Exploring the Multi-lateral Security Cooperation and the Military Control in Korean Peninsula : Focusing on Theories and European Experiences

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-130
Author(s):  
Jeongwoo Lee

Significance Although official results are due on August 10, the Election Commission has announced that, after a count of 94% of votes, both questions posed in the referendum -- on the draft constitution and on the role of the appointed Senate in selecting the prime minister -- have won approval by 61% and 58% respectively. This is a major political victory for the military's National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha. Impacts The military, the palace and all major political parties favour an open economy. This will secure investor interest in Thailand. Strong military control over the state will reduce the policy influence of civilian politicians. Despite the political turn, US-Thailand security cooperation will continue, as will the deepening of China-Thailand economic partnership.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

This chapter examines how enemy images are produced and reproduced in relations between two enemies. It identifies four drivers of security competition that block the development of trust. These are: (1) the security dilemma; (2) the problem of offence–defence differentiation; (3) peaceful/defensive self-images; (4) ideological fundamentalism; and (5) uncertainty about future intentions. Using examples such as the military stand-off on the Korean peninsula and the Libyan dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, the chapter shows how hard it is for face-to-face diplomacy to change enemy images. It also examines the problem of ‘future uncertainty’—the problem of what happens if successor leaders do not share the trust of their predecessors and have malign intent.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Kukjoo Kim ◽  
Kyung-Ryeung Min ◽  
Young-Jun Park

The Korean peninsula is under increasing threat of electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) from neighboring countries; EMP protection facilities are an essential means of ensuring the operational readiness of the military. However, existing EMP protection facilities are manufactured as fixed-weight structures, which limit the mobility of military operations and lead to the misconception of EMP protection as something only required for higher command. The current military and official EMP protection standards require only a uniform shielding effectiveness of 80 dB. Therefore, this study aims to differentiate the existing uniform level of shielding effectiveness of 80 dB into 80 dB, 60 dB, 40 dB, etc. Further, it seeks to derive the factors to be considered when applying various methods, such as shielding rooms, shielding racks, site redundancy, spare equipment, and portable lightweight protective tents, for recovery of failure, instead of the existing protection facilities that rely on shielded rooms by the Delphi analysis. Then, the applicability of lightweight EMP protection is determined after selecting lightweight materials to build a facility. The electromagnetic shielding performance of 21 types of materials was measured in the 30 MHz–1.5 GHz frequency band using ASTM-D-4935-10. The results showed the possibility of developing a lightweight EMP shielding facility, which would save approximately 316,386 tons of concrete, reducing the CO2 emissions by approximately 9,972,489 tons. Assuming that the Korean carbon transaction price is USD 50/ton CO2, the savings are equivalent to USD 49,862,435.


Significance The situation has highlighted several issues of concern around the influence of the Mexican military, the government’s reliance on it and the challenges Mexico and its security agencies face in trying to meet US demands while addressing domestic threats. Impacts Mexican militarisation was facilitated by Trump administration apathy on human rights; this will change under President Joe Biden. Increased US-bound migration, encouraged by Biden’s more humane rhetoric, will heighten the need for bilateral security cooperation. Future Mexican administrations will struggle to reverse the political influence the military has obtained.


2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 68-77
Author(s):  
Bojian LIU ◽  
Gang CHEN

In a new wave of reform, China’s Central Military Commission remains a party-state organ of the highest military control. Politically, the reorganisation enhances intra-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) supervision and inter-section checks, and paves the way for the personnel reshuffle before the 19th Party Congress scheduled in 2017. Strategically, the military reshuffle is to advance the PLA’s joint operational capability, facilitate modernisation of weapon systems, accelerate China’s transition towards maritime power and improve the PLA’s systemic commanding efficiency.


