Investor Horizon and CEO Horizon Incentives

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1299-1328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Jayanthi Sunder

ABSTRACT: We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and chief executive officer (CEO) horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their stock. Specifically, we use the initial public offering (IPO) setting in which venture capitalists (VCs) represent short-horizon, controlling investors with strong selling incentives after the IPO. We predict and find that VCs' short-term incentives influence CEO's annual horizon incentives following the IPO. At the same time, institutional monitoring limits the influence of VCs on annual, short-horizon incentives. To preempt this disciplining by market participants, VCs grant equity prior to the IPO that correspond with their short-horizons and result in shorter portfolio horizon incentives for the CEO after the IPO. We also document a positive relation between long-run abnormal stock returns and horizon incentives, consistent with horizon incentives influencing management actions. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper.

Author(s):  
Michael Adams ◽  
Barry Thornton ◽  
George Hall

Does IPO stand for Instant Profit Opportunity or It’s Probably Over-priced?  The conundrum is that both answers are generally correct.  The answer appears to depend on the investor’s investment horizon.  This realization provides an enigma for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) proponents. It is widely known that initial public offering (IPO) stocks in the past have typically been underpriced, thereby allowing the fortunate purchaser to buy the shares in the primary market and systematically beat the stock market averages. This phenomenon is evidenced by the average one-day returns on IPOs of 15% and presents a puzzle to efficient market advocates. Behavioral finance posits that the same underpriced IPO stocks will under-perform the market and deliver substandard performance during the ensuing one to three years. At a minimum, the “new-issues puzzle” presents a challenge to the EMH and has given rise to many class-action stockholder lawsuits alleging illegal price manipulation.   Why under-pricing systematically happens and why issuing firms/major shareholders choose to leave copious amounts of money on the table is not well explained by traditional financial theory.  Behavioral finance melds together investor psychology and normative financial theory in an attempt to explain this market enigma.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-38
Author(s):  
Susan White

Synopsis Groupon, an online coupon company, was one of many companies that considered an initial public offering (IPO) during what might be a second technology/internet/social media IPO boom in 2011. Some companies chose to postpone their IPOs, while others took advantage of the media attention focussed on technology companies, and in particular, social media firms. Should investors hop on the tech IPO bandwagon, or hold off to better evaluate the long-term prospects of tech companies, and in particular social media companies? Would the valuation of Groupon justify an investment in IPO shares? Research methodology The case was researched from secondary sources, using Groupon's IPO filing information, news articles about the IPO and industry research sources, such as IBIS World. Relevant courses and levels This case is appropriate for an advanced undergraduate or MBA corporate finance or investment elective. Most introductory finance classes do not have the time to cover later chapters in a finance textbook, where information about IPOs is generally found. It could also be used at the end of a core finance course, where the instructor wanted to introduce this topic through a case study of a hard-to-value internet-based company to illustrate the difficulties in setting IPO prices. The case could also be used in an equity analysis class, an entrepreneurial finance class or an investment class, to spur discussion about valuing an internet company and choosing appropriate investments for pension fund investing. This case could also be used in a strategy class, focussing on the five forces question, and eliminating the valuation question. Theoretical basis There is a great deal of literature about IPOs and their long-term performance. An excellent source is Jay R. Ritter's research, http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter, which has a longer time period and more data than could be contained in this case. IPO puzzles include persistent undervaluing of IPOs; in other words, the offer price is lower than, and sometimes substantially lower than, the first day close price. A second issue is the generally poorer long-run performance of companies after their IPO when compared to similar firms that did not do an IPO.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheela Devi D. Sundarasen

Purpose This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent of alteration institutional characteristics, i.e. legal origin and corruption levels, may have on the signaling effects of auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on initial public offering (IPO) initial returns in OECD countries. Design/methodology/approach Cross-sectional data composed of 6,182 IPOs from 30 OECD countries are used for 2003-2012. Ordinary least square with multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses. Findings The findings indicate that the legal framework and corruption level of a country alters the signaling effects of underwriters’ reputation, auditors’ reputation and ownership retention in an IPO environment. These three variables mitigate information asymmetry, signal firm value to potential investors and ultimately decrease IPO initial returns. This relationship is more significant in the civil law countries. Corruption levels negatively moderate the relationship in the common law and Scandinavian civil law countries but have no significance in the German and French civil law countries, indicating the importance of the signaling variables in these two civil law countries. Originality/value This study examines the extent of the alterations that the legal framework and the corruption levels cause to the signaling relationship between auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on IPO initial returns in selected OECD countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (7) ◽  
pp. 869-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozgur Ozdemir

