Eighth Amendment. Trial Court May Impose Death Sentence despite Jury's Recommendation of Life Imprisonment

1984 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Alan Wellek
2021 ◽  
Vol VI (III) ◽  
pp. 13-26
Author(s):  
Hafiz Abdul Rehman Saleem ◽  
Imtiaz Ahmad Khan ◽  
Hamid Mukhtar

Life imprisonment without parole and commutation (LWOP) came under Ninth Amendment to the 1997 Criminal Law of Peoples Republic of China as a proviso to the suspended death penalty for corruption crimes. The legislative intent given for the arrival of new punishment depicts LWOP as a solution for the disparity in a suspended death sentence, controlling judicial discretion and proportional punishment for corruption which is debated as not an exhaustive and compelling justification. The manuscript addresses a substantive question; if LWOP is suitable for the criminal justice system in China? And is answered under three normative claims, namely necessity, effectiveness, and humanness.The examination of the topic contends LWOP is more of an effective tool in broader anti-corruption strategy than a need for domestic utilization.LWOP in China gives no hope of release and stands inconsistent with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights


Author(s):  
Emily Gray

The average amount of time that death row inmates spend on death row has ballooned over the past decade, and for death row inmates in the state of Texas, the entire duration of that increased time will be spent in solitary confinement. This raises the following question: Is solitary confinement now considered to be part of the punishment, one that may be worse than the death penalty itself? This article discusses the history of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and cites scientific literature which posits that long-term solitary confinement can cause serious psychological damage. It examines “death row syndrome,” a term that refers to the psychological illness or disorder exhibited by an inmate who has spent a prolonged period of time in harsh conditions on death row. The article reviews the Polunsky Unit, which currently houses Texas’s death row and has been described as one of the worst prisons in the United States. The article also discusses the long history of Lackey claims, which allege that prolonged confinements under a death sentence breach the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The unresolved dissent within the Supreme Court regarding this subject is presented and discussed. This article contends that the prolonged solitary confinement of a Texas inmate on death row is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and concludes that the only solution is to end the practice of automatic and permanent solitary confinement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-135
Author(s):  
Irvino Rangkuti, Alvi Syahrin, Suhaidi, Mahmud Mulyadi

The application of capital punishment itself has been regulated in Indonesia as contained in the law. Article 2 paragraph (2) of Corruption Act concerning Eradication of Corruption Crimes. According to Romli Atmasasmita, it was argued that the death penalty for corruptors was effectively implemented in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and it was quite successful to reduce corruption. This certainly can be used as an example in Indonesia in imposing capital punishment for corruptors. The imposition of capital punishment for perpetrators of corruption is urgently needed as "shock therapy" because psychologically the death penalty aims for the benefit of general prevention so that others do not participate in committing crimes. Also, the application of capital punishment is based on the reason that capital punishment is more certain than the prison sentence because the prison sentence is often followed by running away, forgiveness, or because of the release. When compared from an economic standpoint, basically the death sentence is more efficient when compared to life imprisonment. As for the problems that can be formulated, namely: legal arrangements regarding corruption in the Corruption Act; the application of capital punishment sanctions against perpetrators of corruption in Indonesia. The results of the study show that: Corruption is a type of extraordinary crime ("extra-ordinary crime") that must be handled extraordinarily, so that the act is contrary to the 1945 Constitution, therefore it does not need to be protected by the 1945 Constitution. accommodated in Article 2 paragraph (2) of the Corruption Act, must meet the requirements "in certain circumstances" by the Elucidation of Article 2 paragraph (2), but its application has never been implemented, so it is necessary to review the rules "in certain circumstances".


