Effects of Incentive Scheme and Working Relationship on Whistle-Blowing in an Audit Setting

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
El'fred Boo ◽  
Terence Bu-Peow Ng ◽  
Premila Gowri Shankar
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Social Stigma ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Working Relationships ◽  
Incentive Scheme ◽  
Working Relationship ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY We examine the joint effects of incentive schemes and working relationships on auditors' propensity to report an audit partner's wrongdoing that impairs financial reporting quality in an experiment involving 90 audit seniors and managers. We predict and find that, relative to a control condition without an incentive scheme, a reward-based career-related incentive scheme is less likely to increase auditors' whistle-blowing propensity in the presence of a close working relationship with the wrongdoer than in its absence. In contrast, a penalty-based career-related scheme increases auditors' whistle-blowing propensity relative to the control condition regardless of the presence of a close working relationship. These results are consistent with a heightened social stigma associated with whistle-blowing on someone close for personal gains, and a preference to avoid losses rather than to acquire gains as predicted by prospect theory. The findings have useful implications for practice and suggest boundary conditions under which an incentive scheme can promote whistle-blowing. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.

scholarly journals The Triangle Defense for Financial Reporting Quality: The Interplay between Internal Auditing, the Audit Committee, and the External Auditor

Wahana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-130
Author(s):  
Djoko Susanto
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Working Relationships ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
External Auditor

The internal audit function, audit committee, and external auditor are three crucial stakeholders of corporate governance that safeguard the quality of financial reporting. In this article, I discuss the interrelationships between these monitoring mechanisms. I also provide insights about what we have learned from academic research about the working relationships between these three governance entities. This article should be of interest to academic researchers as well as to corporate stakeholders, which include management, investors, regulators, and Dewan Komisaris members. Future researchers can make use of this article as they contribute more work in areas related to auditing, monitoring and corporate governance, and financial reporting quality. Insights from this article can also guide corporate stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of the internal audit, audit committee, and external auditors in their organizations.

CFO Outside Directorship and Financial Misstatements

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Sarfraz Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Learning Opportunities ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Board Membership ◽  
Lower Likelihood ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Organizational Embeddedness ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS I study an important accounting consequence—financial misstatements—of CFO outside board membership. I find that firms with CFOs holding outside directorships have a lower likelihood of misstatements. These results likely reflect the benefits accruing to CFOs' home firms in terms of improved financial reporting quality. These findings are based on several methods that control for unobserved factors that may affect both incidence of CFO outside directorships and a firm's financial misstatements. I also provide some preliminary insights into CFO and home firm characteristics that determine CFO outside board directorships. My findings are consistent with the inter-organizational embeddedness perspective, suggesting that inter-firm networks provide sources for counseling and learning opportunities, which executives can use to improve their home firms' performance. JEL Classifications: M41.

scholarly journals Financial Reporting Quality of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect or the Weak Country Effect?

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1363-1390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun-Chih Chen ◽  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Ying Chou Lin ◽  
Yu-Chen Lin ◽  
Xing Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
Reverse Merger ◽  
Gain Access ◽  
Country Effect ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. IPO firms. We find that the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is similar to that of matched U.S. IPO firms, but Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than Chinese ADR firms. We also find that Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. These results indicate that the use of the RM process is associated with poor financial reporting quality only in firms from China, where legal enforcement and investor protection are weak. In addition, we find that compared with Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives (as measured by CEO turnover-performance sensitivity) and poorer corporate governance. These factors, in turn, contribute to the lower financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. Overall, our results suggest that the less scrutinized RM process allows the Chinese firms with weak bonding incentives and poor governance to gain access to U.S. capital markets, resulting in poor financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G15; G24; G34; G38.

scholarly journals Financial Reporting Quality and Dual-Holding of Debt and Equity

