Ingolf Ståhl: Bargaining Theory

1973 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oskar Morgenstern
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Theory

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
The Third ◽  
China And India ◽  
International Setting ◽  
Multiple Audiences ◽  
Crisis Behavior ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Shed Light

This book is the first to theorize third party mediation in crises between regional nuclear powers. Its relevance flows from two of the most significant international developments since the end of the Cold War: the emergence of regional nuclear rivalries; and the shift from the Cold War’s bipolar context to today’s unipolar international setting. Moving away from the traditional bilateral deterrence models, the book conceptualizes crisis behavior as “brokered bargaining”: a three-way bargaining framework where the regional rivals and the ‘third party’ seek to influence each other to behave in line with their crisis objectives and in so doing, affect each other’s crisis behavior. The book tests brokered bargaining theory by examining U.S.-led crisis management in South Asia, analyzing three major crises between India and Pakistan: the Kargil conflict, 1999; the 2001-02 nuclear standoff; and the Mumbai crisis, 2008. The case studies find strong evidence of behavior predicted by the brokered bargaining framework. They also shed light on several risks of misperceptions and inadvertence due to the challenges inherent in signaling to multiple audiences simultaneously. Traditional explanations rooted in bilateral deterrence models do not account for these, leaving a void with serious practical consequences, which the introduction of brokered bargaining seeks to fill. The book’s findings also offer lessons for crises on the Korean peninsula, between China and India, and between potential nuclear rivals in the Middle East.

The Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Regime Formation ◽  
Power Asymmetries

Chapter 2 lays out the book’s main argument on the importance of power asymmetry. It draws from three strands in the literature. From the literature on democratization, this chapter borrows the notion of constitutions as pact-making. From bargaining theory is borrowed the notion of self-dealing: Incumbents will seek to advance the powers of the office that they hold. And from the literature on elite theories of regime formation, the chapter develops the argument that power asymmetries among elite actors are the fundamental drivers of balanced constitutions. This book also seeks to explain the origins of an important institution: constitutions. It takes seriously the insight from institutionalists that institutions emerge from actors’ de facto power and bargaining outcomes. Yet, this book does not assume that actors’ preferences are exogenous, or exclusively ideological, and partisan; rather, those who negotiate a constitution have preferences that depend on whether they are Incumbents or Opposition forces, often regardless of their ideologies and partisan orientation.

Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keniston ◽  
Bradley Larsen ◽  
Shengwu Li ◽  
J.J. Prescott ◽  
Bernardo Silveira ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Theory

Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War

2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 172-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. McKoy ◽  
David A. Lake
Keyword(s):  
Iraq War ◽  
Bargaining Theory

Bargaining for Justice

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Hardin
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Central Core ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Surplus

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement presents a partial theory of distributive justice. It is partial because it applies only to the distribution of gains from joint endeavors, or what we may call the ‘social surplus’ from cooperation. This surplus is the benefit we receive from cooperation insofar as this is greater than what we might have produced through individual efforts without interaction with others. The central core of Gauthier's theory of distributive justice is his bargaining theory of ‘minimax relative concession’ or MRC. Whether his theory is compelling turns essentially on whether MRC is workable and compelling. It is this issue that I wish to address.

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