scholarly journals Rethinking the Ramifications of Reasonableness Review: Stare Decisis and Reasonableness Review on Questions of Law

2018 ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Michelle Biddulph

The recent fashion in the Canadian law of judicial review is to apply the reasonableness standard of review to virtually any decision rendered by an administrative decision-maker. Reasonableness review is a deferential standard of review that requires a court to ensure that the administrative decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes that are defensible in light of the facts and law. When reasonableness review is applied to questions of law, the Supreme Court has occasionally ruled that the question admits of only one reasonable interpretation and has affirmed or quashed an administrative decision on that basis.This article addresses the difficult question of whether a judicial decision affirming that a provision admits of only one reasonable interpretation is strictly binding on an administrative decision-maker interpreting that provision in the future. If reasonableness review is premised on deference, then deference ought to apply to an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of that question in the future, even if it differs from the court’s interpretation. After situating this issue within the principled foundation of the Canadian law of judicial review, this article explores possible solutions to this problem, attempting to balance the need to protect the rule of law against the rationale for deference to administrative interpretations of law in the first place. It ultimately concludes by suggesting that, should Canadian courts continue to apply reasonableness review to virtually all questions of law, a uniquely administrative law approach to stare decisis will need to be developed in order to maintain a coherent and principled system of judicial review.

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 356-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Zamir

Professor David Kretzmer has reviewed the development of administrative law in Israel and reached the conclusion that a revolution has occurred. The revolution manifests itself in the substantial widening of the scope of judicial review over administrative acts. For example, the Supreme Court is now willing to review the legality of parliamentary proceedings. This revolution, in his opinion, reflects a change in the conception of the Court's function in this realm. In the past the Court saw itself as limited to the function of deciding controversies between two opposing parties. Today, it is as if another function has been added, and the Court perceives itself as the guardian of the rule of law. Therefore, it is likely to become actively engaged in protecting the rule of law and to invalidate a governmental decision even absent a controversy in the traditional sense. The Court acts in this manner without explaining the basis or the reason for the role that it has assumed. Thus, the question may well arise whether this revolution is legitimate. On the basis of Professor Kretzmer's comments one may ask if indeed the Court, in the struggle over the rule of law, has taken on a function not its own, and in doing so itself infringed upon the rule of law.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Dean R Knight

AbstractContextual review is a judicial method that rejects doctrinal or categorical methods to guide judicial supervision of administrative action. Judges are invited to assess the circumstances of a claim in the round without any doctrinal scaffolding to control the depth of scrutiny; in other words, intervention turns on an instinctive judicial impulse or overall evaluative judgement. This paper identifies and explains the various instances where this method is deployed in judicial review in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law. The efficacy of this style of review is also evaluated, using rule of law standards to frame the analysis. Its increasing popularity is a worrying turn, in part because its reliance on unstructured normativism undermines the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Knight

© 2020 The Society of Legal Scholars. Contextual review is a judicial method that rejects doctrinal or categorical methods to guide judicial supervision of administrative action. Judges are invited to assess the circumstances of a claim in the round without any doctrinal scaffolding to control the depth of scrutiny; in other words, intervention turns on an instinctive judicial impulse or overall evaluative judgement. This paper identifies and explains the various instances where this method is deployed in judicial review in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law. The efficacy of this style of review is also evaluated, using rule of law standards to frame the analysis. Its increasing popularity is a worrying turn, in part because its reliance on unstructured normativism undermines the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter considers the fate of the royal prerogative in the courts during the twentieth century. The discussions cover the relationship between statute, the prerogative, and the rule of law; the traditional perspective on judicial review of prerogative powers and its erosion; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHG) as the pivotal case in the development of judicial review of the prerogative; post-GCHG developments; and the notion of justiciability. The chapter concludes that the courts supervise the government’s use of prerogative powers more closely now than in the pre-revolutionary era. There has been an increase in the theoretical reach of the courts’ power of review since the 1967 decision in Lain. Administrative law also seems to treat prerogative and statutory powers in the same way.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
István Hoffman

<p class="Default">The Hungarian legal system and especially the administrative law is in the state of permanent change. This constantly transforming environment is a challenge for the rule of law. Every significant field of administrative law is impacted by these changes – even the judicial review model of the administrative decisions. The author analyzes the impact of these changes – especially from the last three years – on the application of administrative law. The issues raised in the article are focused on the transformation of the procedural rules, in particular on the impact of the new Act I of 2017 – Code of Administrative Court Procedure and its amendment in 2019. Two major institutions are analyzed further. First, the work analyzes the impact of the reform on the system of legal remedies in the administrative law, i.e. the reduction of the intra-administration remedies, the administrative appeal. Secondly, the extent of the judicial review was examined, in particular debates, codifications and amendments of the cassation and reformatory jurisdiction of the courts. The courts are currently the major interpreter of administrative law, whose change can be interpreted as a paradigm shift of the approach of the application of administrative law.</p>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Knight

© 2020 The Society of Legal Scholars. Contextual review is a judicial method that rejects doctrinal or categorical methods to guide judicial supervision of administrative action. Judges are invited to assess the circumstances of a claim in the round without any doctrinal scaffolding to control the depth of scrutiny; in other words, intervention turns on an instinctive judicial impulse or overall evaluative judgement. This paper identifies and explains the various instances where this method is deployed in judicial review in Anglo-Commonwealth administrative law. The efficacy of this style of review is also evaluated, using rule of law standards to frame the analysis. Its increasing popularity is a worrying turn, in part because its reliance on unstructured normativism undermines the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines the procedural grounds of judicial review. It discusses how the courts have used the procedural fairness doctrine by reviewing a number of leading cases to identify the values that appear to be shaping the content of the law. The analysis focuses on case law drawn from the ‘modern’ (ie post-1960) era, but several seminal decisions from earlier periods are also considered. The concept of procedural fairness has generated a vast body of case law in the modern era and will continue to do so in future. But the law on this point, even when seen in conjunction with the law relating to the traditional substantive grounds on which government action can be held unlawful, offers only a partial picture of the way in which administrative law fits into the broader constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-374
Author(s):  
Yan Campagnolo

Fifteen years ago, in Babcock v. Canada (A.G.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, which deprives judges of the power to inspect and order the production of Cabinet confidences in litigation, did not offend the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution. The aim of this article is to revisit this controversial ruling and challenge the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The first part seeks to demonstrate that the Supreme Court adopted a very thin conception of the rule of law in its jurisprudence, a conception which is of limited use as a normative framework to assess the legality of statutory provisions. To that end, the author turns to the thicker theory of law as justification which insists upon the requirements of fairness, transparency, and accountability. Pursuant to the theory of law as justification, an executive decision to exclude relevant evidence in litigation must comply with two requirements: it must be made following a fair decision-making process; and it must be subject to meaningful judicial review. The second part seeks to demonstrate that section 39 does not comply with these requirements. The decision-making process established by Parliament under section 39 is procedurally unfair, in violation of paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, because: the identity of the final decision-maker—a minister or the Clerk of the Privy Council—gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; and the decision-maker is not required to properly justify his or her decision to exclude relevant evidence. In addition, section 39 infringes the core, or inherent, jurisdiction and powers of provincial superior courts, in violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as it unduly limits their authority to: control the admissibility of evidence in litigation; and review the legality of executive action. As a result of these flaws, the author argues that section 39 is an unlawful privative clause, a form of legal black hole, which offends the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution.


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