Wilfrid Sellars. Presupposing. The philosophical review, vol. 63 (1954), pp. 197–215. - P. F. Strawson. A reply to Mr. Sellars. The philosophical review, vol. 63 (1954), pp. 216–231. - Max Black. Presupposition and implication. Kagaku tetsugaku eno michi (A way to the philosophy of science), Essays in the philosophical analysis IV, edited by Seizi Uyeda, Waseda University Press, Tokyo1958, pp. 433–448. - Vergil H. Dykstra. Philosophers and presuppositions. Mind, n.s. vol. 69 (1960), pp. 63–68.

1960 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Dummett
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Philosophical Review

Introduction

Diagnosis ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Ashley Graham Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Clinical Diagnosis ◽  
Clinical Setting ◽  
Philosophy Of Medicine ◽  
Diagnostic Testing ◽  
Diagnostic Reasoning ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Practice Of Medicine

Philosophers have been writing about the practice of medicine for some time, but relatively little has been written about the practice of clinical diagnosis or the issues of evidence, ethics, and justice involved in this process. This introduction sets the stage for the philosophical analysis that takes place in the rest of the book, which combines methods of current philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine to address both issues in diagnostic reasoning and diagnostic testing in the clinical setting.

Achinstein on Semantic Relevance

1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-87
Author(s):  
Michael Martin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Semantic Relevance ◽  
Theory And Model

Crucial to Peter Achinstein's philosophy of science, as presented in Concepts of Science, is the concept of semantic relevance. First, the concept of semantic relevance is central to his analysis of definition and it is presupposed both in his analysis of the concepts of theory and model and in his critique of alternative analyses. Secondly, Achinstein's way of doing philosophy of science rests heavily on his analysis of semantic relevance. Philosophical analysis for Achinstein seems primarily to consist in specifying the use of certain terms. As we shall see, use and semantic relevance are, according to Achinstein, closely connected.Yet, despite the centrality of this concept in Achinstein's philosophy, I will argue that the concept has serious philosophical problems and that the use Achinstein makes of the concept is dubious. First, I will argue that the notion of semantic relevance inherits some of the traditional problems of analyticity as well as having problems of its own. In particular, I will show that given Achinstein's construal of semantic relevance it is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine the semantic relevance of a term. Secondly, I will maintain that given these problems, Achinstein is not in any way justified in using the notion of semantic relevance in his criticism of other philosophers' views and in the construction of his own.

scholarly journals Imagining Mechanisms with Diagrams

2019 ◽  
pp. 178-209
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sheredos ◽  
William Bechtel
Keyword(s):  
Circadian Rhythms ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Hypothetical Mechanism ◽  
Scientific Endeavor ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Circadian Biology

Philosophy of science has long focused on how scientists achieve successful explanations of a phenomenon. But much of scientific work is aimed at something more basic: successfully and coherently imagining how a phenomenon might be explained—for example, hypothesizing a mechanism that could possibly produce the phenomenon. This chapter examines the graphics and diagrams that scientists in the field of circadian biology have generated and used to externalize and stabilize their imaginative reasoning. In particular, it examines how scientists revise their graphics as they sharpen and constrain their imaginative construal of a hypothetical mechanism. This analysis examines published diagrams that reflect the community’s developing understanding of the mechanism responsible for circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria and zeroes in on unpublished graphics from a single lab as they developed one operation in the mechanism. The goal is to understand how circadian biologists rely on graphics to overcome the difficulties of imagining the complex working of hypothetical mechanisms over time. Throughout, the chapter emphasizes that pursuing imaginative success is a scientific endeavor governed by its own internal norms, distinct from the norms of successful explanation. The aim is to direct philosophical analysis to scientists’ imaginings and to encourage integrating this understudied dimension of scientific practice with traditional philosophical analysis of normativity in scientific practice.

scholarly journals From the traditional philosophy of science towards the contemporary philosophy of science

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-35
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Drastic Change ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Understanding Of Science ◽  
The Revolution

The aim of this paper is to present the character and reason of the drastic change in the understanding of science that happened in the twentieth century. To do this, author describes the main points of the traditional philosophy of science: then, he argues that reason of the revolution in the philosophy of science used to be the careful philosophical analysis of the great scientific revolutions from 1905. Finally, he concludes that the consequence of mentioned analysis was a number of antagonistic views being the contemporary philosophy of science. To give a monolitic and integral presentment of this philosophy, author enumerated and explained the points shared by the majority of contemporary philosophers of science. In brief, he describes the traditional philosophy of science, the reasons of its fall, and the main tenets of the contemporary philosophy of science.

Philosophical Analysis; Referents of Names

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Arbitrary Collection

Replacing empirical concepts with unicepts has implications both for philosophical methodology and for some central matters in philosophy of science, plilosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. This chapter gives illustrations that concern the fixing of referents of naming words in a public language, the method of philosophical analysis, referential constancy of names for theoretical objects over theory change, the distinction between so-called “observational concepts” and “theoretical concepts,” and last, so-called “theory of mind.” This is a somewhat arbitrary collection of apparent implications of embracing unicepts, but the discussions of the “observation-theory” distinction and of “theory of mind” will be needed when discussing both perception and the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

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