Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. I

1985 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 423
Author(s):  
Michael D. Bayles ◽  
Joel Feinberg
Legal Theory ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Smith

In Chapter 4 of his famous work, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg, with characteristic clarity and insight, outlined the major problems associated with analyzing the foundations of responsibility for the failure to act. In that chapter he made a number of controversial claims supported by arguments that have generated debate ever since he made them in 1984. His analysis led him to conclude that liability (or responsibility) for the failure to act falls within the moral limits of the criminal law in cases in which a random bystander could easily rescue a seriously imperiled stranger.


2021 ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

It is neither easy to define crime nor identify the aims of criminal law but some characteristics may be universal to every crime, including that it involves public wrongs and moral wrongs. ‘Public wrongs’ reflect the important role of the public in punishing crimes. A crime incorporating a moral wrong implies that a ‘wrong’ is done or harm to others is involved but experience suggests that morality and criminal law are not coextensive. The chapter introduces students to thinking about criminalization and the need to guard against overcriminalization. It also examines the principal sources of criminal law: common law, statute, EU law, international law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Problematically, important and serious offences and most defences in English law derive from common law rather than statute, and some offences—from public nuisance to gross negligence manslaughter—have been challenged recently on grounds of certainty and retrospectivity.


1989 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 239
Author(s):  
Gerald Dworkin ◽  
Joel Feinberg
Keyword(s):  

1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander

Joel Feinberg’s magnificent four volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, represents a sustained and comprehensive argument regarding what conduct is appropriately regulated through criminal prohibitions and sanctions. Feinberg’s conclusions are essentially those of the Millian liberal: Conduct that causes harm or offense to others may be criminalized, but conduct that is harmful only to the actor or that is a harmless immorality may not be. Feinberg’s governing principle, however, is not Mill’s maximization of utility but is instead respect for individual autonomy. For Feinberg, respect for autonomy delimits the legitimate boundaries of concern with others’ conduct insofar as the concern is expressed through criminal prohibitions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 309-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Dworkin

AbstractThis is an essay on the limits of the Criminal Law. In particular, it is about what principles, if any, determine whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalize certain conduct. Joel Feinberg in his great work on the moral limits of the criminal law argues that we need only two principles. One is a principle regulating harm to other people and the other is an offense principle regulating certain kinds of offensive conduct. I explore various aspects of his argument. In particular I concentrate on his use of the Volenti Principle: He who consents cannot be wrongfully harmed by conduct to which he has fully consented. Feinberg uses the principle to argue that certain kinds of consensual conduct cannot be forbidden unless we adopt some kind of legal moralism, i.e., conduct can be forbidden on the grounds that it is immoral even though the conduct harms no other person. I explore the possibility of avoiding legal moralism by limiting the use of the Volenti Principle.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

It is neither easy to define crime nor identify the aims of criminal law but some characteristics may be universal to every crime, including that it involves public wrongs and moral wrongs. ‘Public wrongs’ reflect the important role of the public in punishing crimes. A crime incorporating a moral wrong implies that a ‘wrong’ is done or harm to others is involved but experience suggests that morality and criminal law are not coextensive. The chapter introduces students to thinking about criminalization and the need to guard against over-criminalization. It also examines the principal sources of criminal law: common law, statute, EU law, international law, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Problematically, important and serious offences and most defences in English law derive from common law rather than statute, and some offences, from public nuisance to gross negligence manslaughter, have been challenged recently on grounds of certainty and retrospectivity.


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