scholarly journals The Unbroken Supremacy of the Canadian Constitution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Bird
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
The Past ◽  
Parliamentary Supremacy ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review

This article revives the awareness of the heritage and inheritance of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It exposes the pre-1982 legal basis for constitutional judicial review in Canada and the mechanics of the transition in 1982 to an express supremacy clause. This article also challenges two popular notions in Canadian constitutional law today. The first is that the addition of section 52(1) in 1982 transformed Canada from a state governed by parliamentary supremacy into a state governed by constitutional supremacy. The second is that the Canadian judiciary became the guardian of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 1982 was, with respect to the supremacy of the Canadian Constitution, a moment of continuity rather than a break with the past.

Answering the Dispersed Self and Nation: A Response to Jed Rubenfeld's Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self Government

2006 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-383
Author(s):  
Richard P. Church
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
The Past ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Nation ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review

Why do nine Supreme Court justices have the power to overturn the choices of a majority in a democratic nation? This question, known as the counter-majoritarian problem, has driven constitutional theory for the past forty years. Likewise, it is the question at the heart of Jed Rubenfeld'sFreedom and Time, A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government. In responding to this question, Rubenfeld argues that freedom and democracy require temporal extension, precluding either freedom or democracy from being reduced to the immediately present majority will of a people. Therefore, Rubenfeld concludes that the checks on the immediate will of the people at the heart of constitutional judicial review are not only democratically permissible but a necessity.

Administrative Law: Revolution or Evolution?

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 356-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Traditional Sense ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
As If

Professor David Kretzmer has reviewed the development of administrative law in Israel and reached the conclusion that a revolution has occurred. The revolution manifests itself in the substantial widening of the scope of judicial review over administrative acts. For example, the Supreme Court is now willing to review the legality of parliamentary proceedings. This revolution, in his opinion, reflects a change in the conception of the Court's function in this realm. In the past the Court saw itself as limited to the function of deciding controversies between two opposing parties. Today, it is as if another function has been added, and the Court perceives itself as the guardian of the rule of law. Therefore, it is likely to become actively engaged in protecting the rule of law and to invalidate a governmental decision even absent a controversy in the traditional sense. The Court acts in this manner without explaining the basis or the reason for the role that it has assumed. Thus, the question may well arise whether this revolution is legitimate. On the basis of Professor Kretzmer's comments one may ask if indeed the Court, in the struggle over the rule of law, has taken on a function not its own, and in doing so itself infringed upon the rule of law.

Constitutional judicial review of municipal legal acts

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-188
Author(s):  
Tatiana N. Mikheeva ◽  
◽  
Anastasiya Yu. Stepanova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review

James Bryce and the Australian Constitution

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Practical Operation ◽  
Responsible Government ◽  
Shed Light

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.

Traditional and Customary Law: Adat

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Small Proportion ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
The State ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Past ◽  
Statutory Protection ◽  
Traditional Communities

Many Indonesians—primarily those living in rural areas—still follow customary law (adat). The precise rules and processes of that adat differ significantly from place to place, even within short distances. This chapter shows that for many decades, adat has been subservient to national law. State-made law overrode it, leaving it applicable only in a very small proportion of cases where no national law applied, where judges could apply it as ‘living law’. Even in these cases, many judges ignored adat or distorted it when deciding cases. The 1945 Constitution was amended in 2000 to require the state to formally recognize and respect customary law, as practised in traditional communities. The Constitutional Court has given effect to this in various judicial review cases, as have some statutes enacted in the past decade or so. However, this constitutional and statutory ‘protection’ has been impeded in practice by requirements for traditional communities to be formally ‘recognized’ by their local governments, many of whom have been unresponsive to calls for recognition.

Impossible, in a possible sort of way

English Today ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-64
Author(s):  
Michael Bulley
Keyword(s):  
British Society ◽  
The Past ◽  
French Word ◽  
The Guardian

The combination of possibly with can't and couldn't seems to me on the increase. Or perhaps I just notice it more since I've been living in France. For in French there is no direct equivalent of possibly. You have probablement (= probably), but there is no French word *possiblement. What, then, is going on when you find in English, to take a recent example, ‘For all the malfunctions of the past few years, it's assumed the structure of British society can't possibly be refashioned’ (standfirst to an article by Marina Hyde, The Guardian, 7 July 2012)?

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONS, AND WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) THEY DO?

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Principal Function ◽  
Fundamental Law

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.

The judicial review of legality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie R. Davidson ◽  
Leora Bilsky
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
New Model ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Relationship Of

In comparative constitutional law, the various models of judicial review require courts to examine either the substantive content of legislation or the procedure through which legislation was passed. This article offers a new model of judicial review – ‘the judicial review of legality’ – in which courts review instead the forms of law. The forms of law are the ways in which law communicates its norms to the persons who are meant to comply with them, and they include generality, clarity, avoidance of contradiction, and non-retroactivity. Drawing on recent writing on the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, this article argues that Fuller’s linking of the forms of law to a relationship of reciprocity between government and governed can ground judicial review and that such review provides a missing language to address important legislative pathologies. Moreover, through an analysis of recent developments in Israel, the article demonstrates that the judicial review of legality targets some of the key legal techniques of contemporary processes of democratic erosion which other models of judicial review struggle to address, all the while re-centring judicial review on the lawyer’s craftsmanship and thus reducing problems of court legitimacy. This article therefore offers a distinctive and normatively appealing way for courts to act in troubling times.

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