This study examines the effect of geographic dispersion on the short-run and long-run initial public offering (IPO) performance of restaurant firms. Sample of the study consists of 103 restaurant IPOs conducted between 1981 and 2011. The study finds that being geographically dispersed or concentrated in a small area does not lead to a significant difference in the initial returns of restaurant IPOs. Yet the analysis shows that restaurant firms with geographically dispersed operations have significantly higher long-run returns in the post-IPO period compared with their local counterparts. This is evidenced by the significantly larger cumulative abnormal returns for geographically dispersed restaurant firms in the post-IPO period.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Fedyk ◽  
Natalya Khimich

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to link valuation of different accounting items to research and development (R&D) investment decisions and investigate how suboptimal R&D choices during initial public offering (IPO) are linked to future operating and market underperformance. Design/methodology/approach For firms with substantial growth opportunities, accounting net income is a poor measure of the firm’s performance (Smith and Watts, 1992). Therefore, other metrics such as R&D intensity are used by investors to evaluate firms’ performance. This leads to a coexistence of two strategies: if earnings are the main value driver, firms tend to underinvest in R&D; and if R&D expenditures are the main value driver, firms tend to overinvest in R&D. Findings The authors show that the R&D investment decision varies systematically with cross-sectional characteristics: firms that are at the growth stage, unprofitable or belong to science-driven industries are more likely to overinvest, while firms that are able to avoid losses by decreasing R&D expenditure are more likely to underinvest. Finally, they find that R&D overinvestment leads to future underperformance as evidenced by poor operating return on assets, lower product market share, higher frequency of delisting due to poor performance and negative abnormal stock returns. Originality/value While prior literature concentrates on R&D underinvestment as a tool of reporting higher net income, the authors demonstrate the existence of an alternative strategy used by many IPO firms – R&D overinvestment.


2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1295-1333 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. N. V. Krishnan ◽  
Vladimir I. Ivanov ◽  
Ronald W. Masulis ◽  
Ajai K. Singh

AbstractWe examine the association of a venture capital (VC) firm’s reputation with the post-initial public offering (IPO) long-run performance of its portfolio firms. We find that VC reputation, measured by the past market share of VC-backed IPOs, has significant positive associations with long-run firm performance measures. While more reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, more reputable VCs continue to be associated with superior long-run performance, even after controlling for VC selectivity. We find that more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms, and this continued VC involvement positively influences post-IPO firm performance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 216-226
Author(s):  
Bharat A. Jain ◽  
Yingying Shao

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the extent governance choices at the time of going public differ for family versus non family firms. In addition, the short and long-run performance of family and non-family firms after their initial public offering (IPO) is examined. The results indicate significant differences between family versus non-family firms on governance choices at the time of their IPO related to dual class structures, board composition, board size, and board leadership structure. Additionally, the results suggest that investors assign a lower valuation at IPO to family firms. Further, governance mechanism that strengthen family control differentially influence post-IPO underpricing. Finally, the results suggest that family firms underperform non-family firms in terms of long-run post-IPO investment performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Gary K. Taylor ◽  
David D. Williams

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has expressed concern that audit reports do not contain sufficient variation to provide useful information to the market. Using a sample of financially stressed initial public offering (IPO) firms, we investigate whether information uncertainty is affected by (1) three different types of audit reports—unqualified (clean), hybrid (with explanatory language about financial stress), and going concern (GCAR)—and (2) audit report disclosures. We provide evidence that audit reports (hybrid and GCAR) and audit report disclosures provide useful information to the market by finding a significant reduction in information uncertainty. Just as important, we find that management discretionary going concern disclosures do not complement or substitute for the reduction in information uncertainty associated with hybrid audit reports and GCARs. We provide evidence that current audit report types and disclosures of financially stressed IPO firms provide information to the market. JEL Classifications: M40; M42; G14. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2110465
Author(s):  
Norman Massel ◽  
Jung Eun “JP” Park ◽  
Ken Reichelt

We demonstrate that investors in initial public offering (IPO) firms value revenues and that the number of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) revenue recognition comment letters issued on the S-1 registration statement are positively associated with reported revenues. We also find that IPO managers report revenues opportunistically in the fiscal year just prior to the offer. In additional analysis, we find that discretionary revenues are associated with significantly higher first day IPO stock returns but significantly lower 1 year stock returns. Our results are consistent with the incentives of managers to report revenues opportunistically outweighing the higher monitoring and regulatory scrutiny pre-IPO.


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