Reflections on a Decade of SOX 404(b) Audit Production and Alternatives

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Kinney ◽  
Roger D. Martin ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson

SYNOPSIS Since passage of the quickly finalized Sarbanes-Oxley Act during July 2002, audit production in the U.S. has been substantially expanded by mandated internal control audits. The control audit mandate is unique to the U.S. and costly to apply, yet little is known about the conduct of control audits or the efficacy of lower-cost alternatives. This paper reflects our overall knowledge about control audit production and observation of a consistent message across public and limited non-public archival data, analytical studies, and numerous personal experiences of audit practitioners. Our primary observation is that, absent any financial misstatement, auditors find it difficult to identify material weaknesses in control design. Conversely, when auditors know about misstatements they can, and do, detect related material weaknesses and thereby identify most public companies found by mandated control audits to have ineffective controls. Thus, it appears possible to exploit this observation to identify and publicly disclose most companies with weak controls without incurring the cost of full internal control audits. We believe that U.S. markets could benefit from more transparency about the current U.S. audit production process and from informed debate about the best mechanism design for balancing the needs of all parties interested in internal control quality disclosure.

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parveen P. Gupta ◽  
Thomas R. Weirich ◽  
Lynn E. Turner

SYNOPSIS Since its passage, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been criticized, and praised, by many on numerous grounds and claims. However, no single provision of this law has come under more attack than Section 404, which mandates public reporting of internal control effectiveness by an issuer's management as well as its independent auditors. Even after 10 years, the opposition to the Section 404 internal control requirements has continued to the point where the U.S. Congress through two separate Acts—the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the 2012 Jump Start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act—have permanently exempted the non-accelerated SEC filers and the “emerging growth” issuers with revenues of $1 billion or less from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Many of those who oppose the Section 404 requirements rest their claim on grounds that the U.S. Congress acted in haste in mandating the public reporting of internal controls by U.S.-listed companies and that the issue was not well thought out or debated. They also contend that the U.S. Congress acted under pressure because of the public outrage over the bankruptcy filings of Enron and WorldCom. To the contrary, this paper shows that the debate over public reporting of internal control by U.S. public companies is more than six decades old, dating back to the McKesson & Robbins fraud. This paper reviews relevant legislative proposals, bills introduced in both the House and the Senate, regulatory efforts by the SEC, and the recommendations of many commissions set up by the private sector to inform the reader how these efforts were the deliberative precursors to what was eventually codified in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Heninger ◽  
Eric N. Johnson ◽  
John R. Kuhn

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the relationship between (1) information technology-related internal control material weaknesses (ITMWs) as reported by public companies between 2004 and 2012, and (2) earnings management. Prior research suggests that companies with internal control deficiencies are more likely to manage earnings; however, no study has specifically examined the incremental effect of ITMWs on earnings management tendencies. Based on a sample of 268 firm-years of ITMWs disclosed by U.S. public companies in their annual SEC filings (pursuant to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), we find a significant positive association between ITMWs and income-increasing abnormal accruals. In addition, we find a positive relation between poor financial condition and material weaknesses in these companies. These results are robust with respect to two control samples of firms with non-IT-related-only material weaknesses (non-ITMWs) and firms with no material weakness disclosures. Implications of these findings for investors, regulators, and future research are discussed.


2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna M. Nagy

The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, described as “the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President’s appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years.” Established by Congress as the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB” or the “Board”) was structured as “a strong, independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies.” Its principal mission was to prevent the type of auditing failures that contributed to the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies in the period leading up to the passage of the Act.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Ifeoma Udeh

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b). Findings Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period. Practical implications The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems. Originality/value Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha Weber ◽  
Sheri Erickson ◽  
Mary Stone

ABSTRACT: This paper presents an instructional resource and provides suggestions for its implementation. The resource demonstrates a method for teaching students how communication in required SOX Section 404 reports can impact stakeholders’ perceptions of that organization. Students read portions of selected 10-K, 10-Q, and corporate annual reports in which management responds to disclosed internal control material weaknesses. Students then analyze these excerpts according to a well-known image restoration strategy. This assignment enhances written communication skills, analytical skills, research skills, and deepens students’ understanding of Sarbanes-Oxley 404 requirements and of corporate image restoration strategies. The instructional resource would be beneficial in auditing, intermediate, or advanced accounting, as well as a graduate-level accounting course.


2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne H. Shaw ◽  
William D. Terando

SUMMARY Studies documenting the increased audit cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have focused on large cross industry samples of industrial firms. To control for differences in industry and business complexities such as foreign operations or segments, these studies have relied on various dichotomous variables. In addition, the studies have either focused on the cost of Section 404 related to internal control testing or assumed that the increases in audit pricing occurred in 2002 when the law was enacted. By focusing on one industry (REITS), we find that dummy variables may not adequately capture the effect of complexity in an industry. We also show that considering within-industry variations in audit pricing leads to the conclusion that the increase due to SOX is actually lower than previously thought. Finally, by structuring the tests to measure separately for the costs of the audit independence provisions and the internal control provisions, we find that the costs of SOX were much greater than that shown in prior studies, resulting in a 200 percent increase in SOX related costs to REITs with about 75 percent of that increase related to Section 404.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wikil Kwak ◽  
Susan Eldridge ◽  
Yong Shi ◽  
Gang Kou

<h1 style="TEXT-JUSTIFY: inter-ideograph; TEXT-ALIGN: justify; MARGIN: 0in 0.5in 0pt"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Our study proposes a multiple criteria linear programming (MCLP) </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">and other data mining </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">method</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">s</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> to predict </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">material weaknesses in a firm&rsquo;s internal control system after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> (SOX) using </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">2003-2004</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">U.S. </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">data.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </span>The results of the MCLP </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">and other data mining </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">approaches in </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">our</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">prediction </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">study show that the </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">MCLP</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> method performs</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO"> </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">better overall than the </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">other data mining approaches </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">using financial </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO">and other </span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">data from the Form 10-K report.</span><span style="COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: KO"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </span>Consistent with prior research, firms that disclosed material weaknesses in their SOX Section 302 disclosures were more complex (based on the existence of foreign currency translations), more often used Big 4 auditors, and had lower operating cash flows-to-total assets ratios than the non-material weakness control firms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </span>Because of mixed results on several profitability measures and marginal predictive ability for the MCLP and other methods used, more research is needed to identify firm characteristics that help investors, auditors, and others predict material weaknesses.</span></span></h1>


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott N. Bronson ◽  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
K. Raghunandan

This study provides evidence on the nature of voluntary management reports on internal control (MRIC), and on the characteristics of firms issuing such reports, before internal control reports were mandated under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We examine the association between firm characteristics and the voluntary inclusion of an MRIC in the firm's annual report. Our analysis of 397 midsized firms in 1998 indicates that a voluntary MRIC is more likely for firms that are larger, have an audit committee that meets more often, have a greater level of institutional ownership, and have more rapid income growth. We find that a voluntary MRIC is less likely for companies with more rapid sales growth. Slightly more than one-third of our sample issues an MRIC. None of the voluntary MRICs mention any material weaknesses; no reports include an auditor attestation; less than half (41 percent) of the reports include a statement that controls were effective; and only three of these reports include the criteria used to assess control effectiveness.


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document