Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Mind: A Criticism on the Language-As-Content-Integrator Hypothesis

2020 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 307-331
Author(s):  
Hyundeuk Cheon
Keyword(s):  
Massive Modularity

Modular Representations of Cognitive Phenomena in AI, Psychology and Neuroscience

2011 ◽  
pp. 66-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna J. Bryson
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Modular Representations ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Massive Modularity ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Individual Domain ◽  
Behavior Based

Many architectures of mind assume some form of modularity, but what is meant by the term ‘module’? This chapter creates a framework for understanding current modularity research in three subdisciplines of cognitive science: psychology, artificial intelligence (AI), and neuroscience. This framework starts from the distinction between horizontal modules that support all expressed behaviors vs. vertical modules that support individual domain-specific capacities. The framework is used to discuss innateness, automaticity, compositionality, representations, massive modularity, behavior-based and multi-agent AI systems, and correspondence to physiological neurosystems. There is also a brief discussion of the relevance of modularity to conscious experience.

Carruthers on Massive Modularity

2021 ◽  
pp. 881-884
Author(s):  
Ian D Stephen ◽  
Darren Burke ◽  
Danielle Sulikowski
Keyword(s):  
Massive Modularity

scholarly journals Sense or non-sense? a critical discussion of a recent evolutionary–cognitive approach to “folk-economic beliefs”

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theiss Bendixen
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Dual Inheritance Theory ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Massive Modularity ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Environment Of Evolutionary Adaptedness ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Dual Inheritance

Laypeople hold beliefs about economics and policy issues—so-called folk-economic beliefs (FEBs)—that are often wrong or misleading according to professional economists. Here, I critically discuss a recent evolutionary–cognitive approach to understanding folk-economic beliefs. According to this approach (Boyer & Petersen 2018a), some economic beliefs are more prevalent than others, because such beliefs (i.e., folk-economic beliefs) resonate with evolved features of the human mind. I refer to this as the “FEB hypothesis”. A central challenge to the FEB hypothesis, with its heavy reliance on universal cognitive features, is to explain individual and cultural differences in economic beliefs and behavior. This challenge is the starting point for the discussion. Overall, the conclusion of this paper is that the FEB hypothesis relies on unnecessarily strong and controversial theoretical assumptions (e.g., “massive modularity” and the “Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness”), and that it overlooks important findings from adjacent fields, but that the FEB hypothesis, following some modifications inspired by Dual Inheritance Theory, can be integrated with robust findings from the rest of the evolutionary, cognitive, and anthropological sciences, as well as standard political psychology. Based on this discussion, the paper ends with brief reflections on how to correct inaccurate folk-economic beliefs.

Carruthers on Massive Modularity

2016 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Ian D. Stephen ◽  
Darren Burke ◽  
Danielle Sulikowski
Keyword(s):  
Massive Modularity

Modularity

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Massive Modularity ◽  
Philosophical Project ◽  
The Mind

One of the liveliest debates within cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology concerns the extent to which, and in which sense, the mind is modular. Several different notions of module have been developed over the years, and clarifying the weaker and stronger notions of module is an important, substantial philosophical project. A range of arguments has been conceived to show that modular processes subserve all cognitive competences, some of them, or none of them, and these need to be scrutinized with care. Of particular importance are, first, Fodor’s view that modules subserve only input systems (roughly, our senses) and linguistic systems, while nonmodular, domain-general processes subserve thinking and deciding; and, second, evolutionary psychologists’ massive modularity hypothesis, according to which cognition is modular through and through.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document