scholarly journals Writing Nature with Darwin, Darwinism and Jung

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Rowland

Charles Darwin and C. G. Jung were revolutionary thinkers about the role of human beings in the natural world. While Darwin’s Origins of Species (1859) sought to remove both God and “man” from the centre of the understanding of nature, C. G. Jung, one generation later, aimed to remove the ego from the central definition of human nature. Although both theorists have been explored for their conceptual ideas, neither has been seriously considered as writers, and in particular as writers of nature and human nature. This paper shows how similar these authors are in treating the unknowable in the psyche and history as of major significance. In particular, both writers require the resources of ancient myth, especially of nature as an Earth Mother goddess in order to represent the inconceivable. The paper also looks at the new critical practice of “literary Darwinism,” which, while viable in its own terms, suffers from being neither “literary,” nor “Darwinian.”

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milla Benicio

RESUMO O principal objetivo deste artigo é traçar o itinerário científico e filosófico que permitiu à modernidade a criação de um novo campo de visibilidade dentro da ciência, enfraqueceu o antigo pressuposto da centralidade do homem em relação aos demais seres e levou a uma complexa transformação nas relações do homem com o mundo natural. Nosso foco será, portanto, a grande reorganização epistemológica e cultural do Ocidente, cujas quebras de paradigmas revolucionaram não apenas as noções ligadas à natureza, mas, principalmente, ao papel do homem nesse cenário.Palavras-chave: Reorganização Epistemológica; Homem; Mundo Natural.      ABSTRACT This article aims to draw the scientific and philosophical route which allowed to modernity the creation of a new field of visibility within science. This field weakened the old assumption of the centrality of human beings in relation to other and led to a complex transformation in human relationships with the natural world. Our focus will therefore be the major epistemological reorganization of the Western, whose breaking paradigms revolutionized not only the concepts related to the nature, but, mainly, to the role of the man in this scenario.Keywords: Epistemological Reorganization; Man; Natural World.


Author(s):  
Garrett Hardin

Before Malthus appeared on the scene, William Godwin recognized that the expanding population might ultimately produce an unfavorable ratio of population to resources which could create a problem. Five years later Malthus viewed this problem as an inevitable result of human nature reacting to a world of limits. Godwin, however (in the passage previously quoted at the end of Box 3-1) had proposed to solve the population by changing human nature. He suggested that some day our species might "cease to propagate." Since this was written in England two hundred years ago, in the absence of contradictory evidence we can only assume that Godwin was postulating an end to human sexual activity. He no doubt thought the sacrifice would be worthwhile because, in his Utopia, there would be "no war, no crimes, no administration of justice, as it is called, and no government. Besides this, there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, nor resentment." Most of Godwin's suppositions are too ridiculous to linger over, but one of them deserves an extended analysis because it touches on a general principle that will be called upon repeatedly as we continue to look for ways to avoid overpopulation. There is not the ghost of a chance that the human species will ever "cease to propagate." The reason is found in the great discovery made by Charles Darwin sixty years later: selection. Suppose, following Godwin, that the natural fertility of our species evolves almost all the way to zero. Then what? Initially, fertile individuals might be but a tiny minority of the whole; but, over time, selection would ensure the dominance of the fertile fraction. If there were even the slightest genetic basis for fecundity in human beings (as indeed there is in other animals) then fertile human beings would in time replace the infertile. To postulate a selection for universal sterility (as Godwin's scheme would require) is to perpetrate an oxymoron. Nature does not work with oxymorons. We who are alive now are the descendents of an unbroken line of fertile ancestors. This line extends back millions of years to the first humanoids—indeed, billions of years to the beginning of sexual life of any kind. Powerful though she is, Nature cannot create a self-sustaining, totally infertile, sexual species.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-84
Author(s):  
Ana Honnacker

Humanism is charged with fostering a harmful anthropocentrism that has led to the exploitation of non-human beings and the environment. Posthumanist and transhumanist ideas prominently aim at rethinking our self-understanding and human-nature relations. Yet these approaches turn out to be flawed when it comes to addressing the challenges of the “age of the humanity”, the Anthropocene. Whereas posthumanism fails in acknowledging the exceptional role of human beings with regard to political agency and responsibility, transhumanism overemphasizes human capabilities of controlling nature and only deepens the human-nature dualism. Therefore, a critical and humble version of humanism is suggested as a viable alternative. Drawing on pragmatist thinkers William James and F.C.S. Schiller, a resource for de-centering the human being is provided that critically reflects our role in the larger ecosystem and underlines human potentials as well as human responsibilities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 147737082097709
Author(s):  
Jennifer Barton-Crosby

For situational action theory (SAT), morality is key to the definition of crime and the explanation for why and how acts of crime happen: acts of crime are acts of moral rule-breaking and personal morality guides individuals’ perception of moral rule-breaking as an option before controls become relevant. However, the nature and role of morality in SAT can be misread. Within this article I respond to misinterpretations of the theory by elaborating and adding further context to the concept of morality in SAT. I contend that the root of misunderstanding is grounded in alternative assumptions regarding human nature: SAT assumes a fundamentally rule-guided human nature, whereas the prevailing view within criminology is that people are primarily self-interested. In this article I delineate SAT’s assumption of a rule-guided human nature and set out how this assumption informs the definition of crime and personal morality in the theory. I further specify the nature and role of morality in the perception of action alternatives, and in so doing distinguish SAT from theories that view constraint as the measure of morality. Finally, I develop and clarify SAT’s position on the relationship between morality and the law.


