scholarly journals POSISI, TANTANGAN, DAN PROSPEK BAGI INDONESIA DALAM SISTEM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA WTO

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 92
Author(s):  
Dyan F. D. Sitanggang
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Global Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Final Settlement ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

<p><em>The World Trade Organization (WTO) as the sole universal organization managing global trade between member-states has develop a dispute settlement mechanism to deal with disagreement related to the interpretation and/or implementation of reciprocal rights and duties in the economic field. However, the effectiveness of this system hinges on compliance of states to decisions reached.  Compliance in its turn are influenced by how parties to a dispute value the justness or equity of the final settlement.  This paper discusses WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and how Indonesia perceived and utilizes this forum to further its national interest.</em></p>

scholarly journals Going Bananas: A Glimpse into WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kawal Gill ◽  
Panya Baldia
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Economic Impact ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Data ◽  
The World ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The paper seeks to comment on the efficiency and fairness of the World Trade Organization by examining its Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The study has attempted to achieve the same by focusing on the legal and economic analysis of ‘The European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas Case’, a landmark judgement in the Dispute Settlement Body’s history that spanned two decades. The paper has analysed trade data from 1993-2016 to arrive at its conclusions and infer the legal rationale behind the verdict while scrutinizing the sectoral as well as overall economic impact of the case on the parties to the dispute.

scholarly journals An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 2001-2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 218-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

On 11 December 2001, China officially became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after years of negotiations. The paper shows how a major developing country has used the WTO dispute settlement system by examining China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from its entry through 31 December 2010. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the WTO dispute cases in which China has participated as a complainant, a respondent, or a third party.

Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? The Puzzle of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication

2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Iida
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
High Incidence ◽  
The World ◽  
Simple Logic ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization tends to give verdicts for the plaintiff much more often than verdicts for the defendant. Simple logic suggests that this is a puzzle: it is not immediately obvious why defendants do not settle out of court if they are likely to be found guilty. I argue that there are three alternative explanations for this puzzle: imperfect enforcement, asymmetric information, and domestic constraints. By examining three major WTO cases, I find the domestic constraints explanation the most persuasive.

scholarly journals Can WTO Member States Rely on Citizen Concerns to Prevent Corporations from Importing Goods Made from Child Labour?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleydis Nissen
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Child Labour ◽  
Global Supply Chains ◽  
Corporate Accountability ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
The World ◽  
Import Restrictions ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

There has been a polarised debate on the desirability of import restrictions to increase corporate accountability for child labour that occurs in global supply chains. Some scholars have indicated that states in favour of imposing import restrictions could sidestep this debate relying upon the perceptions that people in the importing market might have. They have based this argument on the case law of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO DSM). The attitude-behaviour gap has, however, been largely overlooked in their analyses. This behavioural phenomenon provides an explanation as to why there is an inconsistency between what people value or believe and what they actually do. This essay revisits the WTO DSM's case law in order to determine whether such values or beliefs might justify import restrictions. On balance, this essay finds that the WTO DSM has not sufficiently taken the attitude-behaviour gap into account in its interpretation of Article III(4) and Article XX(a) 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

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