Latin American Politics & the U.S. ConnectionInevitable Revolutions: The United States and Central America. By Walter LaFeber Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches. By Michael A. Morris and Victor Millán New Military Politics in Latin America. By Robert Wesson In Search of Policy: The United States and Latin America. By Howard J. Wiarda

Polity ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-175
Author(s):  
Harold Molineu
Author(s):  
Iñigo García-Bryce

This chapter explores Haya’s changing relationship with the United States. As an exiled student leader he denounced “Yankee imperialism” and alarmed observers in the U.S. State Department. Yet once he entered Peruvian politics, Haya understood the importance of cultivating U.S.-Latin American relations. While in hiding he maintained relations with U.S. intellectuals and politicians and sought U.S. support for his embattled party. His writings increasingly embraced democracy and he maneuvered to position APRA as an ally in the U.S. fight fascism during the 1930s and 40s, and then communism during the Cold War. The five years he spent in Lima’s Colombian embassy awaiting the resolution of his political asylum case, made him into an international symbol of the democratic fight against dictatorship. He would always remain a critic of U.S. support for dictatorships in Latin America.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (23) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro ◽  
Jessica Andrea Rodríguez

China has had a significant incidence in various sectors of African and Latin American politics, economy, and trade. There is no denying that its foreign policy has strategic interests in both regions. One of the most outstanding features of Chinese politics is its desire to promote cooperation to foster a renaissance between Asia and Latin America and Africa. Unlike the old colonial masters, China is committed to providing these regions with new opportunities for development. Bearing in mind Alfred Mahan’s theory of naval power, and the strategic rearguard that, at a given time, it allowed the United States, China is attempting to maintain the strategic center of gravity, which the economic control of Latin America and Africa and its surrounding resources provides to generate a strategic expansion that would ensure its interests and power in the hemisphere. In exchange, China strives to promote economic, commercial, political, and social development in African and Latin American societies.


Author(s):  
Gisela Mateos ◽  
Edna Suárez-Díaz

On December 8, 1953, in the midst of increasing nuclear weapons testing and geopolitical polarization, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace initiative. More than a pacifist program, the initiative is nowadays seen as an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it pursued several ambitious goals, and Latin America was an ideal target for most of them: to create political allies, to ease fears of the deadly atomic energy while fostering receptive attitudes towards nuclear technologies, to control and avoid development of nuclear weapons outside the United States and its allies, and to open or redirect markets for the new nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of State, through the Foreign Operations Administration, acted in concert with several domestic and foreign middle-range actors, including people at national nuclear commissions, universities, and industrial funds, to implement programs of regional technical assistance, education and training, and technological transfer. Latin American countries were classified according to their stage of nuclear development, with Brazil at the top and Argentina and Mexico belonging to the group of “countries worthy of attention.” Nuclear programs often intersected with development projects in other areas, such as agriculture and public health. Moreover, Eisenhower’s initiative required the recruitment of local actors, natural resources and infrastructures, governmental funding, and standardized (but localized techno-scientific) practices from Latin American countries. As Atoms for Peace took shape, it began to rely on newly created multilateral and regional agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nevertheless, as seen from Latin America, the implementation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was reinterpreted in different ways in each country. This fact produced different outcomes, depending on the political, economic, and techno-scientific expectations and interventions of the actors involved. It provided, therefore, an opportunity to create local scientific elites and infrastructure. Finally, the peaceful uses of atomic energy allowed the countries in the region to develop national and international political discourses framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean signed in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, in 1967, which made Latin America the first atomic weapons–free populated zone in the world.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (8) ◽  
pp. 971-999 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Murillo ◽  
Andrew Schrank

Why did Latin American governments adopt potentially costly, union-friendly labor reforms in the cost-sensitive 1980s and 1990s? The authors answer the question by exploring the relationship between trade unions and two of their most important allies: labor-backed parties at home and labor rights activists overseas. While labor-backed parties in Latin America have locked in the support of their core constituencies by adopting relatively union-friendly labor laws in an otherwise uncertain political and economic environment, labor rights activists in the United States have demonstrated their support for their Latin American allies by asking the U.S. government to treat the protection of labor rights as the price of access to the U.S. market. The former trajectory is the norm in traditionally labor-mobilizing polities, where industrialization encouraged the growth of labor-backed parties in the postwar era; the latter is more common in more labor-repressive environments, where vulnerable unions tend to look for allies overseas.


2019 ◽  
pp. 93-118
Author(s):  
Gamonal C. Sergio ◽  
César F. Rosado Marzán

Chapter 4 describes the principle of nonwaiver in Latin America focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. It posits that employers and workers cannot waive labor rights, given by law, through contract. It shows how the principle is expressly stated in some positive law, in court opinions, and in legal scholarship. It also details how the principle is typically applied in controversies over contract terms and claim settlements. The chapter also shows that the principle surfaces in Latin American cases related to contract modification and novation, even when such contracts contain terms that meet or exceed minimum labor standards. Second, the chapter finds a nonwaiver principle in the United States, mostly in its protection of free labor under the Thirteenth Amendment and in the positive labor law and jurisprudence. However, the chapter also focuses on the particular problem of so-called “procedural” waivers sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s coerced readings of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The U.S. Supreme Court permits employers to require employees to sign agreements to arbitrate legal claims, even if those legal claims are class or collective in scope. Evidence clearly shows that such “procedural waivers” undermine substantial labor rights. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled on the issue, we argue that such waivers need to either be legally banned or regulated by Congress, under its Thirteenth Amendment authority, so as to not undo workers’ rights in the United States and force workers to agree to terms they likely oppose. In fact, we argue that regulated arbitration might actually help to create legitimate labor courts in the United States, which that country still lacks.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-40
Author(s):  
Ana Isabel Lopez Garcia