2011 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Raeker-Jordan

In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law that provided for the imposition of death upon one convicted of raping, but not killing or attempting to kill, a child. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, in which the majority, employing various analytical tools, brought its "own judgment" to bear on the excessiveness, and therefore the constitutionality, of the death sentence under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. In emphasizing the Court's use of its own judgment in making the determination of excessiveness or disproportionality, Justice Kennedy and the majority risked the same public and internal dissenting Court criticisms that accompanied previous death penalty opinions in which Court majorities and pluralities similarly employed their own judgments. In the sharp divide over these issues, critics have accused those jurists of disguising their personal views of morality as the doctrinal application of their "own judgment" on these questions. This article argues that despite the criticisms and despite the Court's statement that at least some of its capital punishment case law is "still in search of a unifying principle," there is a precedential thread unifying and justifying the Court's own assessment of excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment. Historical analysis of the Court's Eighth Amendment statements shows that the clear thread in the cases is respect for human dignity and restraint, which plays out through the Amendment's proportionality guarantee. The Court's application of that guarantee against excessiveness has, time and again, invoked the Court's own judgment, based on  contemporary knowledge of punishment, of punishment's goals, and about decency in punishment. This article argues that that approach is sound and historically rooted, and that the Court should continue to apply its own judgment about decency, excessiveness, and proportionality, despite criticisms from the Court's conservative members about personal predilections.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 539-557
Author(s):  
Michael L. Radelet ◽  
G. Ben Cohen

Since 1972, the Supreme Court has experimented with regulation of the death penalty, seeking the illusive goals of consistency, reliability, and fairness. In this century, the court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibited judges from making findings necessary to impose a death sentence. Separately, the court held that the Eighth Amendment safeguarded evolving standards of decency as measured by national consensus. In this article, we discuss the role of judges in death determinations, identifying jurisdictions that initially (post 1972) allowed judge sentencing and naming the individuals who today remain under judge-imposed death sentences. The decisions guaranteeing a jury determination have so far been applied only to cases that have not undergone initial review in state courts. Key questions remain unresolved, including whether the evolving standards of decency permit the execution of more than 100 individuals who were condemned to death by judges without a jury's death verdict before implementation of the rules that now require unanimous jury votes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-130
Author(s):  
Miodrag Simović ◽  
Marina Simović ◽  
Vladimir Simović

In the system of measures of societal reaction towards the perpetrators of criminal offences, all the modern criminal laws, including the new legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognise sentences in the first place. They are the main types of criminal sanctions whose purpose can be achieved to the fullest, and that is the protection of society and social goods from all forms and types of injury and threat caused by the commission of criminal offences. Given that in the structure of criminal offences occur those with serious consequences, violating the highest social values, committed with a severe form of guilt by a repeat offender, in concurrence or by a group or organised crime group, it is logical that all penal systems recognise the harshest sentence - longterm or life imprisonment - especially after the abolition of the death sentence - capital punishment, for the severest forms of crimes. The paper analyses issues related to the harshest sentence, long-term, or life imprisonment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the special emphasis on the European Court of Human Rights case law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 227740172097285
Author(s):  
Anup Surendranath ◽  
Neetika Vishwanath ◽  
Preeti Pratishruti Dash

When the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab in 1980, it also laid down a sentencing framework for subsequent sentencing courts, guiding them in deciding between life imprisonment and the death penalty. This framework, popularly known as the ‘rarest of rare’ framework, was focused on individualised punishment. However, subsequent judgments have strayed away from Bachan Singh’s core framework, and the use of penological justifications as sentencing factors has contributed significantly to this deviation. This article argues that it is not within the mandate of sentencing judges to invoke penological theories as separate sentencing factors in individual cases when deciding between life imprisonment and the death sentence. The article begins by distinguishing between the penological justifications used to retain the death penalty in Bachan Singh and those underlying the sentencing framework developed in the judgment. It then examines subsequent judgments to trace the manner in which the capital sentencing framework was shaped to be crime-centric through the use of penological ideas like ‘collective conscience’ and deterrence. Examining the implications of penological justifications occupying a dominant place in death penalty sentencing, the article examines the broader concerns about the lack of clarity with sentencing goals. The failure in individual cases to distinguish between penological justifications as sentencing factors determining punishment, on the one hand, and viewing them as consequences arising out of an individualised sentencing process, on the other, lies at the core of the critique in this article.


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