Heterogeneous preferences in multidimensional spatial voting models: Ideology and nationalism in Spain

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 136-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Rivero
Keyword(s):  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions

2019 ◽  
pp. 186-207
Author(s):  
James F. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Government Intervention ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Economic Dimension ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Voting Models ◽  
Western Democracies

This chapter broadly surveys spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions, where, in Western democracies, the first dimension is typically the left-right dimension pertaining to policy debates over income redistribution and government intervention in the economy. The second dimension may encompass policy debates over issues that cross-cut the left-right economic dimension, or it may encompass universally valued “valence” dimensions of party evaluation such as parties’ images for competence, integrity, and leadership ability. The chapter reviews models with office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. It also surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on these topics.

Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Rosenthal ◽  
Subrata Sen
Keyword(s):  
Fifth Republic ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

Pareto optimality in spatial voting models

1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Coughlin ◽  
T. R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

POLITICO-ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS EVOLUTION AND GROWTH

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prateek Goorha
Keyword(s):  
Economic Reform ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Learning Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Regime Transition ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Theoretical Frame ◽  
Economic Transitions ◽  
Voting Models

A theory that provides intuitive understanding of a process a s complex as simultaneous political regime transition and growth in economic income would be a valuable addition to Political Science. In this paper, I attempt to provide such an explanation by emplo ying simple insights from evolutionary game theory and developing their application to politico-economic transitions by borrowing freely from various other bodies of literature including economic growth, spatial voting models, and comparative politics. The result is a theoretical frame that comfortably deals with transition as a relatively smoother dynamic and provides some explanation for how regime transition might occur. It also provide's an example of a learning strategy for politicians, which generates the credibility required for successful economic reform and a rationale for democratization.

scholarly journals Evaluating dimensionality in spatial voting models

1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (8-9) ◽  
pp. 85-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith T. Poole ◽  
Fallaw B. Sowell ◽  
Stephen E. Spear
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca B. Morton
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Result ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Empirical Observation ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Voting Models

One of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates. A solution is that candidates are ideological (have policy preferences). When candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences, then platform divergence is theoretically predicted. Experimental tests of the ideological model are presented. It is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences. However, candidate positions are more convergent, on average, than the theory predicts, suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment.

Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 929-937 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Kollman ◽  
John H. Miller ◽  
Scott E. Page
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Adaptive Behavior ◽  
Search Algorithms ◽  
Computer Search ◽  
Complex Issue ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Voting Models ◽  
Issue Space

We develop a model of two-party spatial elections that departs from the standard model in three respects: parties' information about voters' preferences is limited to polls; parties can be either office-seeking or ideological; and parties are not perfect optimizers, that is, they are modelled as boundedly rational adaptive actors. We employ computer search algorithms to model the adaptive behavior of parties and show that three distinct search algorithms lead to similar results. Our findings suggest that convergence in spatial voting models is robust to variations in the intelligence of parties. We also find that an adaptive party in a complex issue space may not be able to defeat a well-positioned incumbent.

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