Rawls's “Political” Philosophy and American Democracy

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political System ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Culture

John Rawls has recently argued that political philosophy can significantly contribute to making democratic societies stable. He seeks moral principles that can ground what he calls an overlapping consensus and argues that his well-known principles of justice can serve in this capacity. I criticize both Rawls's general claims about the role of political philosophy and his particular defense of the principles of justice. Both arguments commit Rawls to specific empirical claims about existing liberal societies that are highly questionable. In particular, the Kantian moral views that Rawls believes to be central to liberal culture are controverted by extensive empirical research on the actual beliefs of liberal citizens. Despite the problems with Rawls's arguments, I suggest that a rather different overlapping consensus appears to contribute to stable democracies. This centers on support of the political system rather than more substantive moral principles.

Political Constructivism in Rawls's Political Liberalism

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Liberal Pluralism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Simpler Method

In Political Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of “political constructivism” to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an “overlapping consensus.” Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's “political” philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The “method of convergence” would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

Introduction

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 53-60
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Practice ◽  
The World ◽  
Ideal Standards ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Ideal

What is the relation between political theory and political practice? In what ways can political philosophy help people to address real injustices in the world? John Rawls argues that an important role of political philosophy is to identify the ideal standards of justice at which we should aim in political practice. Other philosophers challenge this approach, arguing that Rawls’s idealizations are not useful as a guide for action or, worse, that they are an impediment to addressing actual injustices in the world. They argue, instead, that political philosophy ought to be focused on theorizing about the elimination of existing injustice. Still others argue that principles of justice should be identified without any constraint concerning the possibility of implementation or regulation in the real world at all....

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 171-174
Author(s):  
Timothy Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Economic Fairness ◽  
Children's Interests ◽  
Good Environment

The central arguments of this book have been that children are owed a good environment in which to grow up and that adults are owed the stable and supported right to care for children if they so desire. In Part I, I explored how to conceptualize children’s justice and how to measure whether children’s interests are being met by their society. I showed why children’s interests cannot be understood in terms of holding a set of resources, even if resources are understood in a very broad sense. When the subject of justice is understood to be adults, then it makes sense that the role of principles of justice simply be giving each person their fair share. This was the perspective taken by the two most influential liberal thinkers of the last century, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. I suggested their approach cannot cope with the needs of children, since children might have a fair share of economic resources yet grow up socialized into beliefs, values and practices that are harmful to their current and future flourishing. A theory of justice must, therefore, take holistic account of the various ways in which upbringing might affect a person’s life, thus looking at its effects on children’s well-being. To meet this challenge, I offered an objective list account of children’s well-being which suggested that this is principally driven by the quality of their relationships with others. This theoretical shift implies a reconceptualization of what justice is about. Instead of justice being understood primarily as economic fairness, it must be seen as fundamentally about creating a society with norms and practice which foster flourishing interpersonal relationships, with a particular concern for the least advantaged children whose interests must be given priority....

Enquête sur le rapport des journalistes à la démocratie : le rôle de médiateur en question

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Gingras
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Active Role ◽  
The Political ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Media ◽  
Selection Of

Résumé.Dans ce texte, nous tentons d'évaluer le rôle sociopolitique des journalistes en posant les éléments fondamentaux d'une conceptualisation du rôle des médias en démocratie et en analysant les résultats d'une recherche empirique sur l'engagement des journalistes envers la démocratie menée de l'été 2008 au printemps 2010. Notre étude prend appui sur la dichotomie entre un rôle actif des médias et un rôle instrumental face au système politique, dichotomie que nous faisons porter sur les journalistes. Nous prétendons que les médias et les journalistes jouent le rôle de « médiateurs » dans les sociétés libérales, c'est-à-dire d'agents individuels ou collectifs par qui transitent des messages explicites ou implicites; ces agents ajoutent une couche de sens par diverses méthodes dont la sélection des nouvelles, la hiérarchisation des sujets ou le cadrage de personnes ou d'événements.Abstract.This paper aims to assess the sociopolitical role of journalists through a conceptual approach linking media and democracy and through an analysis of the data resulting from an investigation of journalists' commitment to democracy that was conducted from the summer of 2008 to the spring of 2010. Our study is founded on the dichotomy between an active role for the media and an instrumental one in the face of the political system, and this dichotomy is applied to journalists. We believe that the media and journalists function as “mediators” in liberal societies, that is, as individual or collective agents through whom explicit or implicit messages pass; these agents add a layer of signification by diverse methods, among which are the selection of news, the categorization of issues or the framing of individuals or events.

Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labor

1987 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 139-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sibyl Schwarzenbach
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Gender Roles ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Reproductive Labor ◽  
The Real ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Principles Of Justice

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.

On Choosing a Morality1

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. B. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Similar Strategy ◽  
Principles Of Justice

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice.

scholarly journals What Is the Point of Justice?

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW MASON
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Conflicting answers to the question of what principles of justice are for may generate very different ways of theorizing about justice. Indeed divergent answers to it are at the heart of G. A. Cohen's disagreement with John Rawls. Cohen thinks that the roots of this disagreement lie in the constructivist method that Rawls employs, which mistakenly treats the principles that emerge from a procedure that involves factual assumptions as ultimate principles of justice. But I argue that even if Rawls were to abandon his constructivism, and to accept Cohen's argument that ultimate principles of justice are not grounded directly in any facts, their divergent views concerning the proper role of principles of justice would lead them to different conclusions. I contend that even if ultimate principles of justice are not directly grounded in any facts, the role that principles of justice are needed to play may mean that their justification depends upon facts about what is feasible and facts about what is burdensome to people. Contrary to what Cohen maintains, being dependent on the facts in this manner does not preclude a principle from being ultimate; nor do principles which have this sort of dependence on the facts necessarily combine justice with other values in a way that must lead to conflation.

Keynes, Rawls, Uncertainty, and the Liberal Theory of the State

1988 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward McKenna ◽  
Maurice Wade ◽  
Diane Zannoni
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The State ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Government

What role, if any, should the government perform in a society? Two very different answers to this question have been provided by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. For Rawls, the government plays an important role in ensuring that the principles of justice are realized in the workings of society. For Nozick (1974), the role of government is limited to that of providing protection. The debate over these two views has led to the questioning of the entire liberal doctrine, a questioning that has taken place not only within intellectual circles, but also within the society at large.

Ethics, Market, and the Federal Order. The Political Philosophy of Wilhelm Röpke

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Lottieri
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Third Way ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Institutional Competition ◽  
Cultural Conservatism ◽  
Liberal Humanism ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

AbstractThe moral and political philosophy of Wilhelm Röpke is among the finest instances of European classical liberalism in the twentieth century, and in many occasions he stated that only a society which understands the importance of markets can be reconciled with human dignity. Röpke elaborated a political theory that focused on the harmony between moral principles and economic law. In this sense, his liberalism is unique not only because it defends private property and competition as pillars of a thriving economy, but above all that it provides the preconditions of a society that can remain secure from the immorality of despotism and subsequent ethical degeneration. To that end he upheld an economic order based on voluntary cooperation as the basis for a more humane society, emphasizing the role of institutional competition and federalism. Röpke’s cultural conservatism should not therefore be misunderstood, as it is very much connected with his defense of the essential role of property. It is only in this sense that he found in liberal humanism a third way, which is not however situated halfway between the market and socialism, but which represents instead a defense of a competitive society that is aware of its own historical and cultural basis.

scholarly journals IN WHAT SENSE MUST POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BE POLITICAL?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 155-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Narrow View ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Evaluation ◽  
The Right

Abstract:Political philosophy appears to have recovered from its alleged death in the middle of the last century, but now faces the realist charge that in the work of John Rawls and those influenced by him it fails to be political in the right way; it is merely “applied moral philosophy.” I dismiss the hyper-realist position of authors such as Raymond Geuss for taking an implausibly narrow view of politics. There is more merit in Bernard Williams’s claim that legitimacy, not justice, is the central problem of political philosophy. Yet we cannot understand the significance of legitimation without referring to the moral values that are realized when it succeeds. Thus, Williams fails to show that political normativity can be detached entirely from ethics. Moreover the legitimacy requirements of a liberal state, according to Williams, are substantively close to the requirements of justice according to Rawls. In light of the latter’s turn to “political liberalism,” they appear also to hold convergent views about the status of the theories they are advancing. I conclude by suggesting that the “applied moral philosophy” charge would apply only to philosophers who believe that general moral principles, like utility or rights, can do all the work of political evaluation. Politics does indeed have special features that impose distinctive justificatory requirements on its procedures and the outcomes they produce.

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