The Lloyd George Government and the Strickland Report on the Burning of Cork, 1920

1972 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-66
Author(s):  
Martin Frederick Seedorf

The burning of the city of Cork on the night of 11-12 December 1920 —a “truly staggering reprisal” — was one of many outrageous acts by British forces in Ireland in the late autumn of 1920 and indeed during the entire Anglo-Irish War. Known in Ireland at the time as “the troubles” and in Éire today as “the war of independence,” or “the war of liberation,” the Anglo-Irish War lasted two-and-one-half years from January, 1919, until the truce in July, 1921. Not only did that struggle mark the end of 750 years of Irish subjection under Britain; it served as a warning of the eventual collapse of British and Western imperialism throughout the world.Throughout the first eight months of 1919 the British government's policy was simply military suppression of the Republican Movement. Repeatedly, it misjudged Sinn Féin and the rising Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) as nothing but a “murder gang” terrorizing the mass of the Irish people. Not until the Fall of 1919 did Lloyd George finally conceive a policy — one combining force with appeasement. The latter was offered to Ireland in the Fourth Home Rule Bill though it was to be rejected by a majority of the Irish press and people. From the fall of 1919 until the summer of 1920, Lloyd George stepped up coercion, not only by strengthening the military, but by introducing “Black and Tans” into the Irish police force and establishing a new administration at Dublin Castle in the spring of 1920.When, in late July, 1920, it became evident to the British cabinet that police action was losing to the I.R.A.'s guerilla tactics, they broadened the struggle even further by choosing, not appeasement along Dominion lines, but a policy of war. Though never officially declared, war was first implemented under the guise of restoring order in Ireland and later by martial law. Accompanying Lloyd George's war policy between the summers of 1920 and 1921 were systematic reprisals against Irish civilians and their property by British forces retaliating for the I.R.A.'s killing of their own men. These reprisals, which became official and regulated under martial law in 1921, were unauthorized — although not officially condemned — in 1919 and 1920. Unauthorized reprisals reached a peak in the fall of 1920 at Balbriggan, Groke Park, and in the burning of Cork.

Author(s):  
Lisa Weihman

The Irish War of Independence (Irish: Cogadh na Saoirse), also known as the Anglo–Irish War, began in January 1919 as a guerrilla war waged by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British Government. Ireland was formally a part of the United Kingdom as a result of the passing of the Acts of Union in 1800. In the late-nineteenth century, the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell (1846–1891), advocated home rule for Ireland through cooperation with the Liberal Party in the English Parliament, but it was unsuccessful until the Third Home Rule Bill of 1912. This bill provoked Unionists in the north of Ireland to form the Ulster Volunteers, who feared a predominantly Catholic Irish Parliament in Dublin. In response, Nationalists formed the Irish Volunteers. The Third Home Rule Bill never took effect because of the outbreak of World War I; Irish troops fought with England in the war with the promise that home rule would be granted at the conflict’s end.


2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
GERRI O’NEILL

In April 1921, while Waterford was under martial law, Brigid Fahy, a native of Dungarvan, and her maid Bridget O’Neill, became victims of a violent assault in their home during curfew hours. The alleged perpetrators were two ‘Black and Tans’ attached to the RIC barracks in the town. They subsequently returned to the residence and burned it as a reprisal for the formal complaint made by Fahy about their behaviour. This article explores how the police, the military and the state responded to Fahy’s public pursuit of justice. Drawing on the correspondence between Dublin Castle and senior military officers, as well as Fahy’s sworn statement, it highlights the tensions that existed between the civil and military authorities in Ireland during this period. Central to the narrative is chief secretary Sir Hamar Greenwood, who—despite his elevated position within the Irish administration—could not persuade General Strickland’s 6th Division to communicate any information on the case, leaving Greenwood in an almost untenable position when confronted with questions on the matter in the House of Commons. Fahy’s case not only highlights the breakdown in communications that existed between Dublin Castle and the military, but demonstrates the breakdown of trust between the citizens of Dungarvan and the RIC. It argues that crimes of this nature may have been under-reported, as women had no incentive to report the crimes of the RIC and every reason to refrain from doing so.


