Criminal Procedure. Sixth Amendment. Alabama Supreme Court Upholds a Death Sentence Imposed by Judicial Override of a Jury Recommendation for Life Imprisonment without Parole. Ex parte Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 (Ala. 2003)

2004 ◽  
Vol 117 (4) ◽  
pp. 1283 ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 227740172097285
Author(s):  
Anup Surendranath ◽  
Neetika Vishwanath ◽  
Preeti Pratishruti Dash

When the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab in 1980, it also laid down a sentencing framework for subsequent sentencing courts, guiding them in deciding between life imprisonment and the death penalty. This framework, popularly known as the ‘rarest of rare’ framework, was focused on individualised punishment. However, subsequent judgments have strayed away from Bachan Singh’s core framework, and the use of penological justifications as sentencing factors has contributed significantly to this deviation. This article argues that it is not within the mandate of sentencing judges to invoke penological theories as separate sentencing factors in individual cases when deciding between life imprisonment and the death sentence. The article begins by distinguishing between the penological justifications used to retain the death penalty in Bachan Singh and those underlying the sentencing framework developed in the judgment. It then examines subsequent judgments to trace the manner in which the capital sentencing framework was shaped to be crime-centric through the use of penological ideas like ‘collective conscience’ and deterrence. Examining the implications of penological justifications occupying a dominant place in death penalty sentencing, the article examines the broader concerns about the lack of clarity with sentencing goals. The failure in individual cases to distinguish between penological justifications as sentencing factors determining punishment, on the one hand, and viewing them as consequences arising out of an individualised sentencing process, on the other, lies at the core of the critique in this article.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Manohina

In the article, the author turns to the study of the peculiarities of choosing such a preventive measure as house arrest for minors. Due to the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation does not precisely define cases when a court must elect a house arrest in relation to minors, in practice there are often difficulties in which cases to choose such a preventive measure as detention, and in which house arrest. In the work, the author attempts to determine the essence of such a preventive measure as house arrest and the peculiarities of his election in relation to minors, and also considers the prohibitions and (or) restrictions to which minors cannot be subjected. The positions contained in the resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court “On the practice of the application by the courts of legislation on preventive measures in the form of detention, house arrest and bail” are analyzed. The author expresses the opinion that it is inadvisable to choose such a preventive measure as house arrest for minors. Based on the study, the author makes recommendations on the possibility, at the discretion of the court, to make adjustments to the prohibitions and (or) restrictions to which a minor suspect or accused will be subjected to whom such a preventive measure as house arrest is chosen.


2021 ◽  
pp. 192536212110325
Author(s):  
Victor W. Weedn

Background: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause gives defendants a right to confront their accusers. Method: U.S. Supreme Court cases that interpreted this right as applied to forensic scientists were reviewed. Results: Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams examined constitutional rights to confront forensic scientists. Lower courts have specifically examined their application to forensic pathology. Whether autopsy reports are considered “testimonial” varies among jurisdictions and has not been definitively settled. Defendants are generally able to compel testimony of forensic pathologists. Where the forensic pathologist is truly unavailable, the surrogate expert should be in a position to render an independent opinion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 463
Author(s):  
NFN Ramiyanto

KUHAP sebagai hukum acara pidana yang bersifat umum tidak mengakui bukti elektronik sebagai salah satu jenis alat bukti yang sah. Di dalam praktik, bukti elektronik juga digunakan sebagai alat bukti yang sah untuk membuktikan tindak pidana yang terjadi di pengadilan. Dari hasil pembahasan dapat disimpulkan, bahwa bukti elektronik dalam hukum acara pidana berstatus sebagai alat bukti yang berdiri sendiri dan alat bukti yang tidak berdiri sendiri (pengganti bukti surat apabila memenuhi prinsip/dasar dalam functional equivalent approach dan perluasan bukti petunjuk) sebagaimana dicantumkan dalam beberapa undang-undang khusus dan instrumen hukum yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Agung. Walaupun bukti elektronik tidak diatur dalam KUHAP sebagai lex generalis, namun untuk tercapainya kebenaran materiil dapat juga digunakan sebagai alat bukti yang sah untuk pembuktian seluruh jenis tindak pidana di pengadilan. Hal itu didasarkan pada pengakuan dalam praktik peradilan pidana, beberapa undang-undang khusus, dan instrumen yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Agung.The Criminal Procedure Code as a general criminal procedure does not recognize electronic evidence as one of the admissible types of evidence. In practice, electronic evidence is also used as an admissible evidence to prove the criminal offenses in court. From the results of the discussion it can be concluded that electronic evidence in criminal procedure law is a dependent evidence and an independent evidence (substitution of letter proof if it meets the principle of functional equivalent approach and expansion of evidence) as specified in several special laws and instruments issued by the Supreme Court. The electronic evidence is not regulated in the Criminal Procedure Code as a lex generalis, however, to achieve material truth it can also be used as a valid evidence for the provision of all types of criminal offenses in court. It is based on recognition in the practice of criminal justice, some special laws, and instruments issued by the Supreme Court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-101
Author(s):  
E. V. Smakhtin

