price stability. Inflation varied substantially during these subperiods. Our analysis suggests that the central bank independence, combined with a commitment to price stability, renders the best results in terms of price stability.

scholarly journals Warehousing: A Historical Lesson in Central Bank Independence

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen F. Humpage
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Foreign Exchange ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Exchange Exposure

This Economic Commentary explains how warehousing—a seemingly innocuous institutional arrangement between the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury—came to threaten the Fed’s independence. Warehousing began as an arcane procedure designed to help the Treasury cover a specific type of foreign-exchange exposure. It then grew into a supplemental source of funding for the Treasury's foreign-exchange interventions. Eventually the procedure morphed into a sizeable off-budget source of funding for other Treasury activities and seemed an inappropriate subversion of the congressional appropriations process, a development that raised concerns within the Fed about its ability to conduct monetary policy free from political concerns.

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