Is There Any Link between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Ignacio Jácome ◽  
Francisco Vazquez
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
The Caribbean

scholarly journals A historical analysis of central bank independence in Latin America: the Colombian experience, 1923-2008

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adolfo Meisel ◽  
Juan D. Barón
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Latin America, using the experience of Colombia (1923-2008) as a case study. Since its creation, in 1923, Colombia’s central bank has undergone several reforms that have changed its objectives and degree of independence. Between 1923 and 1951, it was private and independent, with a legal commitment to price stability. In 1962, monetary responsibilities were divided between a government-dominated monetary board, in charge of monetary policies, and the central bank, which carried them out. In the early 1990s, the bank recovered its independence and its focus on price stability. Inflation varied substantially during these subperiods. Our analysis suggests that the central bank independence, combined with a commitment to price stability, renders the best results in terms of price stability.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document