The article deals with the peculiarities of the activity of courts in making judicial decisions in the context of a pandemic. First of all, we are talking about the wider use of digital and information technologies in criminal proceedings, which have previously been repeatedly recommended by forensic science for implementation in judicial practice. Some recommendations of criminalistics are currently accepted by the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in its Decision dated April 08, 2020 № 821 and Review on certain issues of judicial practice related to the application of legislation and measures to counteract the spread of a new coronavirus infection (COVID-19) in the territory of the Russian Federation № 2, which provided appropriate explanations for their use in practice. In particular, we are talking about the possibility of using video conferencing systems for certain categories of criminal cases and materials that are considered urgent, although this is not provided for in criminal procedure legislation. It is concluded that it is necessary to change the current criminal procedure legislation, bring it into line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws and subordinate regulatory legal acts, including orders of the Judicial Department under the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-165

The article aims to examine one of the elements of the formal mechanism of maintaining court practice unity in criminal proceedings of Ukraine and European countries – referring a case to the highest division of the Supreme Court. Similar to the Ukrainian criminal procedure legislation, the grounds for referring a criminal case and the procedure of its application are provided in the legislation of Estonia, Italy and Lithuania. At the same time, the Ukrainian legislator has established a number of special features, however, the wording of the relevant articles of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine is not perfect. The article provides answers to such questions as how forceful the provisions of criminal procedure legislation of Ukraine are, to what extent of effectiveness the Supreme Court exercises its legal authority regarding the unity of court practice in criminal proceedings, and whether the controversies in legal positions of the structural divisions of the Supreme Court have been successfully avoided. In order to achieve the stated aims, parts 2 and 3 are devoted to the examination of the grounds for referring a case in criminal proceedings of Ukraine and European countries. Part 4 outlines the shortcomings of the content of some articles of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine concerning the procedure of the referral of a criminal case to the highest division of the Supreme Court. Part 5 provides the analysis of the validity of decisions made by the boards of judges at the Supreme Court on the referral of criminal proceedings to its higher judicial divisions – the joint chamber of the Criminal Cassation Court and the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. On the basis of the study of the judgements of boards, the judicial chambers of the Criminal Cassation Court and the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, in part 6 the question is answered on whether the Supreme Court of Ukraine managed to perform its duty on the assurance of court practice unity in such an area as criminal proceedings. Keywords: exclusive legal problem, development of law, formation of uniform law enforcement practice, the Supreme Court, criminal proceedings, Ukraine.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 97-106
Author(s):  
V. V. Nikolyuk ◽  
◽  
L. A. Pupysheva ◽  

The article analyzes the concept of execution of a sentence as an independent stage of the criminal process (the stage of criminal proceedings). Arguments are given that point to its certain illogicality and inconsistency. The authors on the basis of existing legislation and taking into account the positions of Plenum of the Supreme Court additionally reasoned and substantiated the thesis of the existence of the criminal process self in relation to a criminal case of criminal procedure, regulated by Chapter 47 of the Code of criminal procedure.


Author(s):  
Mwiza Jo Nkhata

In 2007, the High Court of Malawi, sitting as a constitutional court, declared that the mandatory sentence of death for murder was unconstitutional. At the time of the High Court’s invalidation of the mandatory death penalty, Malawi’s prisons had over 190 prisoners serving their sentences as a result of the imposition of the mandatory death penalty. Some of these prisoners were on death row, while others had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. When the mandatory death penalty was declared unconstitutional, the High Court also directed that all prisoners serving their sentences for murder should be brought before the High Court so that they could receive individual sentences taking into account the circumstances of the offense, the offender, as well as the interests of the victim(s). This paper interrogates the application of the sentencing discretion that was introduced with the outlawing of the mandatory death penalty in Malawi. Specifically, the paper analyzes decisions that have emerged from the resentencing of capital offenders in so far as judges have either considered or refused to consider the relevance of post-conviction factors during the resentencing. It is this paper’s central finding that a refusal to consider post-conviction factors, as some judges held, was not only unjustified but was also contrary to Malawi’s Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code and the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. This refusal, the paper argues, resulted in sentencing discrepancies as well as a failure to properly utilize the discretion vested in the courts for purposes of sentencing.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 592-621
Author(s):  
Eliahu Harnon

Once upon a time there was a lawyer who was most familiar with the rules of criminal procedure and of evidence in force in mandatory Palestine in May 1948. One day in June 1948, the lawyer disappeared. Some say he fell into a deep sleep for many years. Only after the passage of forty years he awoke.Turning to and fro, he will immediately recognize the Ottoman building that houses the courts in Jerusalem's Russian Compound. He will also feel at home with the basic hierarchy of the judiciary: two courts of first instance—magistrates' and district—and no intermediate court of appeal between the district level and the Supreme Court.


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