The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers

The first eleven years of the United States Supreme Court show us a plural mosaic of feelings, perhaps even contradictory each other, with regard to the evaluation of the organ and its decisions. The view of a devaluated Court it is the frist feeling. The Circuit riding’s duty of the Supreme Court Justices, the short-lived of its sessions and the reduced number of its opinions are some of the reasons of this devaluation. Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the contents of some decisions, it is possible to change the feelings. Certainly, in this initial stage we don’t find noted cases nor impact opinions, but we think that it’s indisputable that some decisions contributed to the frist forging of the American constitutional system. With regard to the judicial review of the constituonality of the acts passed by Congress, we shall not be so audacious to question the Marbury v. Madison Myth, but we think that Marbury opinion involves only the formal establishment of a doctrine whose theoretical grounds and historical precedents are present not only in the No. LXXVIII of the «Federalist papers» but also in several decisions of the «pre- Marshcall Court» and in different dogmatic expositions of the first stage’s Supreme Court Justices.Los primeros once años del Tribunal Supremo norteamericano nos muestran un plural mosaico de sensaciones, quizá incluso contradictorias, en orden a la calaboración del órgano y sus decisiones. La primera de ellas es la que nos encontramos ante un órgano devaluado. La participación de los Jueces de la Corte Suprema en los Tribunales de Circuito, la corta duración de sus sesiones y el reducido número de sus sentencias, son algunas de las razones de esa devaluación. Sin embargo, si atendemos al contenido de algunas de sus decisiones, las sensaciones pueden llegar a cambiar. Desde luego, en esta etapa inicial del tribunal no nos encontramos con casos célebres ni con decisiones impactantes, pero creemos que es indiscutible, que algunas decisiones contribuyeron a la primera forja del sistema constitucional norteamericno. En relación a la revisión judicial de la constitucionalidad de las leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, no vamos a ser tan atrevidos, como para cuestionar el mito de Marbury v. Madison (1803), pero sí pensamos que la sentencia Marbury entraña tan sólo el establecimineto formal de una doctrina cuyos fundamentos teóricos se hallan presentes no sólo en el Nº LXXVIII del «Federalista», sino también en varias decisiones de la Corte anterior a Marshall y en diferentes planteamientos dogmáticos de los Jueces de esta primera etapa del Tribunal.

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The American Judiciary Through the Lens of The Federalist Papers

The Agora Political Science Undergraduate Journal ◽

10.29173/agora10084 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 1 ◽

pp. 10-15

Author(s):

Eric Rayment-Law

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Political Agenda ◽

Constitutional Rights ◽

American Founding ◽

Supreme Court Justice ◽

Federalist Papers ◽

The Federalist ◽

Controversial Topic ◽

The Federalist Papers ◽

Interpretive Strategies

The manner in which a Supreme Court justice ought to rule in any given case before him or her is a controversial topic in America, with a number of American lawmakers feeling that each justice should exercise “judicial restraint.” Those who feel this way often subscribe to the interpretive strategies of strict construction or originalism, which both cast judges as activists who have a political agenda, imposing it on America while ignoring the Constitution. As a remedy to their grievances, constructionists propose that the constitutional text should be rigorously adhered to while constitutional rights should be narrowly defined. Similarly, originalists propose that the Justices of the American Supreme Court interpret the law according to the intentions of the founding generation. This paper assesses the validity of these interpretive strategies by entertaining the originalist argument (albeit modified) and deferring judgment in this matter to The Federalist number seventy-eight and number ten. Upon analysis of these American founding documents, it is found that the intent of the founding generation to indeed create a judiciary that adheres to the parameters set by the Constitution, but also one that possesses room to incorporate their own judicial philosophies into their legal interpretations as opposed to one that exercises strict judicial restraint.

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The Federalist Papers

Wolfram Research Data Repository ◽

10.24097/wolfram.55418.data ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Keyword(s):

Federalist Papers ◽

The Federalist ◽

The Federalist Papers

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The Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers

The William and Mary Quarterly ◽

10.2307/1920448 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 42 (2) ◽

pp. 296

Author(s):

Robert J. Morgan ◽

Albert Furtwangler ◽

David F. Epstein

Keyword(s):

Federalist Papers ◽

The Federalist ◽

The Federalist Papers

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Book Review | George Will’s Conservatism and Democracy in Crisis

eJournal of Public Affairs ◽

10.21768/ejopa.v9i2.10 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Direct Democracy ◽

The United States ◽

James Madison ◽

American Government ◽

Federalist Papers ◽

The Federalist ◽

The Difference ◽

The Government ◽

The Federalist Papers

Americans typically view the United States as a democracy and are rightly proud of that. Of course, as those of a more precise nature, along with smug college students enrolled in introductory American government classes, are quick to point out, the United States is technically a republic. This is a bit too clever by half since James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, defined a republic the way most people think of a democracy—a system of representative government with elections: “[The]… difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.” What the framers thought of as democracy is today referred to as direct democracy, the belief that citizens should have more direct control over governing. The Athenian assembly was what the framers, Madison in particular, saw as the paragon of direct democracy—and as quite dangerous. While direct democracy has its champions, most Americans equate democracy with electing officials to do the business of government.

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