scholarly journals Research on Deviations of the Chinese Fiscal Competition among Local Governments from the Tiebout Model

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang Lijuan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Tiebout Model

Public Finance and Soft Budgets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosella Levaggi
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Public Healthcare ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint

The concept of soft budget constraint, describes a situation where a decision-maker finds it impossible to keep an agent to a fixed budget. In healthcare it may refer to a (nonprofit) hospital that overspends, or to a lower government level that does not balance its accounts. The existence of a soft budget constraint may represent an optimal policy from the regulator point of view only in specific settings. In general, its presence may allow for strategic behavior that changes considerably its nature and its desirability. In this article, soft budget constraint will be analyzed along two lines: from a market perspective and from a fiscal federalism perspective. The creation of an internal market for healthcare has made hospitals with different objectives and constraints compete together. The literature does not agree on the effects of competition on healthcare or on which type of organizations should compete. Public hospitals are often seen as less efficient providers, but they are also intrinsically motivated and/or altruistic. Competition for quality in a market where costs are sunk and competitors have asymmetric objectives may produce regulatory failures; for this reason, it might be optimal to implement soft budget constraint rules to public hospitals even at the risk of perverse effects. Several authors have attempted to estimate the presence of soft budget constraint, showing that they derive from different strategic behaviors and lead to quite different outcomes. The reforms that have reshaped public healthcare systems across Europe have often been accompanied by a process of devolution; in some countries it has often been accompanied by widespread soft budget constraint policies. Medicaid expenditure in the United States is becoming a serious concern for the Federal Government and the evidence from other states is not reassuring. Several explanations have been proposed: (a) local governments may use spillovers to induce neighbors to pay for their local public goods; (b) size matters: if the local authority is sufficiently big, the center will bail it out; equalization grants and fiscal competition may be responsible for the rise of soft budget constraint policies. Soft budget policies may also derive from strategic agreements among lower tiers, or as a consequence of fiscal imbalances. In this context the optimal use of soft budget constraint as a policy instrument may not be desirable.

Establishing The Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 702-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Teske ◽  
Mark Schneider ◽  
Michael Mintrom ◽  
Samuel Best
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Tiebout Model ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Micro Foundations

The Tiebout model of competition in the local market for public goods is an important and controversial theory. The current debate revolves around the apparent disparity between macro empirical studies that show greater efficiency in the supply of public goods in polycentric regions compared to consolidated ones and micro evidence of widespread citizen-consumer ignorance, which has been used to argue that individual actions cannot plausibly lead to efficiency-enhancing competition between local governments. We argue that competitive markets can be driven by a subset of informed consumers who shop around between alternate suppliers and produce pressure for competitive outcomes from which all consumers benefit. Using data from a survey of over five hundred households, we analyze the role of these marginal citizen-consumers and incorporate the costs of information gathering and the strategic interests of local governments into the competitive market model.

The Effects of Fiscal Competition on Local Property and Income Tax Reliance

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Arthur Spry
Keyword(s):  
School Districts ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Local Property ◽  
Property Taxes ◽  
Recent Experience ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Ohio School Districts

AbstractThis paper examines why local governments rely heavily on the property tax, even when they have access to another revenue source, using data from Ohio’s recent experience of permitting local school districts to use both property taxes and residence-based income taxes. Nechyba’s (1997) theory that local governments’ reliance on the property tax instead of the income tax is due to fiscal competition for relatively high-income residents is tested using data from 610 Ohio school districts. The Ohio residence-based school district income tax is used by only 119 school districts, at low tax rates, to supplement the traditional property tax. The use of a local income tax declines sharply as fiscal competition increases, as measured by the number of nearby school districts. School districts with greater opportunities to export the burden of the property tax to non-residential property owners are less likely to adopt a local income tax.

scholarly journals Fiscal Competition Among Local Governments after Fiscal Decentralization

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Haryo Kuncoro
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Spatial Interaction ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Intergovernmental Grants ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Local Government Expenditures

Spatial interaction among local governments in fiscal setting decisions is receiving increasingly attention in the applied public economics literature. Spatial interaction models rely on the presence of an externality from local budget making, that is external effects originate from inter-jurisdictional resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base, or from local public expenditure spillovers into neighboring jurisdictions. Similarly, the intergovernmental grants competition exists when there is a rivalry among local governments to get them from central government. This paper attempted to identify how great the fiscal competition among local governments in Indonesia. Using spatial statistics, we concluded that the fiscal competition among municipalities was greater compared to the pre fiscal decentralization period. It seems that the local tax setting and expenditures decisions in particular municipality can be attributed to the mimicking behavior to neighbor regions. Also, we found that the fiscal competition among municipalities could be attributed negatively to the fiscal disparity. Those imply that in the regional autonomy era the local governments tend to increase their local own revenue intensively and demand for intergovernmental grants in order to finance their expenditures. In the long run, they could lead to the high cost economy, worsening fiscal dependency, and inefficiency of local government expenditures. Those findings above suggest that the distribution of intergovernmental transfers among regions should consider the local tax effort and the services minimum standard plays an important role to achieve the efficiency of local government expenditures.

scholarly journals FISCAL COMPETITION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

2012 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250013 ◽  
Author(s):  
THIERRY MADIÈS ◽  
JEAN-JACQUES DETHIER
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Public Infrastructure ◽  
Fdi Inflows ◽  
Fiscal Incentives ◽  
Accelerated Depreciation ◽  
Tax Holidays

Fiscal competition between governments to attract investment can take the form of business tax rebates, productivity-enhancing public infrastructure, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances or loss carry-forward for income tax purposes. This paper surveys the recent theoretical and empirical economic literature and deals with three issues. First, it examines if the theoretical literature on fiscal competition and bidding races contribute to a better understanding of these phenomena in developing countries. Second, it examines whether FDI inflows in developing countries are sensitive to fiscal incentives and if there is empirical evidence of strategic behavior by developing country governments in order to attract FDI. Finally, it reviews the literature's conclusions about fiscal competition among local governments in developing countries.

Florida Agritourism Building and Fire Codes

EDIS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Beth Henry ◽  
Kathryn A Stofer
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Education ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Building Codes ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Agricultural Operations ◽  
On Farm ◽  
Fire Codes

Agritourism marries Florida’s two largest industries, tourism and agriculture, to provide an on-farm recreational experience for consumers. Although Florida trails many other states in the number of agritourism operations, the number of Florida farms offering recreational experiences more than doubled from 2007 to 2012. This new 4-page document describes building codes relevant to Florida agritourism operations. Written by Mary Beth Henry and Kathryn A. Stofer, and published by the UF/IFAS Department of Agricultural Education and Communication.https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/wc349 A companion document, Florida’s Agritourism Laws, EDIS publication AEC623, Florida’s Agritourism Laws, http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/wc285, discusses Florida Statutes related to definitions, liability protections, and limits to regulatory authority of local governments over bona fide agricultural operations engaged in agritourism.

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