Early China ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 113-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Rakita Goldin

This article discusses the several previously unknown Confucian texts discovered in 1993 in a Warring States tomb at Guodian, near Jingmen, Hubei Province. I believe that these works should be understood as doctrinal material deriving from a single tradition of Confucianism and datable to around 300 B.C. Of the surviving literature from the same period, they are closer to the Xunzi than to any other text, and anticipate several characteristic themes in Xunzi's philosophy. These are: the notion of human nature (xing 性),and the controversy over whether the source of morality is internar or “external”; the role of learning (xue 學)and habitual practice (xi 習) in moral development; the content and origin of ritual (li 禮), by which human beings accord with the Way; the conception of the ruler as the mind (xin 心) of the state; and the psychological utility of music (yue 樂) in inculcating proper values.It is especially important for scholars to take note of these connections with Xunzi, in view of the emerging trend to associate the Guodian manuscripts with Zisi, the famous grandson of Confucius, whom Xunzi bitterly criticized.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Gerald Filson

Human beings are conceptual in ways unique to our species, different in kind from animal rationality. Our conceptual capacity goes beyond the cognitive and shapes our emotions, our moral and spiritual capabilities and our perception of the world. That conceptual capacity is formed by culture and language where language plays a central role in how we experience the world. The role of language, especially spiritual or religious language, can inform our perception of the world in ways that represent genuine ‘spiritual perception’ of the material, social and spiritual dimensions of reality. Human beings’ conceptual capabilities are fallible, even in how we use perception as a capacity for knowing the world. Conditions in modernity have increased our vulnerability to fallibility. Consequently, collective exercise of our conceptual capacities in deliberation and coordinated assessments of reality are more necessary than ever. Science and religion are influential models of how collective deliberation, or consultation, enhances our conceptual capabilities and the ways in which perception takes in a world that is both material and spiritual.


2011 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert H. Gassmann

AbstractThinkers in the Zhànguó period of Chinese history debated intensely whether men were by nature “good” or “bad”. This debate has for many years been an important focus of sinological interest, but usually these properties were not attributed to men, but rather to so-called “human nature” (xìng 性) – thus, in effect, mirroring well-known (and problematic) “European” positions and discussions. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to redirect attention to the original Zhànguó positions and to explore the reasons for their variance by offering novel and close historical readings of relevant passages, and on the other, to propose a viable historical reconstruction of the common anthropological assumptions underlying these positions by blending it with the traces of a dominant cognitive image present in the texts. This calls for a systematic rethinking of the role of hearts (in the plural), desires, and behavioural patterns in their interplay and as elements of a concept of the psychological build of human beings current in early China.


2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-116
Author(s):  
Soumaya Pernilla Ouis

Dr. Mawil Izzi Dien, Senior Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the University ofWales, has been writing about Islam and environmental issues for almosttwo decades. The Environmental Dimensions of Islam is a summary of hisprevious writings presented together with new additions. Izzi Dien is oneof the most prominent scholars in the new discourse of Islamic ecotheology,although he himself seldom refers to other Muslim scholars in this field,which somehow gives the wrong impression that he is the only one amongMuslims dealing with environmental issues.After a short introductory chapter, Izzi Dien discusses in chapter 2"The Environment and Its Components in Islam." This chapter gives aninformative introduction to Qur'anic terminology on various environmentalcomponents and their status in Islam, such as water, earth, living organisms,diversity and biogeological cycles.This Qur'anic terminology is further developed in chapter 3, deaLingwith theology pertaining to the environment. This chapter deals with issuessuch as the question of creation and the unseen and the Divine origin ofeverything: constancy, comprehensiveness, balance, and universal laws innature as the Creation. I sympathize with much of the argument presentedregarding the role of human beings in Creation, i.e., their trusteeship, partnershipand responsibility. This chapter would have been strengthened by adiscussion of the accusations from the environmental movement that themonotheistic religions represent an anthropocentric, and thus problematic,view of nature. For instance, the idea expressed in the Qur'an that God madenature subservient 􀀱·akhkhara) to human beings may be criticized (seeQur'anic verses 2:29; 45:12-13; and 14:33-34), but the author chooses notto discuss this concept at all or to refer to other scholars' criticisms.Another problem is his unusual definition of positivism, a philosophyheld accountable for promoting a hegemonic position of science associatedwith a problematic view of nature. He sees positivism as something thatIslam promotes, as in his view, it implies that human beings "are an active,positive force placed on this earth to construct, improve, and reform it." lnthe Qur'an we read about examples of how people who destroyed their ownhabitat were punished by God in the form of ecocatastrophes ...


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-251
Author(s):  
Shan Gao ◽  

Transcendentalism and Confucianism involve different understandinsgs of the concepts of nature, wilderness, and supreme goodness in terms of the metaphysical understanding of nature and how it influences the understanding of human nature. The goodness of Tao is not transcendental as understood by transcendentalism. Rather the goodness of Tao as the important moral values is shaped by human beings’ experience of the natural world. It is this deeper philosophical reason why transcendentalism encourages the aesthetic appreciation of wilderness while Confucianism encourages the aesthetic appreciation of humanized nature.


2019 ◽  
pp. 40-60
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This chapter shows that Spinoza is committed to a type of moral realism. By “moral realism” is meant a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties. By “objective property” is meant a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. The author argues that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties. Instances of goodness do not directly depend on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. The same holds for badness. His argument for this reading hinges on the conception of human nature that Spinoza appeals to in his definition of “virtue” (4D8). This conception of human nature serves as the foundation for the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness, and the author contends that it is this that makes Spinoza a type of moral realist.


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