U.S. Audit Partner Rotations

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Laurion ◽  
Alastair Lawrence ◽  
James P. Ryans
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Deferred Tax ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of audit partner rotation among U.S. publicly listed firms, utilizing the fact that audit partners are periodically copied by name in public correspondence between issuers and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Relative to non-rotation firms, we find no evidence of a change in the frequency of misstatements following the partner rotation; however, there is an increase in the frequency of restatement discoveries and announcements. We also find an increase in deferred tax valuation allowances. Overall, the results provide some evidence suggesting that U.S. partner rotations support a fresh look at the audit engagement. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.

Determinants and Consequences of Quantitative Critical Accounting Estimate Disclosures

2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 189-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Glendening ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Kenneth W. Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Estimation Uncertainty ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices with multiple quantitative CAE clients. These findings hold for the presence, initiation, number, and magnitude of quantitative CAE, and for both pension and non-pension quantitative CAE. We also find that incidences of AAERs, misstatements, and small positive earnings surprises decrease after initiation of quantitative CAE. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the use of quantitative disclosure to inform users about accounting estimation uncertainty in financial reports. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals Accounting Restatements and the Timeliness of Disclosures

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad A. Badertscher ◽  
Jeffrey J. Burks
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Negligible Effect ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Reliable Information ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Quarterly Earnings ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS Regulators are concerned that during the process of restating financial statements, firms fail to provide timely progress updates, and delay earnings announcements and regulatory filings. To reduce these perceived lags in disclosure, an advisory group to the Securities and Exchange Commission recommends more use of catch-up adjustments rather than restatements to correct accounting errors. Some investor groups oppose the recommendations because they fear that preparers will begin to correct important errors through catch-up adjustments, which are less transparent than restatements. We inform this debate by examining (1) the length of disclosure lags around restatements to understand the extent of the problem, and (2) the causes of disclosure lags to evaluate whether the reforms would address the root causes of the lags. We find that lengthy lags are uncommon and appear to be largely unavoidable consequences of fraud investigations. When fraud is a factor, the firm typically takes weeks or months to release restatement details, quarterly earnings, and SEC filings, likely because investigations are necessary to restore the firm's ability to produce reliable information. When fraud is not a factor, the firm typically discloses the restatement's earnings impact within a day of the initial restatement announcement, and delays the quarterly earnings announcement and SEC filing by less than a week. Although fraud is by far the most economically significant cause of lags, we also find that lags increase when a restatement involves multiple, long-standing, or large errors. Finally, we show that the restatements targeted by the reforms tend to have the shortest lags, even among non-fraudulent restatements. Thus, the proposed reforms would have a negligible effect on disclosure timeliness because the targeted restatements tend to have short lags to begin with, and because long lags appear to be caused by inherent constraints on producing reliable information. JEL Classifications: M41, G38. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Noncompliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements: The Magnitude and Determinants of Undisclosed Permanently Reinvested Earnings

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ayers ◽  
Casey M. Schwab ◽  
Steven Utke
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Mandatory Disclosure ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Foreign Earnings ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Deferred Tax ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We develop estimates of a firm's foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested (PRE) and the unrecorded deferred tax liability (TAX) associated with PRE that are independent of whether a firm explicitly discloses this information. We then investigate firms' noncompliance with Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740 provisions that require financial statement disclosure of PRE and either the tax associated with PRE or a statement that calculating the tax is not practicable. We find that a nontrivial portion of firms do not comply with the PRE disclosure requirements and that the amounts of undisclosed PRE and the related tax are substantial in magnitude. Cross-sectional evidence suggests managers opportunistically choose when to disclose PRE and TAX and that compliance with PRE disclosure requirements increased following the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which increased incentives to disclose PRE. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; H25; K34. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Does External Assurance Enhance the Credibility of CSR Reports? Evidence from CSR-Related Misconduct Events in Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Du ◽  
Shing-Jen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Repeat Offenders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Perceived Credibility ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
First Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Country Specific

SUMMARY This study examines the credibility of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports and the role of external assurance on CSR reports. Based on a sample of listed firms in Taiwan, we find that the issuance of CSR reports is not associated with a lower incidence, or frequency, of future CSR-related misconduct, unless accompanied by external assurance. In other words, external assurance can enhance the credibility of CSR reports. Moreover, the perceived credibility of CSR reports depends on whether firms genuinely fulfill their CSR commitments. For first-time offenders, prior CSR reports play a significant role in protecting firm value when misconduct does occur; however, for repeat offenders, such an insurance role does not exist, regardless of whether the CSR report is assured or not. Our findings attest to the benefits of CSR assurance and underscore the importance of understanding CSR practice in the context of country-specific institutions. JEL Classifications: M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper. Manually collected data on CSR-related misconduct events will be provided upon request.

THE SEC PREEMPTS THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD IN 1965: THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED TAX CREDIT RELATING TO INSTALLMENT SALES

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Zeff
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Accounting Practice ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
Accounting Principles ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Deferred Tax ◽  
Accounting Procedure ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Do So

In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the APB's first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more impressive than its predecessor's. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB's slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article discusses the circumstances attending the SEC's issuance of an Accounting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the tensions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author's personal archive, which have not been used previously in published work.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Come on Over: Analyst/Investor Days as a Disclosure Medium

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (6) ◽  
pp. 1725-1750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Stanimir Markov
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Short Duration ◽  
Price Impact ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Temporal Proximity ◽  
Conference Presentations ◽  
Close Temporal Proximity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Our study introduces analyst/investor days, a new disclosure medium that allows for private interactions with influential market participants. We also highlight interdependencies in the choice and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations, a well-researched disclosure medium that similarly allows for private interactions. Analyst/investor days are less frequent, but with longer duration and greater price impact than conference presentations. They are mostly hosted by firms that already have opportunities to interact with investors at conferences, but whose complex and diverse activities make the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation an imperfect solution to these firms' information problems. Analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in different quarters, consistent with their competing for the time and attention of senior management. When these two mediums are scheduled in close temporal proximity to each other, analyst/investor days diminish the information content of conference presentations, but not vice versa, consistent with managers' favoring analyst/investor days over conference presentations as a disclosure medium. JEL Classifications: D82; M41; G11; G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

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