Author(s):  
Simon James

From the junction of H and 8th Sts, which gave access to the twin main axes of the military base zone on the plateau, H St led S to the bulk of the civil town and ultimately to the Palmyrene Gate, the steppe plateau W of the city, and the roads W to Palmyra and NW up the Euphrates to Syria. The fourth side of the crossroads followed a curving course SE, down into the inner wadi, then snaking through the irregularly laid-out old lower town to the now-lost River Gate, portal to the Euphrates and its plain. Of most immediate significance is that the Wadi Ascent Road also linked the plateau military zone with what can now be seen as another major area of military control, in the old Citadel, and on the adjacent wadi floor. The N part of the wadi floor is now known to have accommodated two military-built temples, the larger of which, the A1 ‘Temple of the Roman Archers’, was axial to the long wadi floor, which in the Roman period appears to have comprised one of the largest areas of open ground inside the city walls. This is interpreted as the campus, or military assembly and training ground, extension of which was commemorated in an inscription found in the temple. In 2011, what is virtually certainly a second military temple was found in the wadi close by the first, built against the foundation of the Citadel. This is here referred to as the Military Zeus Temple. Behind the Temple of the Roman Archers was a lane leading from the Wadi Ascent Road to the N gate of the Citadel. It helped define a further de facto enclosure, effectively surrounded by other military-controlled areas and so also presumed to have been in military hands. The Citadel itself, while in Roman times already ruinous on the river side due to cliff falls, still formed part of the defences. Moreover the massive shell of its Hellenistic walls now also appears to have been adapted to yet more military accommodation, some of it two storeys or higher.


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Sondrol

The Process of the transition from authoritarianism to more representative forms of government has become a major subject of the scholarship on Latin American politics today (O'Donnell, et al, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Stepan, 1989; Diamond et al, 1988-1990; Lowenthal, 1991). Given this interest, as expressed by the growing literature in this area, little attention has been paid to the transition process now going on in Paraguay, which is now emerging from one of Latin America's most long-standing authoritarian regimes.A number of studies testify to the authoritarian nature of Paraguay's government and society. Johnson indicates that Paraguay ranked either 18th or 19th—out of 20 Latin American nations ... in 9 successive surveys of democratic development, carried out at 5-year intervals from 1945 to 1985 (Jonnson> 1988). A longitudinal study of press freedom found that Paraguay was invariably placed in the category of “poor,” or even “none,” between 1945-1975 (Hill and Hurley, 1980). When Palmer applied his 5 indicators of authoritarianism (nonelective rule, coups, primacy of the military, military rule, executive predominance) to the countries of Latin America, Paraguay consistently ranked first in its degree of authoritarianism (Palmer, 1977).


Author(s):  
Cecilia Sheridan-Prieto

In New Spain, the 18th century was characterized by important political and administrative changes in imperial geopolicy that stemmed from the reforms introduced by Spain’s king, Charles III, which continued under the Bourbon monarchs. These so-called Bourbon Reforms sought to reduce the centralizing power of the viceroyalty’s governments, as well as that of the Royal Audiences in Spanish America. The British colonization of the Atlantic coast and the continued confrontation with Native Americans resulted in changes in New Spain’s territorial structure, especially the consolidating of the northern Provincias Internas (Internal Provinces). The project of structuring a political territory in the north originally emerged in 1751 with the aim of organizing the space into a General Command. The process began in 1776 with the appointment of José de Gálvez as the minister of the Indies. The first commanding general, Teodoro de Croix (1730–1792), who was given authorization to act independently of the viceroyalty, established the command by taking into his jurisdiction the provinces of Sonora, Sinaloa, the Californias, Nueva Vizcaya, New Mexico, Coahuila, and Tejas and, later, the New Kingdom of León and New Santander. In 1787, the Spanish government decided to modify the jurisdictions by creating provincial blocks: the Eastern Internal Provinces and the Western Internal Provinces. The jurisdiction that would experience a number of difficult changes that arose principally from the military control that began during the first years of colonization and lasted until the disappearance of viceregal power. The rest of the Spanish Empire’s territory, meanwhile, was organized into administrations ruled by a general governor or mayor who exercised powers of law, war, the treasury, public works, and the development of local economic efforts.


Significance The last major rebel-held area in Syria, Idlib province is under the military control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a salafi-jihadist rebel alliance. Jaysh al-Ahrar, the largest non-al-Qaida faction in HTS, announced on September 13 it was leaving the organisation. This followed the resignation of one of HTS’s top clerics, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, after the leaking of telephone conversations in which the military leadership criticised him harshly. Impacts Renewed unity talks between mainstream rebel factions will encourage another round of pre-emptive attacks by HTS. Likely rejection of HTS’s outreach initiative by the mainstream opposition will empower the hawks within the group. Possible regime operations against HTS would be limited to peripheral strategic positions such as Jisr al-Shughur. US-backed and pro-Damascus forces will seek to avoid clashes around Deir ez-Zour city in their separate offensives against Islamic State. A Russian military presence will deter Turkey from attacking the Syrian Kurds in Afrin and elsewhere.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document