scholarly journals Does Telepathy Threaten Mental Privacy?

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
Stephen Braude
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Mental Privacy

A long-standing concern (or at least a belief) about ESP, held by both skeptics and believers in the paranormal, is that if telepathy really occurs, then it might pose a threat to mental privacy. And it’s easy enough to see what motivates that view. Presumably we like to think that we enjoy privileged access to our own mental states. But if others could come to know telepathically what we’re thinking or feeling, then (among other disquieting prospects) that would mean that our sins of the heart and most embarrassing or repulsive fleeting thoughts would potentially be available for public inspection. But how well-founded is that belief or concern? To get a grip on the issues, we should begin by considering the valuable distinction (perhaps first mentioned by C.D. Broad--Broad, 1953, 1962) between telepathic (or clairvoyant) cognition and telepathic (or clairvoyant) interaction. As you would expect, every instance of the former would be an instance of the latter, but the converse doesn’t hold—that is, ESP interaction may occur without ESP cognition. To see why this matters, we must take a closer look. If telepathic cognition occurs at all, it would presumably be a form of non-sensorial knowledge about another individual’s state of mind. More specifically, it would be a state of affairs in which so-called “percipient” A comes to know something about a telepathic interaction A has with another individual B.  And what kind of things might A telepathically come to know? Well, presumably, in its most robust (and most intrusively intimidating) form, A would learn what’s going on in B’s mind—that is, that B is having certain thoughts, perceptions, or emotions. But it would still be an instance of telepathic cognition—admittedly, less intimidating or threatening to one’s mental privacy—if A learned merely that B was the telepathic cause of A’s current thought or experience—that is, that B was directly influencing or interfering with A’s stream of consciousness, whether or not A’s resulting thoughts or experiences were those of B or known by A to be those of B.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

scholarly journals Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Figà Talamanca
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cooperative Hunting ◽  
Mutual Awareness ◽  
Shared Practice ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.

Intentionality of movement: Mirror neuron system and theory of mind

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2113-2113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Borghi ◽  
F. Binkofski
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Action Understanding ◽  
Imaging Studies ◽  
Motor Representation ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Additional Explanation

The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.

2. The elements of a crime: actus reus

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-87
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Problematic Case ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Mental Element ◽  
State Of Affairs

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result and negligible causes.

2. The elements of a crime: actus reus

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Problematic Case ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Mental Element ◽  
State Of Affairs

The chapter begins the exploration of the elements of criminal offences. Two factors are crucial: the event, behaviour or state of affairs known as the external element or actus reus, and the state of mind known as the mental element or mens rea. This chapter discusses the principle of actus reus, proof and the elements of the offence, how to identify elements of actus reus and mens rea, coincidence of actus reus and mens rea, the effect of penalty provisions in determining the elements of the actus reus, actus reus and justification or excuse, the problematic case of Dadson with regard to actus reus, physical involuntariness, a ‘state of affairs’ as an actus reus, general liability for omissions, offences of mere omission, causation, the ‘but for’ principle, the connection between fault and result, and negligible causes.

The Challenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges Mounted from That Data

2020 ◽  
pp. 207-261
Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
The Brain

The suppositions about the psychology of moral agency are challenged by neuroscience in four ways: first, by denying that the choices of persons can be uncaused (and thus “free” in this contra-causal sense); second, by denying that the choices of persons actually cause the actions that are chosen, such actions rather being epiphenomenal with such actions, co-effects of some common cause in the brain; third, by denying that the minds of persons are anything but the brute, dumb firing of two valued switches in the brains of such persons, a mere mechanism or machine; fourth, by denying that persons have the kind of privileged access to their own mental states that gives persons the knowledge needed for control and for responsibility. Two responses to these four challenges are previewed, a response denying the truth of these claims and a response denying the relevance of these claims to responsibility. The attempt to sidestep these challenges known as “cheap compatibilism” is also reviewed and rejected.

scholarly journals Ferenczi and group analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Tubert-Oklander
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Influence ◽  
Group Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Transference And Countertransference ◽  
The Family ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Essential Unity

Sándor Ferenczi did not work with groups, yet his thinking and practice can be conceived as a major influence on the origins and development of group analysis and as a seminal source of ideas for its further development today. In his approach to psychoanalysis, social facts have a bearing on psychological facts, and vice versa. This implies a constant interchange and mutual influence between individual and collective processes, inner and outer, psychological and social. This is one of the basic tenets of group analysis, which requires that social facts be given as much attention as the psychological. Ferenczi’s major contributions to the emergence of group analysis are his conceptual and technical revolutionary innovations, centred on the essential unity and mutual interchange between transference and countertransference. His emphasis on the fundamental importance of actual relations with other significant persons, such as the primary caregivers, the family, the analyst and society, and his description of the dynamic interplay of transference and countertransference anticipated the theoretical developments of group analysis. He introduced the holistic concept of the unity of transference and countertransference and of the family and the child. This implied an underlying but yet unformulated field theory, which is basic for group analysis. The essential unity and mutual interchange of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ may be accounted for by Ferenczi’s concept of an originary undifferentiated state of mind, called ‘Thalassal’, from which all other mental states, experiences, perceptions and thoughts evolve, and which remains present but unseen, underlying the more differentiated states. This is the psychological basis for Foulkes’ conception of the matrix and Pichon-Rivière’s theory of the link (bond). Ferenczi’s memory was long repressed by the psychoanalytic world, but now that it has been recovered, his contributions may provide many of the missing pieces of group-analytic theory and practice and build the much-needed bridges between psychoanalysis and group analysis.

scholarly journals Peace and Paradise: Searching for Identity

2002 ◽  
pp. 48-55
Author(s):  
K. Semchynskiy
Keyword(s):  
Kingdom Of God ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
The One ◽  
Special Meaning

The concept of "peace" from a religious point of view is complex and multifaceted. On the one hand, "peace" is a state of affairs opposite to that of war; on the other, it is a certain state of mind, characterized by calmness and lack of anxiety, a grace bestowed. All the world's religions give special meaning to this concept and use it to express their best wishes. Greetings from Jews, Christians, and Muslims sound like "peace to you", Christians wishing each other peace during worship ("Peace be with you"). "Peace" is desirable both in real earthly life and in another, better world, represented in these religions as "paradise", the heaven of heavens, the kingdom of God, various degrees of heaven (seventh heaven, virgin heaven).

scholarly journals Judging the Secret Thoughts of All: Functional Neuroimaging, ‘Brain Reading’, and the Theological Ethics of Privacy

2020 ◽  
pp. 095394682091032
Author(s):  
Neil Messer
Keyword(s):  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Lie Detection ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Theological Ethics ◽  
Privacy Rights ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Reading Technology ◽  
The Many ◽  
Mental Privacy

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection.

When the Antidote is the Poison: Ironic Mental Control Processes

1997 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Wegner
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Load ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Operating Process ◽  
Monitoring Process ◽  
Ironic Processes ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Automatic Search ◽  
Time Urgency ◽  
Mental Contents

The theory of ironic processes of mental control holds that both the most and the least desired effects of attempts to control one's own mental states accrue from two processes an intentional operating process (a conscious, effortful search for mental contents that will produce a desired state of mind) and an ironic monitoring process (an unconscious, automatic search for mental contents that signal a failure to produce the desired state of mind) Although the monitoring process usually functions just to activate the operating process, during stress, distraction, time urgency, or other mental load, the monitor's effects on mind can supersede those of the operator, producing the very state of mind that is least desired An individual's attempts to gain mental control may thus precipitate the unwanted mental states they were intended to remedy

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