A New Conception of Restraint in False Imprisonment

1920 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 360
Author(s):  
Otto P. Mann
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 15-15
Author(s):  
Eric Lyerly
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 56-59
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

This Chapter describes how the system of restraints on power during the colonial and early national periods was synergistic yet homeostatic. The synergies arose because aggrieved parties might pursue their remedies simultaneously rather than sequentially. For example, when J.P. Wyseman Claggett of New Hampshire sent James Dwyer to jail pending trial on theft charges, the immediate result was both a criminal indictment for unlawfully altering the order and, as this Chapter details, a false imprisonment action by Dwyer against both Claggett and the constable who conducted the arrest. Yet while interweaving actions amplified the power of the system they also served as stabilizers. If a particular action were abused the victim might have recourse to a damages action of his or her own. For example, as several malicious prosecution cases in this Chapter illustrate, a criminal defendant who secured a favorable outcome could sue a party who had pursued a private criminal prosecution or wrongfully procured initiation of a public criminal prosecution.


as illegally obtained evidence is not, ipso facto, automatically rendered inadmissible. The House of Lords ruled in Sang that no discretion existed to exclude evidence simply because it had been illegally or improperly obtained. A court could only exclude relevant evidence where its effect would be 'unduly prejudicial'. This is reflected in s 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 (below). This perhaps surprising rule was supported by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (although the argument there w as chiefly focused on the admissibility of confession evidence). An action for damages for false imprisonment. In some cases the damages for such an action would be likely to be nominal if the violation by the detainer does not have much impact on the detainee. Consider cases under this heading like Christie v Leachinsky. Damages can, however, be considerable. Apart from the question of civil remedies, it is important to remember that, if the arrest is not lawful, there is the right to use reasonable force to resist it. This is a remedy, however, of doubtful advisability as the legality of the arrest will only be properly tested after the event in a law court. If a police officer was engaged in what the courts decide was a lawful arrest or conduct, then anyone who uses force against the officer might have been guilty of an offence of assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty contrary to s of the Police Act 1964. Police Act Section Assaults on constables

2012 ◽  
pp. 358-358

2021 ◽  
pp. 128-139
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses both common law and statute in relation to the torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts have three common characteristics: they are the result of intentional actions, take the form of direct harm, and are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage. An additional intentional tort is derived from Wilkinson v Downton (1897), the wilful infliction of physical harm upon the claimant by indirect means. This category of intentional harm is also augmented by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Defences to the intentional torts are also discussed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 327-356
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter considers intentional interferences with the person, including the so-called trespass to the person torts, the tort in Wilkinson v Downton and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Trespass is an ancient set of wrongs which mainly deals with the direct, and usually intentional, invasion of a claimant’s interest in his person, his land or his goods. It is the right itself which is protected, and not just the freedom from resulting damage, and much of the law of trespass is the basis of civil liberties today. This chapter considers the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment, together with various defences. The principal use today of these torts relates not so much to recovery of compensation but to the establishment of a right, or a recognition that the defendant acted unlawfully. The chapter then considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton which provides a remedy in cases of indirect intentional infliction of distress and the statutory tort of harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997).


Author(s):  
Dr Karen Dyer

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses intentional torts. It covers key debates, sample questions, diagram answer plan, tips for getting extra marks, and online resources. To answer questions on this topic, students need to understand the following: trespass to the person: assault, battery, false imprisonment, the rule in Wilkinson v Downton, and Protection from Harassment Act 1997; trespass to land; trespass to goods and the tort of conversion; and defences to intentional torts: necessity, lawful arrest, consent, and self-defence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 319-345
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter considers intentional interferences with the person, including the so-called trespass to the person torts, the tort in Wilkinson v Downton and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Trespass is an ancient set of wrongs which mainly deals with the direct, and usually intentional, invasion of a claimant’s interest in his person, his land or his goods. It is the right itself which is protected, and not just the freedom from resulting damage, and much of the law of trespass is the basis of civil liberties today. This chapter considers the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment, together with various defences. The principal use today of these torts relates not so much to recovery of compensation but to the establishment of a right, or a recognition that the defendant acted unlawfully. The chapter then considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton which provides a remedy in cases of indirect intentional infliction of distress and the statutory tort of harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997).


Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 410-445
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines intentional interferences with the person, including the torts comprising trespass to the person—battery, assault and false imprisonment—the tort in Wilkinson v Downton [1897], and the statutory tort of harassment. The trespass to the person torts seek to protect an individual against an infringement of their personal or bodily integrity, that is, against the infliction, or fearing the infliction, of unlawful force (battery and assault) and the unlawful restriction of a person’s freedom of movement (false imprisonment). The three trespass to the person torts have the same characteristics: the defendant must have intended both the conduct itself and consequences of their action; the defendant’s action must cause direct and immediate harm; and they are actionable per se, that is, without proof of loss. The chapter also considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, which provides a remedy for physical and psychiatric harm deliberately caused by a false statement, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which imposes both civil and criminal liability for harassing conduct.


Author(s):  
Paul Connor ◽  
Glenn Hutton ◽  
David Johnston ◽  
Gavin McKinnon
Keyword(s):  

Legal Studies ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku

A Turk is fined and recommended for deportation by a magistrate for breach of the Aliens Order 1953. The magistrate recommends that he not be detained in custody pending the Home Office’ decision on the recommendation for deportation. The Turk appeals to the Crown Court against the recommendation for his deportation. The judge rules that he has no jurisidiction to hear the appeal and dismisses it. On seeing the erstwhile appellant about to leave the court premises the judge cries ‘stop him’, on which the appellant Turk is arrested by the police and detained in custody. The Divisional Court of the Queens Bench issues an order of habeas corpus for the release of the Turk on the ground that the judge in the Crown Court had been functus officio before be began to consider whether the Turk should be detained or not. The Turk consequently brings an action against the Crown Court judge and the police, claiming damages for assault and false imprisonment. It is decided that the judge is immune from liability because he had acted in his capacity as a judge.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document