Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca B. Morton
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Result ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Empirical Observation ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

One of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates. A solution is that candidates are ideological (have policy preferences). When candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences, then platform divergence is theoretically predicted. Experimental tests of the ideological model are presented. It is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences. However, candidate positions are more convergent, on average, than the theory predicts, suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment.

Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions

2019 ◽  
pp. 186-207
Author(s):  
James F. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Government Intervention ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Economic Dimension ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Voting Models ◽  
Western Democracies

This chapter broadly surveys spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions, where, in Western democracies, the first dimension is typically the left-right dimension pertaining to policy debates over income redistribution and government intervention in the economy. The second dimension may encompass policy debates over issues that cross-cut the left-right economic dimension, or it may encompass universally valued “valence” dimensions of party evaluation such as parties’ images for competence, integrity, and leadership ability. The chapter reviews models with office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. It also surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on these topics.

Measuring Voters’ Multidimensional Policy Preferences with Conjoint Analysis: Application to Japan’s 2014 Election

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusaku Horiuchi ◽  
Daniel M. Smith ◽  
Teppei Yamamoto
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Party Manifestos ◽  
Analysis Application ◽  
The Media ◽  
Election Results

Representative democracy entails the aggregation of multiple policy issues by parties into competing bundles of policies, or “manifestos,” which are then evaluated holistically by voters in elections. This aggregation process obscures the multidimensional policy preferences underlying a voter’s single choice of party or candidate. We address this problem through a conjoint experiment based on the actual party manifestos in Japan’s 2014 House of Representatives election. By juxtaposing sets of issue positions as hypothetical manifestos and asking respondents to choose one, our study identifies the effects of specific positions on the overall assessment of manifestos, heterogeneity in preferences among subgroups of respondents, and the popularity ranking of manifestos. Our analysis uncovers important discrepancies between voter preferences and the portrayal of the election results by politicians and the media as providing a policy mandate to the Liberal Democratic Party, underscoring the potential danger of inferring public opinion from election outcomes alone.

The Dynamics of Party Identification

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 957-973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Franklin ◽  
John E. Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Party Identification ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Issue Voting ◽  
Hierarchical Relationship ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Relative Proximity ◽  
Voting Models ◽  
Development And Evolution

This article presents a model of individuals' party identification that contrasts with previous models. Past models, with the few recent exceptions noted, assume a hierarchical relationship either from identification to other aspects of political behavior, such as the perception and evaluation of issues and candidates, or from these behaviors to party identifications. The model discussed here places party within a dynamic concept of the electoral process and tests several hypotheses about factors producing changes in identifications. The first factor, consistent with the spatial-type issue voting models, estimates the effects of the relative proximity of each party to the individual's own policy preferences. Second, we examine the effect of the actual voting decision on subsequent identifications, with the expectation that if votes differ from previous identifications, there is a resulting shift in partisanship. Finally, we examine the hypothesis that identifications become less susceptible to change as people age and accumulate political experience. When combined with other research, the results indicate a model of the electoral process in which party identifications are both influenced by circumstances specific to each election and influence other behaviors. This nonrecursive model has a number of implications for the development and evolution of individual and aggregate partisanship. These implications are discussed at the end of the article.

Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Rosenthal ◽  
Subrata Sen
Keyword(s):  
Fifth Republic ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

Pareto optimality in spatial voting models

1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Coughlin ◽  
T. R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

POLITICO-ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS EVOLUTION AND GROWTH

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prateek Goorha
Keyword(s):  
Economic Reform ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Learning Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Regime Transition ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Theoretical Frame ◽  
Economic Transitions ◽  
Voting Models

A theory that provides intuitive understanding of a process a s complex as simultaneous political regime transition and growth in economic income would be a valuable addition to Political Science. In this paper, I attempt to provide such an explanation by emplo ying simple insights from evolutionary game theory and developing their application to politico-economic transitions by borrowing freely from various other bodies of literature including economic growth, spatial voting models, and comparative politics. The result is a theoretical frame that comfortably deals with transition as a relatively smoother dynamic and provides some explanation for how regime transition might occur. It also provide's an example of a learning strategy for politicians, which generates the credibility required for successful economic reform and a rationale for democratization.

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