scholarly journals Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Elson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Realism

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new ‘reduction’ argument against non- reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his ‘simple moral theory’ version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

FACTICITY AND SOCIOCENTRISM: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING TWO BASIC CONCEPTS OF MORAL THEORY

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (113) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Marcel Niquet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Critical Content ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Kantian Deontology ◽  
Core Meaning

Faticidade e sociocentrismo são dois conceitos fundamentais com os quais toda teoria moral se vê confrontada. O artigo enquadra o significado deles na deontologia clássica kantiana e no paradigma pós-kantiano da ética do discurso. A discussão dos problemas implicados nesses conceitos leva o autor a defender um paradigma do Realismo Normativo que faz justiça ao conteúdo crítico desses conceitos e às intuições morais contidas neles.Abstract: ´Facticity´ and ´socio-centrism´ denote major structural features of theories of morality. The paper explicates their core-meaning and tries to demonstrate how these notions are instantiated in classical Kantian deontology and the post-Kantian paradigms of discourse-ethics. A justification is attempted for abandoning these theories in favour of a possible successor paradigm of Normative Realism which does better justice to the critical content of these concepts and the morally loaded intuitions contained therein.

Caring, objectivity and justice: An integrative view

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stan van Hooft
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethics Of Care ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Integrative View ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Subjective Form

The argument of this article is framed by a debate between the principle of humanity and the principle of justice. Whereas the principle of humanity requires us to care about others and to want to help them meet their vital needs, and so to be partial towards those others, the principle of justice requires us to consider their needs without the intrusion of our subjective interests or emotions so that we can act with impartiality. I argue that a deep form of caring lies behind both approaches and so unites them. In the course of the argument, I reject Michael Slote’s sentimentalist form of an ethics of care, and expound Thomas Nagel’s moral theory, which seems to lie at the opposite end of a spectrum ranging from moral sentiments to impersonal objectivity. Nevertheless, Nagel’s theory of normative realism provides unexpected support for the thesis that a deep and subjective form of caring lies at the base of even our most objective moral reasons.

The Metaethical and Epistemological Framework

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-196
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Epistemological Framework

This chapter focuses on the metaethical and epistemological framework within which Ross develops his moral theory. It is argued that the most important distinctive feature of Ross’s nonnaturalist metaethics is his emphasis on the distinction between essence theories and grounds theories, which is the product of his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty; that Ross does a better job of arguing for nonnaturalism than Moore does in Principia Ethica; and that Ross also does well in recognizing and taking on two new alternative positions in metaethics: noncognitivism (against which he raises a version of the Frege-Geach problem decades before Geach) and error theory. It is then argued that his moral epistemology is less satisfactory. He inherits from Prichard a distinctive form of knowledge-first epistemology that (unlike Sidgwick’s fallibilist intuitionism) leads to dogmatism. And his claims about the special epistemic status of principles of prima facie duty are problematic.

What’s Wrong with Relaxing?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 725-742
Author(s):  
Christine Tiefensee
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Realism

In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way round the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory fail either for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism or expressivism. In this contribution, I show that this is false: we can avoid this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about the fate of other metaethical positions, then, relaxed realism remains immune to the problems he raises.

Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Relational Ethics and Partiality

Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (152) ◽  
pp. 53-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Motsamai Molefe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Relational Ethics ◽  
The Individual

AbstractIn this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the ‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right.

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