It is often argued that the first and most visible impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has been the reordering of Washington’s priorities in its relations with Latin America. The United States (U.S.) has focused its attention outside the hemisphere and placed Latin America at the “bottom of U.S. terrorist agenda” (Youngers 2003). Various scholars argue that the U.S has returned to its Cold-War stance, in which it only notices those developments in Latin America that directly challenge U.S. interests (Hakim 2006). Accordingly, after 9/11 U.S. security demands have overshadowed other issues that Latin American countries consider priorities (Youngers 2003, 2). Susan Kauffman (2002), for instance, posits that: “once again the United States is looking at Latin America through a security lens, while Latin America wants the emphasis to remain on economic development.” The effects of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America after 9/11 have not repeated the pattern of the Cold War. Although Latin America no longer is the overriding priority of American foreign policy, the U.S. has not neglected the region, nor, as many analysts have argued (Shifter 2004; Youngers 2003; Hakim 2006; Roett 2006), has it become disengaged from the hemisphere. The terrorist attacks did not introduce a different agenda for U.S.-Latin American relations from that of the post-Cold-War period. Free trade, illegal migration and the fight against drugs have continued to be the main issues of U.S.-Latin American relations. Even the trend towards militarization of U.S. foreign policy began in Latin America long before the terrorist attacks. U.S.-Latin America relations have been affected significantly not by the consequences of 9/11, but rather by the negative effects of the U.S-promoted economic model in the region. The failures of the so-called Washington Consensus are not linked to the terrorist attacks.


Author(s):  
Sebastian Bitar ◽  
Tom Long

Latin America exhibits some of the world’s most worrisome patterns of insecurity. Homicide rates have reached alarming levels in dozens of cities in Mexico, Central America, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia. Drug and other illicit trafficking generate massive income for criminal organizations. Fighting among these organizations, and between criminal groups and the state, threatens human security in zones of production and along transit routes. Refugee crises—especially an exodus of 4 million Venezuelans by 2019—could increase substantially. Receiving countries struggle to respond. Insecurity in Latin America cannot be fully understood through comparison of the domestic challenges of each country in the region. The sources of contemporary insecurity are not contained within countries, but extend to transnational criminal networks, flows of illicit goods, and human trafficking and displacement. Likewise, isolated state responses are insufficient to respond to transnational dynamics; although some coordination has been achieved, intergovernmental responses have produced limited gains and substantial unintended consequences. Thus, we consider security challenges in the region as a “security complex” that includes Latin American and Caribbean countries, but in which the United States remains significant. On the other hand, international conflict and civil war, as traditionally defined, have almost vanished from Latin America. Threats of military coups and politically motivated violence have declined after being a key security issue for decades. However, some troubling cases and trends complicate this positive trend. Venezuela’s governing civilian–military alliance eroded basic democratic institutions and produced an economic, political, and humanitarian crisis. In response, the United States has raised the specter of military intervention or coup sponsorship. Honduras and especially Nicaragua have turned to authoritarianism, accompanied by alarming levels of repression of protesters and civil society activists. U.S. policies under the Trump administration toward migrants from Central America and Mexico are creating great tension in the region and fear of reprisals. Although most border disputes have been settled a few still are unresolved or contested and could generate tensions between countries in the region. The academic literature about international security in Latin America reflects the complex dynamics described above, covers historical and contemporary security challenges in the region, and presents debates and developments on Latin American security at the international and national levels. Despite its wide scope, the existing literature presents areas where more work is needed to account for emerging trends of (in)security.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
N. Yu. Kudeyarova

Latin America is one of the high level migration activity regions. The mass migration flows are the part of the Western Hemisphere South nations history for more than a century and a half. Both the structure and direction of that flows have been significantly transformed during that period. While being the transatlantic flows recipients at the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX centuries, the Latin American States turned into donors of human resources in the second half of the XX century due to the profound demographic transformation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the demographic transformations impact on the emigration mobility models development in Latin America and the Caribbean countries. Demographic changes were manifested in different ways in countries with a large share of European migrants and those that were not affected by mass migrations flows at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries. The Central America countries and Mexico have experienced the most profound population explosion that subsequently affected the intensity of the migration movement to the United States. The paper examines the main migration directions of Latin America and the Caribbean residents, identifies two basic mobility source areas that demonstrate different strategies via different destination countries choice. While the United States has become the leading destination country for Latin American migrants, accounting for 93% of migrants from Central America and Mexico, the South American migration is mostly intraregional. The largest regional integration associations migration policies implementation reflects this difference. Spain has become a significant extra-regional migration destination for South America. At the end of the second decade of the XXI century, global economic transformations affect the migration dynamics of Latin American subregions, producing powerful migration crises and local tensions.


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