1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy J. Curtin

In an 1989 article inIrish Historical Studies, Brendan Bradshaw challenged the current practice of Irish history by arguing that an “ideology of professionalism” associated with the modern historiographical tradition established a half century ago, and now entrenched in the academy, “served to inhibit rather than to enhance the understanding of the Irish historical experience.” Inspired by the cautionary injunctions of Herbert Butterfield about teleological history, T. W. Moody, D. B. Quinn, and R. Dudley Edwards launched this revisionist enterprise in the 1930s, transforming Irish historiography which until then was subordinating historical truth to the cause of the nation. Their mission was to cleanse the historical record of its mythological clutter, to engage in what Moody called “the mental war of liberation from servitude to the myth” of Irish nationalist history, by applying scientific methods to the evidence, separating fact from destructive and divisive fictions.Events in the 1960s and 1970s reinforced this sense that the Irish people needed liberation from nationalist mythology, a mythology held responsible for the eruption of the Troubles in Northern Ireland and which offered legitimation to the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the nightmare of history from which professional historians could rouse the Irish people. Nationalist heroes and movements came under even more aggressive, critical scrutiny. But much of this was of the character of specific studies. The revisionists seemed to have succeeded in tearing down the edifice of nationalist history, but they had offered little in the way of a general, synthetic history to replace it.


1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan J. Ward

In 1922 the Irish Free State began life with a constitution which embodied two contradictory principles. The first recognized that all powers of government derive from the people and provided for a system of government in which the Irish Cabinet was clearly responsible to the popularly elected Irish lower house, Dail Eireann. The second recognized a monarch, King George V, as head of the Irish executive, with substantial prerogative powers derived not from the Irish people but from British common law. The constitution was a compromise between Britain and Irish republicans to end the Irish War of Independence. Though not every compromise in politics makes complete sense, for Britain this one represented more than a short-range expedient. Its contradictions represented the dying gasp in a long, often anguished, and ultimately futile attempt by Britain to devise a formula which would simultaneously permit the Irish a measure of self-government and protect vital British interests in Ireland.This essay will review the attempts to construct a satisfactory Anglo-Irish relationship in the years between 1782 and 1949. It will concentrate on four models of government proposed for Ireland: (a) the independent Irish Parliament of the period from 1782 to 1800, (b) O'Connell's proposals to repeal the union with Britain in the 1830s and 1840s, (c) the devolution proposed in the home rule bills of 1886, 1893, 1912, and the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, and (d) the independence provided in the Irish Free State constitution of 1922 and its successor, the Irish constitution of 1937. It will also place these models in the context of the constitutional evolution of the British Empire. In the Canadian, New Zealand, Australian, and South African colonies, colonial self-government and British imperial interests were reconciled, beginning in Nova Scotia in 1848, by using a kind of constitutional double-think involving the Crown and the colonial Governor. But the problem of the troubled Anglo-Irish relationship could not be resolved so easily.


1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-616
Author(s):  
Charles Fairman

It is not in the least unusual, in newspaper accounts of a strike, riot, flood, or fire, to read that the governor has proclaimed martial law and summoned the militia to the threatened zone. However exaggerated such reports may be, they are evidence of a general belief that there exists some mysterious “martial law” which, when proclaimed, augments the powers of soldiers and paves the way for heroic measures. Nor are these notions wholly fanciful. For such a proclamation may indeed be followed by an extraordinary régime in which the military authority will issue regulations for the conduct of the civil population, troops may be called upon to take life, and perhaps the individuals accused of fomenting trouble will be held without authority of a court, or in some cases may even be tried by a military tribunal. Quite likely these severe measures will receive the approval of public opinion. Yet it is surprising that a people ordinarily rather legalistic should have evinced so little disposition to inquire what rules of law, if any, govern the exercise of these military powers. To answering that unasked query the present study is addressed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-81
Author(s):  
Mubarra Javed ◽  
Naushaba Haq

