scholarly journals From the traditional philosophy of science towards the contemporary philosophy of science

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-35
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic

The aim of this paper is to present the character and reason of the drastic change in the understanding of science that happened in the twentieth century. To do this, author describes the main points of the traditional philosophy of science: then, he argues that reason of the revolution in the philosophy of science used to be the careful philosophical analysis of the great scientific revolutions from 1905. Finally, he concludes that the consequence of mentioned analysis was a number of antagonistic views being the contemporary philosophy of science. To give a monolitic and integral presentment of this philosophy, author enumerated and explained the points shared by the majority of contemporary philosophers of science. In brief, he describes the traditional philosophy of science, the reasons of its fall, and the main tenets of the contemporary philosophy of science.

TEME ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 845
Author(s):  
Katarina Tomašević ◽  
Sanela D Andrić ◽  
Srđan M Milašinović

Kun’s The structure of the scientific revolutions triggered the avalanche of criticism and represents the most conducive and most critical work of the sixties until the eighties of the twentieth century in which the problems of understanding scientific knowledge are discussed. The development of science was understood as a gradual process during which the stages of normal science and scientific revolutions are being shifted. Boldly, by introducing new concepts in the history of philosophy of science, he has received many opponents, but also many followers. In this paper, we tried to present Kun's understanding of the progress in the science and criticism of his greatest opponents, with a reference to the scientific revolutions in social sciences. We also tried to answer the question of whether the scientific revolutions have been depleted and what is happening with the objectivity of science.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-43
Author(s):  
Kyle Cavagnini

The twentieth century saw extended development in the philosophy of science to incorporate contemporary expansions of scientific theory and investigation. Richard Rorty was a prominent and rather controversial thinker who maintained that all progress, from social change to scientific inquiry, was achieved through the redescription of existing vocabularies. However, this theory fails to describe revolutionary scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm change, as first described in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, better portray this process. I attempt to show this by applying Kuhn’s and Rorty’s views to examples of scientific progress and comparing the results.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to answer the question is it possible to speak about some kind of Kantian turn in the transition from the traditional philosophy of science to the contemporary one. Second, and more important, to describe the main points of the new philosophy of science just through the discussion of above question. The author is of the opinion that it is possible to speak about Kantian turn in the new philosophy of science (the philosophy which underlines the role of an a priori and conventional conceptual framework), but he also indicates certain important differences between Kantian original position and the new philosophy of science.


Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.


Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger ◽  
Juha Saatsi

What is a scientific explanation? This has been a central question in philosophy of science at least since Hempel and Oppenheim’s pivotal attempt at an answer in 1948 (also known as the covering-law model of explanation; Hempel 1965: chapter 10). It is no surprise that this question has retained its place at the heart of contemporary philosophy of science, given that it is one of the sciences’ key aims to provide ...


Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations—and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 871-881
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Brooks

Transcendental arguments are not popular in contemporary philosophy of science. They are typically seen as antinaturalistic and incapable of providing explanatory force in accounting for natural phenomena. However, when viewed as providing (certain types of) intelligibility to complicated concepts used in scientific reasoning, a concrete and productive role is recoverable for transcendental reasoning in philosophy of science. In this article I argue that the resources, and possibly the need, for such a role are available within a thoroughly naturalistic framework garnered from the work of Hasok Chang and William Wimsatt.


Authorship ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Bonciarelli

The objective of this article is to analyze how or in what ways the most advanced visual experiments centred on “the book” as an object in the period between 1900 and 1930 in Italy, in particular in relation to the development of middlebrow literature. The article’s hypothesis is that the revolution brought about by Futurism soon touched on literature intended for a middlebrow reading public, attracted and interested by the paratextual presentation of the book and its physical aspects. This article focuses in particular on changes in page layout and on lettering games in paratextuality, to give a precise idea of how strong the thrust of Futurism was and how book design affected the visual culture of the beginning of the twentieth century in Italy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahid Rahman ◽  
Muhammad Iqbal

AbstractOne of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās, represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provides new epistemological insights into legal reasoning in general but also furnishes a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning which can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. However, in the present paper we will only discuss the case of so-called co-relational inferences of the occasioning factor and only in the context of Islamic jurisprudence.


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