International Business, Morality, and the Common Good

1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Velasquez
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
International Business ◽  
Greenhouse Effect ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Environment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Business Morality

The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and provided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are support of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency.

International Business and the Common Good: A Response to Manuel Velasquez

1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter B. Gulick
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
International Business ◽  
Common Good ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
Legislative Processes ◽  
Governmental Control

The topic of Manuel Velasquez's clear and persuasive paper is of great significance today—far greater than is commonly realized. For multinational corporations have come to play an extraordinary—and largely unchecked—role in shaping the conditions of life today around the world. It is not so much that they have begun to control legislative processes—although there is some of this—as that they have increasingly escaped governmental control by playing governments off one another. Accordingly, the board rooms in New York, Toronto, and Amsterdam have more and more replaced the legislative chambers in Washington, Ottawa, and the Hague as internationally significant centers of power. And where the interests of business and government have tended to merge, there one finds the most powerful international forces in the world today—witness Japan, Inc.

Justice Beyond Borders – Extraterritorial Obligations from Thucydides to Grotius

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-248
Author(s):  
Tilmann Altwicker
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Early History ◽  
History Of Ideas ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common

The article traces the problem of extraterritorial obligations in the early history of ideas, spanning from Thucydides to Grotius. Extraterritorial obligations are defined here as moral obligations of a legitimate authority to perform or not to perform an act vis-à-vis individuals who are not its subjects. The article shows that arguments about justice beyond the border rely on transnational conceptions of the common good. In the early history of ideas concerning extraterritorial obligations, the following questions were central: Can there be a transnational meaning of moral concepts? Are extraterritorial obligations merely negative obligations? Is the extraterritorial pursuit of state interests limited by higher-ranking principles? Under which circumstances is the extra-territorial use of force permitted in order to protect individuals?

scholarly journals Seeking the Common Good or Just Making Us be Good? Recent Amendment to New Zealand's Social Security Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Māmari Stephens
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Social Security Act ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

New Zealand's social security system was born out of a vision of society consistent with a definition of the common good informed by Christian ethics. The past 30 years, in particular, have seen fierce ideological battles fought between the left and right over the extent, coverage, and generosity of the system. Yet a remnant of the vision of the common good remains, whereby individuals can have some access, by virtue of social security, to the sufficient conditions of social life to be free enough to find some level of fulfilment in that life. However, the freedom to be good, as is also required by a broad understanding of the common good, is under threat within New Zealand's social security law. Social security law asserts a vision, and not a coherent one, of what it means to be good in New Zealand society.  Newly minted social obligations in the Social Security Act 1964 go beyond the purposes of the legislation; being unconnected to relieving need, maintaining fiscal prudence, or even seeking paid employment as a means of achieving welfare. These modern moral obligations ensure that beneficiaries' freedom to choose to live life in a way consonant with the common good is frustrated, if not substantially abrogated, striking the wrong balance between the law's protection of individual autonomy and its implementation of social imperatives in pursuit of the common good.

The Ethics of Voting

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Civic Duty ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right

Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. This book challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens—in fact, it argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. The book shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well—or not vote at all. This book explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, “How to Vote Well,” the book provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.

11. Why obey the law?

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Do we have a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules simply because they are legal rules? What about obviously unfair or unjust laws? Or laws that impose unreasonable demands on us? The question of whether we have a duty to follow the demands of the law raises some fundamental issues regarding the nature of law and its moral claims. This chapter examines a number of possible reasons for obeying the law. It will examine the principal justifications for obedience: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Henham
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Social Divisions ◽  
Sentencing Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
Normative Dimension

The Introduction outlines the work’s rationale and scope. Two main propositions are advanced. First, it is argued that the values underpinning sentencing policy should promote social cohesion rather than neo-liberal retributive values, which tend to reinforce social divisions through the disproportionate use of incarceration. Thus, sentencing policy should reflect shared values that justify punishment for the common good. Crucially, the identification of such values is regarded as a moral obligation that falls to the state. Secondly, and fundamental to social justice and credible governance, is the normative dimension. Hence, values must be realized through practice so that outcomes have moral credibility at the community level. It is suggested how value-related information could be accommodated in individual cases, whilst maintaining the system’s overall consistency. Numerous changes to practice and guidance are advocated, the most important being that sentencers should be given more discretion, not less, to facilitate the changes proposed.

FINNIS ON THE AUTHORITY OF LAW AND THE COMMON GOOD

Legal Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Duke
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Moral Difference

This paper seeks to elucidate the role played by the common good in John Finnis's arguments for a generic and presumptive moral obligation to obey the law.1Finnis's appeal to the common good constitutes a direct challenge to liberal and philosophical anarchist denials of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law.2It is questionable, however, whether Finnis has presented the strongest possible case for his position. In the first section I outline Finnis's account of the relationship between basic goods, the common good, and the authority of law. Section II demonstrates how Finnis's emphasis upon the instrumental nature of the common good leaves his position vulnerable to Joseph Raz's objections3that not all cases of law make a moral difference and that governmental authority is often unnecessary to resolve coordination problems. I argue that Raz's critique nonetheless fails adequately to address an alternative defense of the existence of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law, suggested by some passages in Finnis's work, according to which the common good is integral, rather than merely instrumental, to the good of individuals. In the final section I consider whether Finnis could strengthen his case for a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law by adopting a more consistently robust—and hence also more contentious—account of the common good.

Voting as an Ethical Issue

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Issue ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
The Common

This introductory chapter provides an overview of voting ethics. Voting is the principal way that citizens influence the quality of government. As such, individual voters have moral obligations concerning how they vote. Indeed, how individuals vote can help or harm people. Electoral outcomes can lead to a bad government, which can exploit the minority for the benefit of the majority. This book argues that citizens must vote well or abstain instead. Voters ought to vote for what they justifiedly believe promotes the common good. Even if many voters intend to promote the common good, they all too often lack sufficient evidence to justify the beliefs they advocate. When they do vote, they pollute democracy with their votes and make it more likely that people will have to suffer from bad governance.

11. Why obey the law?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Is there a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules solely because they are legal rules? This question is particularly demanding when we are faced with laws that are obviously unjust or unfair, or those laws that make irrational or unreasonable demands on us. This subject has long vexed legal and moral philosophers; this chapter examines what possible reasons there are for obeying the law. The moral basis of obedience may spring from one or more of the following four principal sources: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude. Each is briefly discussed.

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