This research paper explores the factors behind the political instability and economic inequality in Pakistan, especially during General Zia’s military regime as reflected in Nadeem Aslam’s novel ‘Season of the Rainbirds’ (1993), in the light of the theory of New Historicism. The study highlights that the military intervened in political affairs and imposed martial law in 1977. The parliamentary democratic process in Pakistan did not get stability due to certain factors, such as feudal dynasty, social and economic inequalities, exploitation of masses, and low literacy rate. The feudal elites have always supported the military in this process to seek their vested interests, as their dominance over political affairs has been great. On the other hand, the masses’ dependency on their land for economic survival has worsened the situation. This study is based on a qualitative research approach and has been carried out by doing a textual analysis of the selected excerpts from the novel ‘Season of the Rainbirds’. The findings reveal that the social composition of the feudal class has undermined the institution of democracy and caused political, social, and economic disintegration. It monopolized the institution of politics and made a way for the military to intervene in the political affairs of the country. Without the provision of social and economic justice, democracy cannot get stability in Pakistan.


1982 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-8
Author(s):  
Boleslaw Taborski

Leading Polish writers, academics, composers, film-makers and theatre directors met in Warsaw on 11 December for what was to be a three-day Congress of Polish Culture. Two days were spent in fruitful discussion, but then the proceedings came to an unexpected and abrupt end with the declaration of martial law in the early hours of 13 December. Boleslaw Taborski, a Polish poet and translator living in London, here gives a personal account of the Congress which was attended by some 800 people, many of whom are now among those detained by the military authorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-119
Author(s):  
Bartosz Kapuściak

The primary task of the military intelligence in the People’s Republic of Poland was to acquire materials on the armament and stationing of NATO troops. However, due to the demand of the communist authorities, it also conducted political activities aimed at, among others, the Catholic Church. The interest of the state authorities increased especially during the pontificate of John Paul II. According to the assessment of military intelligence, the election of Karol Wojtyła as Bishop of Rome stimulated the Catholic Church both in Poland and in the Vatican. In this way, the activities of the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army were within the scope of civil intelligence interests. The article aims to show the role played by intelligence officers and informers operating in Rome undercover as military attachés or in civilian institutions. Their actions resulted in the establishment of contacts with the church environment and acquisition of voluntary and involuntary informants. In this way, the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army provided the party and political apparatus with interesting news and materials. Following the introduction of martial law in Poland, the church from the Rome area started sending parcels of food, clothes and medicines to Poland. This aid for the country was used to establish contact with the Polish clergy thanks to the initiative of Colonel Franciszek Mazurek.


Belleten ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (255) ◽  
pp. 629-642
Author(s):  
Himmet Umunç

As a young reporter, Ernest Hemingway visited İstanbul and the Thracian part of Turkey between 29 September and 18 October 1922. During his stay, he closely followed the military and political consequences of the Great Offensive, which was a major stage in the Turkish War of Independence, and also witnessed at first hand the Greek evacuation of eastern Thrace. His impressions of the İstanbul under occupation and also his observations of the events and developments at the time were included in the short stories which he wrote later on. In his fictions, he described and represented his observations fronı a point of view which was against Mustafa Kemal and Turkey, and, since he wrote in a mood supportive of the Allies and their invading forces, he failed to grasp the principles of righteousness and national independence, upon which the Turkish War of Independence was fought. This article is a study, within the context of the Turkish War of Independence, of Hemingway's anti-Turkish attitude crystallized in his desriptions and fıctions related to Turkey.


Author(s):  
Tony Murray

This chapter explores how three short stories by William Trevor portray the way in which Irish people in London were affected by the Troubles. For a writer who had established a reputation for his empathetic portrayal of the anomalous position of the Anglo-Irish in Ireland, the political situation of the Irish in London in the 1970s and 1980s provided Trevor with similar subject matter, but in a wholly new context. His stories provide an important corrective to some of the more pervasive stereotypes found in the popular genre of Troubles fiction. They reveal how, during the Troubles, the neighbourhood and the home became heightened political ‘contact zones’ between migrant and host communities. With attention to AvtarBrah’s notion of ‘diaspora space’, I demonstrate how fiction, and the personal and collective narratives contained therein, has a valuable role to play in mediating memories of the Troubles in Britain. This, in turn, can inform the wider discussion of British-Irish relations and contribute to post-conflict understanding.


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