scholarly journals Entertainment Technology: Dynamic Game Production

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-206
Author(s):  
Yogi Udjaja
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Entertainment Technology

scholarly journals Automatic Lane-Changing Decision Based on Single-Step Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Collision-Free Path Planning

Actuators ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Hongbo Wang ◽  
Shihan Xu ◽  
Longze Deng
Keyword(s):  
Path Planning ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Single Step ◽  
Bézier Curve ◽  
Vehicle Safety ◽  
Bezier Curve ◽  
Lane Change ◽  
Hardware In The Loop ◽  
Power Performance ◽  
Lane Changing

Traffic accidents are often caused by improper lane changes. Although the safety of lane-changing has attracted extensive attention in the vehicle and traffic fields, there are few studies considering the lateral comfort of vehicle users in lane-changing decision-making. Lane-changing decision-making by single-step dynamic game with incomplete information and path planning based on Bézier curve are proposed in this paper to coordinate vehicle lane-changing performance from safety payoff, velocity payoff, and comfort payoff. First, the lane-changing safety distance which is improved by collecting lane-changing data through simulated driving, and lane-changing time obtained by Bézier curve path planning are introduced into the game payoff, so that the selection of the lane-changing start time considers the vehicle safety, power performance and passenger comfort of the lane-changing process. Second, the lane-changing path without collision to the forward vehicle is obtained through the constrained Bézier curve, and the Bézier curve is further constrained to obtain a smoother lane-changing path. The path tracking sliding mode controller of front wheel angle compensation by radical basis function neural network is designed. Finally, the model in the loop simulation and the hardware in the loop experiment are carried out to verify the advantages of the proposed method. The results of three lane-changing conditions designed in the hardware in the loop experiment show that the vehicle safety, power performance, and passenger comfort of the vehicle controlled by the proposed method are better than that of human drivers in discretionary lane change and mandatory lane change scenarios.

scholarly journals Dynamic game semantics

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-60
Author(s):  
Norihiro Yamada ◽  
Samson Abramsky
Keyword(s):  
Programming Languages ◽  
Functional Programming ◽  
Operational Semantics ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Functional Programming Languages ◽  
Game Semantics ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Cartesian Closed Categories ◽  
Cartesian Closed

Abstract The present work achieves a mathematical, in particular syntax-independent, formulation of dynamics and intensionality of computation in terms of games and strategies. Specifically, we give game semantics of a higher-order programming language that distinguishes programmes with the same value yet different algorithms (or intensionality) and the hiding operation on strategies that precisely corresponds to the (small-step) operational semantics (or dynamics) of the language. Categorically, our games and strategies give rise to a cartesian closed bicategory, and our game semantics forms an instance of a bicategorical generalisation of the standard interpretation of functional programming languages in cartesian closed categories. This work is intended to be a step towards a mathematical foundation of intensional and dynamic aspects of logic and computation; it should be applicable to a wide range of logics and computations.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

An optimal task management and control scheme for military operations with dynamic game strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. 106815
Author(s):  
Tao Zhang ◽  
Chengchao Li ◽  
Dongying Ma ◽  
Xiaodong Wang ◽  
Chaoyong Li
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Task Management ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Control Scheme ◽  
And Control

The benefits of international cooperation under climate uncertainty: a dynamic game analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock
Keyword(s):  
Global Warming ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Climate Uncertainty ◽  
Expected Payoffs

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

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