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 351-371
Author(s):  
Leila Peyravan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Excess Returns ◽  
Earnings Announcement ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT I investigate whether the financial reporting quality (FRQ) of a firm influences the propensity of institutional investors to simultaneously hold the firm's debt and equity (dual-holding). I predict that the underlying reason for institutional dual-holding is access to the better information that is available to lenders in firms with low FRQ. Accordingly, I find that dual-holders are more likely to participate in firms with low FRQ. Additionally, I predict and find that dual-holders trade on the additional information received from borrowers. I find that dual-holders achieve excess returns of 8 percent on their trades in the borrower's equity, and that the direction of their trades predicts the direction of borrowers' news on the earnings announcement day. Finally, I demonstrate that dual-holders' trades generate excess returns only in firms with low FRQ, suggesting that investors become dual-holders in firms with low FRQ because informed trades in such firms offer higher returns. JEL Classifications: G14; M41.

The Impact of Going Concern on Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Phung Anh Thu ◽  
Nguyen Vinh Khuong
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Viet Nam ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Debt Covenant

The investigation was conducted to contribute empirical evidence of the association between going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms on the Vietnam stock market. Based on data from 279 companies listed on the HNX and HOSE exchanges in Vietnam for the period 2009-2015, the quantitative research. Results found that the relationship between the going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms. Research results are significant for investors, regulators to the transparency of financial reporting information. Keywords Going concern, financial reporting quality, listed firms References Agrawal, K., & Chatterjee, C. (2015). Earnings management and financial distress: Evidence from India. Global Business Review, 16(5_suppl), 140S-154S.Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511–529.Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., & Trigeorgis, L. (2007a). Earnings behaviour of financially distressed firms: The role of institutional ownership. Abacus, 43(3), 271–296.Chen, Y., Chen, C., & Huang, S. (2010). An appraisal of financially distressed companies’ earnings management: Evidence from listed companies in China. Pacific Accounting Review, 22(1), 22–41Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35-59.DeFond, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 145–176.DeFond, M.L., & Park, C.W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115–139.Dichev, I., & Skinner, D. (2004). Large sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1091–1123.Đinh Thị Thu T., Nguyễn Vĩnh K. (2016). Tác động của hành vi điều chỉnh thu nhập đến khả năng hoạt động liên tục trong kế toán: Nghiên cứu thực nghiệm cho các doanh nghiệp niêm yết tại Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển khoa học và công nghệ, Quí 3, tr.96-108.Đỗ Thị Vân Trang (2015). Các mô hình đánh giá chất lượng báo cáo tài chính, Tạp chí chứng khoán Việt Nam, 200, tr 18-21.Habib, A., Uddin Bhuiyan, B., & Islam, A. (2013). Financial distress, earnings management and market pricing of accruals during the global financial crisis. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 155-180.Jaggi, B., & Lee, P. (2002). Earnings management response to debt covenant violations and debt restructuring. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 17(4), 295–324.Kasznik, R., (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), pp.57-81.Lu, J. (1999). An empirical study of earnings management by loss-making listed Chinese companies. KuaijiYanjiu (Accounting Research), (9), 25–35.McNichols, M.F. and Stubben, S.R., (2008). Does earnings management affect firms’ investment decisions?. The accounting review, 83(6), pp.1571-1603.Selahudin, N.F., Zakaria, N.B., & Sanusi, Z.M. (2014). Remodelling the earnings management with the appear- ance of leverage, financial distress and free cash flow: Malaysia and Thailand evidences. Journal of Applied Sciences, 14(21), 2644–2661.Skinner, D.J., & Sloan, R. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2/3), 289–312.Sweeney, A.P., (1994). Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17(3): 281-308.Trần Thị Thùy Linh, Mai Hoàng Hạnh (2015). Chất lượng báo cáo tài chính và kỳ hạn nợ ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả hoạt động của doanh nghiệp Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển kinh tế, 10, tr.27-50.Trương Thị Thùy Dương (2017). Nâng cao chất lượng báo cáo tài chính công ty đại chúng, Tạp chí tài chính, 1(3), tr.55-56.Uwuigbe, Ranti, Bernard, (2015). Assessment of the effects of firm’s characteristics on earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria, Asian Economic and Financial Review,5(2):218-228.

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