scholarly journals Calculation of resources and an efficiency analysis of strategies in a game model of confrontation

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-258
Author(s):  
М.А. Мусаева
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Efficiency Analysis ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Existence Conditions ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense

Сформулирована игровая модель противоборства в виде модели "нападение и защита", указаны способы вычисления ресурсов сторон, анализированы эффективность их стратегий и установлены условия существования оптимального решения рассматриваемых задач. A game model of confrontation is formulated in the form of an attack and defense model, methods for calculating the resources of the confrontation parties are discussed, their efficiency is analyzed, and the existence conditions are given for an optimal solution to the considering problems.

scholarly journals MAIAD: A Multistage Asymmetric Information Attack and Defense Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Yang ◽  
Bichen Che ◽  
Yang Zeng ◽  
Yang Cheng ◽  
Chenyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Systems Simulation

With the rapid development and widespread applications of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the corresponding security issues are getting more and more serious. This paper proposes a multistage asymmetric information attack and defense model (MAIAD) for IoT systems. Under the premise of asymmetric information, MAIAD extends the single-stage game model with dynamic and evolutionary game theory. By quantifying the benefits for both the attack and defense, MAIAD can determine the optimal defense strategy for IoT systems. Simulation results show that the model can select the optimal security defense strategy for various IoT systems.

Dynamic game model of botnet DDoS attack and defense

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (16) ◽  
pp. 3127-3140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yichuan Wang ◽  
Jianfeng Ma ◽  
Liumei Zhang ◽  
Wenjiang Ji ◽  
Di Lu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Ddos Attack ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Attack And Defense

scholarly journals Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (23) ◽  
pp. 3014
Author(s):  
Pengxi Yang ◽  
Fei Gao ◽  
Hua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.

scholarly journals A Comprehensive Attack and Defense Model for the Automotive Domain

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hutzelmann ◽  
Sebastian Banescu ◽  
Alexander Pretschner
Keyword(s):  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense

scholarly journals Study on Stochastic Differential Game Model in Network Attack and Defense

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xiaotong Xu ◽  
Gaocai Wang ◽  
Jintian Hu ◽  
Yuting Lu
Keyword(s):  
Differential Equation ◽  
Stochastic Differential Equation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Markov Property ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Disturbance Factor ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Selection Of

In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been gradually applied to analyze and predict network attack and defense for maintaining cybersecurity. The traditional deterministic game model cannot accurately describe the process of actual network attack and defense due to changing in the set of attack-defense strategies and external factors (such as the operating environment of the system). In this paper, we construct a stochastic evolutionary game model by the stochastic differential equation with Markov property. The evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is found and the stability of the model is proved according to the knowledge of the stochastic differential equation. And we apply the explicit Euler numerical method to analyze the evolution of the strategy selection of the players for different problem situations. The simulation results show that the stochastic evolutionary game model proposed in this paper can get a steady state and obtain the optimal defense strategy under the action of the stochastic disturbance factor. In addition, compared with other kinds of literature, we can conclude that the return on security investment of this model is better, and the strategy selection of the attackers and defenders in our model is more suitable for actual network attack and defense.

Skills, Efficiency, and Timing in a Simple Attack and Defense Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Dimitri
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Relative Efficiency ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Relative Notion ◽  
Attack And Defense

In this paper, we consider a simple two-player attack and defense model, focusing on the role of players’ abilities and choice timing. Abilities are divided into skills and efficiency, where the former is an absolute notion and the latter a relative notion of ability. Timing is investigated by comparing players’ investments in a simultaneous and a Stackelberg game. In the simultaneous game, the Nash Equilibrium investment level in attack and defense resources is symmetric, increasing in the skills but non-monotonic in the relative efficiency. In the Stackelberg game, the equilibrium investment levels are asymmetric, increasing in the skills, but with their ranking affected only by the relative efficiency. Therefore, interestingly, players’ choice is mostly characterized by players’ relative efficiency rather than by their skills, in regards to timing.

scholarly journals The ``attack-defense'' game with restrictions on the intake capacity of points

2020 ◽  
pp. 78-92
Author(s):  
Александр Геннадьевич Перевозчиков ◽  
Валерий Юрьевич Решетов ◽  
Александра Ильинична Лесик
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Distribution ◽  
Minimax Problems ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Upper Estimate ◽  
The Military ◽  
Gross Model

Работа обобщает игру «нападение-оборона» Ю.Б.Гермейера в части учета пропускной способности пунктов и основана на его обобщенном принципе уравнивания, что приводит в случае однородности ресурсов сторон к выпуклым минимаксным задачам, которые могут быть решены методом субградиентного спуска. Классическая модель «нападение-оборона» Ю.Б.Гермейера является модификацией модели О.Гросса. В работе В.Ф. Огарышева исследована игровая модель, обобщающая модели Гросса и Гермейера. В работе Д.А. Молодцова изучалась модель Гросса с непротивоположными интересами сторон, в работах Т.Н.Данильченко, К.К. Масевич и Б.П.Крутова - динамические расширения модели. В военных моделях пункты интерпретируются обычно как направления и характеризуют пространственное распределение ресурсов защиты по ширине. Однако реально имеют место также ограничения по пропускной способности пунктов (направлений). Это приводит в случае однородных ресурсов к минимаксным задачам для определения гарантированного результата (НГР) обороны. Получена точная верхняя оценка для НГР обороны, которая показывает потенциальные возможности обороны с учетом пропускной способности пунктов (направлений). The work generalizes the Germeier’s "attack-defense" game in terms of accounting for the intake capacity of points and is based on his generalized equalization principle, which leads to convex minimax problems that can be solved by subgradient descent in the case of homogeneity of the parties' resources. The classical Germeier’s "attack-defense" model is a modification of the Gross’ model. The game model that generalizes Gross’ model and Germeier’s model was studied by Ogaryshev. Molodtsov studied the Gross’s model with nonantagonistic interests of the parties; Danilchenko, Masevich and Krutova studied the dynamic extensions of the model. In the military models the points are usually interpreted as directions and characterize the spatial distribution of defense resources by width. However, there are also actual restrictions on the intake capacity of points. This leads, in the case of homogeneous resources, to minimax problems for determining the best guaranteed defense result (BGDR). An accurate upper estimate for the best guaranteed defense result was obtained, which shows the potential defense capabilities taking into account the intake capacity of points.

scholarly journals Multi-layer Network Attack and Defense Model Based on Entropy Method to Measure Network Security

2019 ◽  
Vol 1302 ◽  
pp. 022068
Author(s):  
Xiaolin Zhao ◽  
Jiong Guo ◽  
Xiaoyi Jiang ◽  
Jingjing Zhao ◽  
Hao Xu
Keyword(s):  
Network Security ◽  
Entropy Method ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense
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