scholarly journals The American Judiciary Through the Lens of The Federalist Papers

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 10-15
Author(s):  
Eric Rayment-Law

The manner in which a Supreme Court justice ought to rule in any given case before him or her is a controversial topic in America, with a number of American lawmakers feeling that each justice should exercise “judicial restraint.” Those who feel this way often subscribe to the interpretive strategies of strict construction or originalism, which both cast judges as activists who have a political agenda, imposing it on America while ignoring the Constitution. As a remedy to their grievances, constructionists propose that the constitutional text should be rigorously adhered to while constitutional rights should be narrowly defined. Similarly, originalists propose that the Justices of the American Supreme Court interpret the law according to the intentions of the founding generation. This paper assesses the validity of these interpretive strategies by entertaining the originalist argument (albeit modified) and deferring judgment in this matter to The Federalist number seventy-eight and number ten.  Upon analysis of these American founding documents, it is found that the intent of the founding generation to indeed create a judiciary that adheres to the parameters set by the Constitution, but also one that possesses room to incorporate their own judicial philosophies into their legal interpretations as opposed to one that exercises strict judicial restraint.

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela C. Corley ◽  
Robert M. Howard ◽  
David C. Nixon

1960 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-76
Author(s):  
Herbert J. Spiro

When the American Founding Fathers set about the task of perfecting the constitution of their union, they turned to the theory and practice of the Old World for counsel and illustration. The Federalist Papers contain many references to Hume and Montesquieu, the British Constitution and ancient leagues. However, it was not copying from foreign examples that made such an outstanding success of the Constitution of the United States. Rather it was the authors' imaginative creativity that gave to this oldest of the still operating written constitutions its unique combination of stability and flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency.


2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela C. Corley, J. D. ◽  
Robert M. Howard ◽  
David C. Nixon

1988 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 923
Author(s):  
Harold M. Hyman ◽  
Charles R. Kesler ◽  
Burke Marshall

Author(s):  
Francisco Fernández Segado

The first eleven years of the United States Supreme Court show us a plural mosaic of feelings, perhaps even contradictory each other, with regard to the evaluation of the organ and its decisions. The view of a devaluated Court it is the frist feeling. The Circuit riding’s duty of the Supreme Court Justices, the short-lived of its sessions and the reduced number of its opinions are some of the reasons of this devaluation. Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the contents of some decisions, it is possible to change the feelings. Certainly, in this initial stage we don’t find noted cases nor impact opinions, but we think that it’s indisputable that some decisions contributed to the frist forging of the American constitutional system. With regard to the judicial review of the constituonality of the acts passed by Congress, we shall not be so audacious to question the Marbury v. Madison Myth, but we think that Marbury opinion involves only the formal establishment of a doctrine whose theoretical grounds and historical precedents are present not only in the No. LXXVIII of the «Federalist papers» but also in several decisions of the «pre- Marshcall Court» and in different dogmatic expositions of the first stage’s Supreme Court Justices.Los primeros once años del Tribunal Supremo norteamericano nos muestran un plural mosaico de sensaciones, quizá incluso contradictorias, en orden a la calaboración del órgano y sus decisiones. La primera de ellas es la que nos encontramos ante un órgano devaluado. La participación de los Jueces de la Corte Suprema en los Tribunales de Circuito, la corta duración de sus sesiones y el reducido número de sus sentencias, son algunas de las razones de esa devaluación. Sin embargo, si atendemos al contenido de algunas de sus decisiones, las sensaciones pueden llegar a cambiar. Desde luego, en esta etapa inicial del tribunal no nos encontramos con casos célebres ni con decisiones impactantes, pero creemos que es indiscutible, que algunas decisiones contribuyeron a la primera forja del sistema constitucional norteamericno. En relación a la revisión judicial de la constitucionalidad de las leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, no vamos a ser tan atrevidos, como para cuestionar el mito de Marbury v. Madison (1803), pero sí pensamos que la sentencia Marbury entraña tan sólo el establecimineto formal de una doctrina cuyos fundamentos teóricos se hallan presentes no sólo en el Nº LXXVIII del «Federalista», sino también en varias decisiones de la Corte anterior a Marshall y en diferentes planteamientos dogmáticos de los Jueces de esta primera etapa del Tribunal.


1988 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Steinberg

CAN THE SWISS CONFEDERATION BE IMITATED? THAT DEPENDS, says the historian, on what you mean by imitation. Switzerland has certainly served as a model for others, sometimes a model distinctly not to be imitated. When the American Founding Fathers gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to write a new constitution and ‘to form a more perfect Union’, they had Switzerland in mind. Alexander Hamilton, a chief actor in that enterprise, devoted part of an issue of The Federalist Papers, written the following year as a defence of what the framers had drafted, to a close analysis of the Swiss Confederation. Switzerland did not impress him:The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy, though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions. They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common part of sovereignty …He recognised that they were held together ‘by their joint interest’ but saw the confederacy as a poor guarantor of internal and external coherence. ‘Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up capable of trying its strength it failed.’


1985 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 296
Author(s):  
Robert J. Morgan ◽  
Albert Furtwangler ◽  
David F. Epstein

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